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"BY THE DAWN'S EARLY LIGHT:" THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE STILL STANDS AFTER
THE 2000 SUPREME COURT TERM (COMMERCE
CLAUSE, DELEGATION, AND TAKINGS)
Maria E. Mansfield*
I. INTRODUCTION
To a certain extent, the modem environmental regulatory regime in
the United States depends on the viability of the "administrative state," a
term some use with admiration and others with disdain. To attempt a
neutral definition, the "administrative state" is simply the ability of Con-
gress to address problems by providing nation-wide guidance, through
delegated authority, to a federal agency with expertise. In order to enable
such a regulatory tack to be laudatory, the process must be consistent
with the ideals of our nation, which include accountability and individual
liberty. Therefore, it is not surprising that the three cases the Supreme
Court decided in the 2000 term with an environmental "tinge" dealt with
Commerce Clause jurisdiction,1 the nondelegation doctrine,2 and takings
jurisprudence,3 all of which have implications that are at the heart of the
"administrative state." These cases are also identifiably "environmental"
because environmental statutes were at issue in each of them.
The "administrative state" survived this year's Supreme Court term.
Although the environmental community might breathe a sigh of relief
about "what might have been" had the Supreme Court decided to use
heavy artillery, it might reflect that the EPA's ozone standard cannot be
implemented in non-attainment areas4 and the Corps of Engineers has
been found to have no jurisdiction over certain isolated waters.5 The Court
* Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs., 531 U.S. 159
(2001).
2. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., Inc., 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001).
3. Palazzolo v. R.L, 121 S. CL 2448 (2001).
4. Am. Trucking, 121 S. CL at 919. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals had found that
EPA's use of PM, as the indicator for coarse particulate matter was arbitrary and capri-
cious. Am. Trucking Assns., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C.
Cir. 1999), on rehearing, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), affd in part, rev'd in part, 121 S. Ct.
903 (2001). No one brought this issue to the Supreme Court.
5. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 174.
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did not blast these regulations to smithereens on constitutional grounds,
but as a "minimalist" Court, it invalidated these regulations on basic statu-
tory interpretation grounds.6 Twice, the Supreme Court found that an
agency interpretation of a statute was erroneous.7 In so doing, the Court
camouflages its activism and its antagonism to some aspects of the admin-
istrative state.
The Court had to face the Constitutional issues in the takings case
because that case did not involve interpretation of a federal statute. The
Supreme Court did not, however, require the over-use of a checkbook in a
manner that would necessarily impede environmental regulation. In fact,
the Court did not find a denial of a permit to be either a categorical taking
or a compensable taking on other grounds.s In the process, however, it re-
jected a per se rule on the impact of a regulation at land acquisition on a
landowner's reasonable investment-backed expectations; the existence of
the regulation on that date does not make the regulation a part of back-
ground property rights and therefore foreclose the possibility of a taking.
The regulation, however, could affect such expectations. 9
This Article examines these three cases in historical perspective and
assesses their impact on the administrative state. First, however, Section
II addresses the need for the administrative state in the environmental
arena. When this is completed, Section III looks at the Solid Waste case,
exploring its impact from the vantage points of both Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence and commentary on statutory interpretation. The case has
not moved commerce clause jurisdiction significantly from its current
status, except by intimating future reviews of environmental statutes may
be more rigorous. The statutory interpretation evinced by the majority,
however, is revealed as shallow and manipulative. Section IV of the Article
provides a similar analysis of American Trucking. This discussion explains
why no one seems to be reviving a strong non-delegation program. It also
examines whether American Trucking has changed standards of judicial re-
view of agency action and concludes that it does not. Section V considers
the last case, Palazzolo. Again, the Supreme Court does not offer clarion
guidance on takings, but gives Delphic hints of what might come. The Ar-
ticle, therefore, concludes that the administrative state still is intact, but
smoke from the bombardment may deter aggressive environmental action.
6. The term "minimalist" is used in the sense employed by Cass R. Sunstein. See gen-
erally Cass Sunstein, One Case at at Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Harv.
U. Press 1990).
7. Once because the agency violated the clear meaning of a statute, Solid Waste, 531
U.S. at 172-74, and once because the agency interpretation of an unclear statute was un-
reasonable, Am. 'Ducking, 121 S. Ct. at 918-19.
8. Pallazzolo, 121 U.S. at 2464-65.
9. Id. at 2464. The Court also concurred that there was no categorical taking because
the remaining upland portion of the land could be developed and yield a more than nomi-
nal value. Because the plaintiffs had not raised the issue below, the Court declined to en-
ter an opinion on whether the property affected was the wetland area alone. Id. at 2465.
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Changing the metaphor from war, but still clinging to the star-spangled
banner, one could say that the cases reveal some threads are dangling
from these doctrinal flags.
II. CONTOURS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Under the current regime of environmental law, much guidance
comes from the federal government, as either federal agencies or state
agencies enforce the standards contained in federal statutes. This focus
on administrative action, especially federal, was not always the norm. In
the past, state and local governments determined what environmental pro-
tection there would be.'0 The effects of pollution were treated as local for
two reasons. First, neighbors were believed to primarily suffer the costs
from a particular polluting entity. Second, the benefits of the activity, be it
a desired product or a job base, also generally were distributed locally.
Therefore, most believed state common law or statutory law to be the best
venue to balance the costs and benefits of the activity. Eventually, this
perspective changed.
Before the change, however, the common law was the primary arbiter
of disputes. Property and tort law provide at least four possible causes of
action. First, trespass could be alleged if pollutants actually land on the
plaintiffs property. Second, nuisance laws protect one party's use of prop-
erty from another's unreasonable use of their property even without a
physical intrusion. A third tort, that of negligence, also could come into
play if the offending activity violates a duty of care to another. Finally, if
activities are "ultra-hazardous," they could engender liability for damages
to others despite the participant's lack of negligence.
Tort law, nevertheless, could not and cannot readily address all
environmental claims.' One problem is proving causation. It might be
easy to trace particles of coal dust to a factory if only one factory is present
in a town, but if numerous factories spew particulate matter into the air,
determining the proper defendant becomes more difficult. Additionally, it
is easy to prove that the offending coal dust dirtied laundry hanging in a
backyard, but harder to prove that the dust caused a particular illness in a
particular plaintiff. It is even more difficult to prove that in the future the
coal dust would cause a particular illness. Moreover, in addition to these
problems proving causation, tort law often examines the benefits of the de-
fendant's activity; strict liability is the exception, not the norm.'2 With
10. The following four paragraphs were adapted from Maria E. Mansfield, Energy Policy:
The Reel World Cases And Materials on Resources, Energy, and Environmental Law 394-95
(Carolina Academic Press 2001).
11. J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of
Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1407, 1454-56
(1996) (nuisance was the beginning of environmental law, but the doctrine could not evolve
sufficiently to continue its central role).
12. For example, nuisance law directly compares the plaintiffs harm with the harm that
would occur if the defendant were forced to forego its activity. Similarly, negligence often
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neighbors profiting from jobs, a plaintiff might fight a lonely uphill battle to
stop the activity the plaintiff found believed to be damaging.
Therefore, state and local governments could and did employ their po-
lice powers, which allow them to moderate private activities and protect
public welfare and health, and supplemented private tort action. One im-
portant avenue for this type of intervention is through zoning laws, which
can separate industrial areas from residential ones. Boards of health at
the state and local level also might act in some instances. Beyond legisla-
tive or regulatory activities, public nuisance actions could be brought un-
der common law and under various statutes. These actions would seek
abatement of activities that affect many and spare the cost of individual
suits.
Despite the presence of state and common law remedies, however, be-
ginning after World War II and culminating in the 1970s, Congress began
to address the problems of pollution on a national level. '* For example, the
evolution of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") is instructive.14 As constituted
before 1972, the CWA's goal was setting quality standards and, essentially,
it was a zoning statute. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972 changed the federal program from one that simply sought
quality standards to one that allowed for national effluent limitations and
enforcement mechanisms to reach the standards. To understand the CWA
as set up in 1972, one must first examine the types of sources of water pol-
lution.
There is a dichotomy in regard to sources in the Clean Water Act. The
CWA looks at "point sources" and "non-point sources" of pollution. Point
sources are discrete dischargers of effluent. A traditional point source
would be a pipe entering a water body, but point sources do not need
pipes. Point sources, because they are discrete, are amenable to technol-
ogy. A technological "fix" could control the problem before the pollutants
have a chance to enter water. Non-point sources of pollutants are those
that create pollution in a dispersed, non-discrete manner. Non-point
sources are more land-use based. Examples include urban run-off, agri-
cultural cropping practices, forestry practices such as clear cutting, logging
road construction, and atmospheric disposition of pollutants such as
PCB's. To address non-point sources of pollution requires meshing local,
state, and federal land use planning.
The 1972 Amendments initiated two major changes in the now-
deemed "comprehensive" Act. First, it legislated a new goal; the goal of no
requires an element of unreasonable activity on the part of the defendant; if the offending
factory is meeting all industry standards and there is no alternative technology, its owners
might not be guilty of negligence.
13. The following four paragraphs were adapted from Mansfield, supra, n. 10, at 401-02.
14. It was not until the 1977 Amendments that the act was named the Clean Water Act,
but for ease of reference the major federal water pollution control legislation will be called
the CWA. It is currently codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
208 [Vol. 37:205
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 37 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss1/6
BY THE DAWN'S EARLY LIGHT
pollution discharge substituted for the earlier goal of calibrating discharges
to water use. Basically, it is illegal to discharge effluent into the waters of
the United States from a point source without a NPDES permit (National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System). In addition to changing the Act's
goal, another big change in the 1972 Act was that the federal government
takes a front seat in regulation. A state may "drive" - that is, may permit
discharges and enforce the Act's provisions - but only if the state has an
approved program. This is the co-operative federalism model popular in
the 1970s. The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), however, sets
the effluent limitations on discharges. These limits are uniform nationally
for the same type of source, but the limits vary from point source type to
point source type. The effluent limitations are geared to what is possible
for each type of point source to achieve. 5
If the federal goverment is to have the ability to intervene in such a
manner, of course, there must be an enumerated power. The ability to
"regulate Commerce... among the several States," 6 the so-called Com-
merce Clause, is the obvious choice. In the Clean Water Act setting, not
only does some water flow interstate or form a part of a navigable net-
work,'7 but also the impacts of pollution may be felt in interstate com-
merce. As the Supreme Court stated in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
and Reclamation Association, Inc.:18  "[W]e agree with the lower federal
courts that have uniformly found the power conferred by the Commerce
Clause broad enough to permit congressional regulation of activities caus-
ing air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have
effects in more than one State." 1 Moreover, each state may fear to indi-
vidually regulate its industry for fear that it would suffer a commercial dis-
advantage. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining again instructs on the need for
federal action: "The prevention of this sort of destructive interstate compe-
tition is a traditional role for congressional action under the Commerce
Clause."20
For environmental law, therefore, Commerce Clause jurisdiction to
enact national law is the first building block of the "administrative state."
Although the main statutes have been upheld, issues emerge at the indi-
vidual regulation or application.2 If jurisdiction is confirmed, the next
15. The CWA has a 2-tier system of technology-based effluent limitations. The effluent
limitations require levels of treatment and restrict quantities, rates, and concentrations of
chemical, physical, biological, or other constituents of a discharge. The limits supplement
existing water quality standards set by a state. The required permit will tell the level of ef-
fluent discharge allowed.
16. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17. Protection of navigation was one of the first recognized federal duties. Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
18. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
19. Id. at 282.
20. Id. at 282.
21. See infra Sections III.B. and III.D.2. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 492-94 (4th
Cir. 2000) (prohibition of acts on private property that would "take" a red wolf even if the
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building block that Congress must have is a way of executing the laws. To
do so, Congress creates an agency.
The administrative system Congress creates provides three essential
elements to complete the lawmaking Congress began pursuant to the Con-
22stitution. First, agencies offer additional expertise. They can transform
policy into particular requirements for particular situations in order to
meet goals. Second, the agency provides a mechanism for enforcement.
Finally, the rules and agency precedent interpreting the rules may provide
remedies for those who believe that agency personnel are not complying
with the law. There is a definite practical justification for agencies even if
they are not mentioned in the Constitution.
Nevertheless, for a time earlier in the century there was some doubt
as to whether Congress could delegate lawmaking authority to an agency.
Additionally, the appropriate role model for an agency has gone through
several incarnations.23 First, concern over the ability to delegate legislative
power lead to a requirement that legislation contain standards that would
guide the agency. 2 4 One way of describing the resulting agency was that
the agency should be a "transmission belt," and simply implement policy
Congress denominated.
During the New Deal, another model of an agency gained credence.
During this period, there was more faith in agency expertise. New Dealers
believed an agency could reach an abstract "public interest" if left alone.
Therefore, they desired to insulate an agency from central policy control by
giving an agency discretion. In this era, statutes were not stricken as be-
ing unlawful delegations of legislative power. Additionally, it was deemed
desirable to isolate the agency from even executive control and further to
limit judicial oversight. If there were few standards in the legislation, it
would be difficult for a court to find an agency "arbitrary and capricious."
Many, however, saw the New Deal model leading to agencies that were
.captured" by industry, and unresponsive to new needs. Agencies were la-
beled "arrogant," and this disenchantment solidified to a certain extent
with the environmental movement. Many stopped believing in an objective
.public interest" and stopped considering expertise to be a savior.
The resulting third model of administrative law is referred to as the
same were re-introduced to historic range was valid); NatL Assn. of Home Builders v. Bab-
bitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1041-57 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (ESA take provision as applied to an endan-
gered fly found only in California was within Commerce Clause), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937
(1998).
22. The following five paragraphs were adapted from Mansfield, supran. 10, at 31-32.
23. For an excellent history of administrative models, albeit with different labels, see
Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith in
Pragmatic Government, 48 U. Kan. L. Rev. 689 (2000); Mark Siedenfeld, A Syncopated
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of
Statutes, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 83, 88-93 (1994).
24. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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25
"public interest representation" model. Under it, agencies provide an al-
temative forum to balance and weigh interests. Therefore, all parties must
have access to the decision-making. Agencies are thus surrogate legisla-
tures taking the place of a Congress that failed to make hard choices. Un-
der this model, courts more actively enforce rights to participate. Adher-
ents would applaud decentralized and open decision-making.
Finally, a fourth movement seemed to be afoot in the eighties and
nineties, which may be referred to as a "post modem" view. This model of
an agency reflects some characteristics of the first two eras. Reliance on
agency expertise and deference to the agency may be prevalent, but there
is also a resurgence of separation of powers analysis, which may require
Congress to legislate with more detail. Since the New Deal, the law has
stated that, in theory, so long as there is an "intelligible principle," Con-
gress may make a delegation to the executive. Conventional wisdom might
say the question had been decided and that such delegations could occur
with minimal guidance. Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, in past concur-
ring opinions, argued to invalidate laws under the nondelegation theory.
2 6
The issue reasserted itself when the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
remanded a regulation promulgated under the Clean Air Act to the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency. The Court required the agency to define its
statutory command in a manner that would limit the unlawful discretion
the statute provided. 7
The last portion of the "administrative state" the Supreme Court con-
sidered in the 2000 term was a Fifth Amendment restraint, namely, that
"private property [not] be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion."2 The provision is hard to classify as procedural or substantive. It
does not forbid a government from taking property so long as it is for a
public use, but the Amendment provides another prerequisite before the
appropriation can proceed.2 9 Just compensation must be paid. This re-
quirement could be deemed a procedural requirement to substantively
compensate. However, in some instances, compensation may be prohibi-
tive and therefore the Fifth Amendment constraints could end up defeating
the governmental program.
This latter situation is not much of an issue when a government af-
firmatively and physically requisitions land or property. The government
25. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 1669 (1975).
26. See e.g. Indus. Union Dept. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
27. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038.
28. U.S. Const amend. V.
29. Of course, as with all governmental action, the program the government forwards
must be within the government's authority. For the federal government, this means that if
a statute is involved, it must be within one of the enumerated Congressional powers. If a
regulation is at issue, it must meet this test plus be within the statutory authorization of
the agency. The question of authority is perhaps easier on the state level; the program
simply must be within the state's police power.
20011 211
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generally budgets for acquisitions before it proceeds. Compensation ren-
dering a program infeasible more often rears its head in the setting of so-
called "regulatory takings." In this situation, the private party alleges that
a governmental regulation so impedes that party's ability to use private
property that it has, in effect, "taken" the property away. An 1887 case
boldly stated "[a] prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes
that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals,
or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking
or an appropriation of property for the public benefit."30 In 1922, a second
famous case, Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon,31 changed the land-
scape without overruling Mugler. In it, Justice Holmes declared: 'The gen-
eral rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain ex-
tent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 2 Although
still an ad hoc factual matter, the test later more openly balanced several
factors in the "too far" equation when income-producing property was at
issue: 1) the character of the government action; 2) the economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant; and 3) the interference, if any, with invest-
ment-backed expectations.33
In 1992, the Supreme Court decided a case that purported to give
some additional guidance. 4 In Lucas, the Court stated that any regulation
that fell into the following categories would be a taking: 1) if it created a
permanent physical intrusion on real property; or 2) if it denied all eco-
nomical use of property.35 The second category of automatic takings would
not apply if the limitation "inhere[d] in the title itself, in the restrictions
that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance al-
ready place upon land ownership."36 If the law simply duplicated a restric-
tion on private property development, such as nuisance law or the public
trust doctrine, it would not be a taking. Several questions, however, re-
mained. For example, it is not clear how to define the "property" impacted
by the regulation, a necessary predicate to ascertaining if the regulation
denied "all" economically viable use. Nor is it clear what restrictions, other
than the common law restriction on nuisances, provide the background
principles of law tempering the "right" of private landowners to do as they
might please. The Supreme Court had the opportunity to explicate the
contours of the second category of automatic taking this term.
The Supreme Court therefore considered three of the main building
blocks of the administration state in these cases. The results could have
redefined environmental law as well as other regulatory regimes.
30. Mugler v. Kan., 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
31. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
32. Id. at 415.
33. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
34. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
35. I& at 1015.
36. Id. at 1029.
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III. COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: SOLID WASTE
The federal government is not the repository of a general police power.
Therefore, Congress needs an enumerated power to legislate. Generally,
the Commerce Clause is invoked to justify environmental legislation.37 The
Clean Water Act ("CWA")38 is one such law. In Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps. of Engineers,3 9 ["Solid
Waste"], the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a rule the
Corps of Engineers promulgated under the CWA went beyond what the
Commerce Clause authorizes. The Supreme Court, however, finessed the
issue: it invalidated the regulation as not being within Congress's statutory
grant of authority to the Corps. Five members of the Court joined the deci-
sion, with four Justices dissenting.
A. Background of the Case
1. Regulatory and Factual Milieu
In 1972, Congress significantly revamped the CWA. One provision,
Section 404(a),40 gives the Corps of Engineers the authority to issue per-
mits "for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters
at specified disposal sites."41 The purpose of this provision, as well as the
entire Act, was to create a comprehensive response to problems of water
pollution.42 The reach of the regulatory program is connected to the scope
of the words "navigable waters."43 Congress included a definition of this
crucial phrase in the CWA; "navigable waters" are "the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas."44 The Solid Waste Agency of North-
ern Cook County ("SWANCC") ran into the regulatory arena of the Corps
when it sought to develop a site as a landfill.
The SWANCC is a governmental corporation comprised of a consor-
tium of municipalities seeking a landfill site. The SWANCC acquired a
533-acre parcel on which to place a "balefill" trash repository.45 The Su-
preme Court described the area in a perfunctory manner as "an aban-
doned sand and gravel pit in northern Illinois which provides habitat for
37. Some legislation may be authorized by other provisions, such as the Property Clause
(U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2) or the Spending power (U.S.Const. art. I, § 8, ci. 1).
38. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
39. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994).
41. Id.
42. The CWA's avowed purpose is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
43. Naturally, questions about reach of the CWA and the definition of "navigable waters"
are not isolated to the dredge and fill permit program. The basic requirement to have a
permit before the discharge of a pollutant is predicated on the discharge being into naviga-
ble waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994).
45. A balefill landfill has the trash formed into bales before it is deposited.
2001] 213
9
Mansfield: By the Dawn's Early Light: The Administrative State Still Stands
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
migratory birds. "4 6  Given this decidedly non-rhapsodic description, one
might discount any "natural" delights in the area. The words of the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, evoke a seemingly different locale:
Approximately 298 acres of the proposed balefll site [which is 410 acres]
is what is known as an early successional stage forest. At one time, it was
a strip mine, but when the mining operation shut down approximately fifty
years ago, a labyrinth of trenches and other depressions remained behind.
Over time, the land evolved into an attractive woodland vegetated by ap-
proximately 170 different species of plants. What were once gravel pits are
now over 200 permanent and seasonal ponds. These ponds range from
less than one-tenth of an acre to several acres in size, and from several
inches to several feet in depth. The forest is also home to a variety of
small animals. Most important for our purposes are the 100-plus species
of birds that have been observed there. These include many endangered,
water-dependent, and migratory birds. Among the species that have been
seen nesting, feeding, or breeding at the site are mallard ducks, wood
ducks, Canada geese, sandpipers, kingfishers, water thrushes, swamp
swallows, redwinged blackbirds, tree swallows, and several varieties of
herons. Most notably, the site is a seasonal home to the second-largest
breeding colony of great blue herons in northeastern Illinois, with ap-
proximately 192 nests in 1993.47
Before the "balefill" could open on this land, however, approximately 17.6
acres of ponds and small lakes had to be filled in. The SWANCC therefore
contacted the Corps of Engineers, both about its originally owned land and
a second time about additional acreage it had purchased.
The first two times, the Corps of Engineers responded that it did not
have jurisdiction over the area. Each time, the Corps based its decision on
the fact that there were no "wetlands or lakes" as defined in its regula-
48tions. On July 8, 1987, there was a third request that the Corps examine
its jurisdiction. The Illinois Nature Preserves Commission, a state agency,
wrote to the Corps detailing use of the property by four different migratory
species.49 This necessitated a reassessment of whether SWANCC would
need a permit for its fill. The Corps concluded that it did, employing a dif-
46. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 162. Chief Justice Rehnquist also gave a more lengthy de-
scription: "Long since abandoned, the old mining site eventually gave way to a successional
stage forest, with its remnant excavation trenches evolving into a scattering of permanent
and seasonal ponds of varying size (from under one-tenth of an acre to several acres) and
depth (from several inches to several feet)." Id. at 163.
47. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs., 191 F.3d 845,
848 (7th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
48. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs., 998 F. Supp.
946, 948 (N.D. II. 1998), affd, 191 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 531 U.S. 159
(2001). Wetlands are lands "that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at
a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do
support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.
Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas." 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(b) (2001).
49. Solid Waste, 998 F. Supp. at 948-49.
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ferent analysis of jurisdiction. The prior examinations centered on whether
or not the area was a "wetland," one potential source of jurisdiction. The
Corps now concentrated on another aspect of its definition of "waters of the
United States."
In 1977, the Corps finalized regulations defining the term "waters of
the United States" to include "waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,
streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands,
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the
use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign
commerce.. . ."5 Naturally, this regulation itself was not crystal-clear,
especially in determining what "could affect interstate or foreign com-
merce." In a preamble to re-codification of the regulation, the Corps pro-
vided some guidance, declaring that its jurisdiction would extend to intra-
state waters:
a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory
Bird Treaties; or
b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which
cross state lines; or
c. Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species; or
51d. Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.
This last guidance is colloquially referred to as the "Migratory Bird
Rule. "52 As a result of its consideration of the evidence, the Corps
then required the SWANCC to apply for a Section 404 permit. The
two applications it submitted for approval were denied.
53
2. Lower Court Dispositions
In the District Court suit that followed, the SWANCC attacked the de-
nial of the permit both in the particular and the abstract. The particular
argument was that the denial was arbitrary and capricious. District Judge
Lindberg, however, disagreed, finding that the evidence was sufficient in
the administrative record, which included two environmental impact re-
ports. The crucial determination was that the land was suitable habitat for
50. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2001).
51. 51 Fed. Reg. 41217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
52. The Corps considered the rule to be an interpretive rule, which simply gave examples
of what might be "intrastate water" that could affect interstate or foreign commerce. There-
fore, it was not promulgated with notice-and-comment. The District Court concurred with
this analysis. Solid Waste, 998 F. Supp. at 955-57. The Seventh Circuit concurred. Solid
Waste, 191 F.3d at 852. This issue was not included in the grant of certiorari. The Fourth
Circuit had held the opposite and found that the Corps had not properly promulgated the
rule. Tabb Lakes, Ltd v. U.S., 715 F. Supp. 726, 728-29 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd, 885 F.2d
866 (4th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
53. Solid Waste, 998 F. Supp. at 949.
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migratory birds. 4 The more general or abstract arguments were that the
Migratory Bird Rule should not be applied because it was 1) beyond the
scope of the authority authorized by the CWA, 2) even if so authorized, be-
yond the scope of the Commerce Clause, and 3) invalid for not having been
promulgated with notice and comment as the Administrative Procedure
Act 5 requires. The District Court opinion rejected all the arguments
In an opinion by Judge Wood, a unanimous panel of the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed. The opinion first considered whether the Commerce Clause
was sufficiently broad to confer jurisdiction on intrastate waters based on
the presence of migratory birds. The court quickly assessed the pre-Lopez
jurisprudence as allowing such an assertion of jurisdiction.5 7 It then noted
that Lopez repeated the premise that Commerce Clause jurisdiction ex-
tended to three areas: "(1) regulation of the channels of interstate com-
merce; (2) regulation or protection of the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; or (3) regulation of
activities that 'substantially affect' interstate commerce."58 The Lopez case
invalidated a federal statute that made it a crime to possess a gun in a
school zone. 59 This Act, according to the Supreme Court, could only in
60theory be justified under the third category of Commerce Clause power.
If valid, the Migratory Bird Rule would have to take this same avenue.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Migratory Bird Rule could
navigate this road successfully. Unlike the Gun Free School Zone Act, the
Migratory Bird Rule could rely on aggregating the affect on interstate com-
merce of the numerous intrastate waters that could support migratory
birds. As the court stated, "The effect may not be observable as each iso-
lated pond used by the birds for feeding, nesting, and breeding is filled, but
the aggregate effect is clear, and that is all the Commerce Clause re-
quires."61 Migratory birds generated huge expenditures by those who de-
54. Id. at 953. The Corps could examine the whole area, not just the 17.6 acres of water.
Id. at 953. The factual conclusion was not appealed.
55. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
56. The court first considered the Commerce Clause issue. Precedent finding the Migra-
tory Bird rule constitutional existed. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir.
1993). The judge did not consider the answer modified by the holding of U.S. v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995), which emphasized that activity regulated under the Commerce Clause
must have a substantial affect on interstate commerce. See Solid Waste, 998 F. Supp. at
949-52. On the issue of statutory interpretation, the judge concluded that the CWA was
intended to reach all waters reachable under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 954-55.
57. Solid Waste, 191 F.3d at 849 (citing Rueth v. EPA, 13 F.3d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1993);
Leslie Salt Co. v. U.S., 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1990)).
58. Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59).
59. Gun Free School Zone Act of 1990 (18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2) (1994)).
60. The statute had difficulties crossing the "substantially affects interstate commerce"
threshold for three reasons. First, it was a criminal statue and therefore was not directly
related to commercial activity. Second, the statute did not require any firearm in question
to have affected interstate commerce. Third, the Court believed that Congress offered no
legislative findings sufficient to show that possessing a gun in a school zone affected inter-
state commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-62.
61. Solid Waste, 191 F.3d. at 850.
[Vol. 37:205216
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 37 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss1/6
BY THE DAWN'S EARLY LIGHT
sire to hunt, photograph or simply observe them. Many persons travel
across state lines to indulge in these pastimes.6 2 The Court also nimbly re-
jected the "boogeyman" argument about allowing jurisdiction over intra-
state waters under the rule: it would not allow the Corps to regulate every
puddle into which a migratory bird inserted a foot. The wording of the Mi-
gratory Bird Rule refers to waters "which are or would be used as habitat"
for such birds:63
A habitat is not simply a place where a bird might alight for a few minutes,
as SWANCC suggests, but rather 'the place where a plant or animal spe-
cies naturally lives or grows.' Before the Corps may assert jurisdiction
under the migratory bird rule, it must first make a factual determination
that a particular body of water provides a habitat for migratory birds,
which it has done here.
6 4
A jurisdictional threshold will have to be crossed in each factual situation.
Moreover, the court concluded that the regulation of waters that could ad-
versely impact on such habitat was not a "local" concern. The court con-
centrated not on land use regulation, but on the fact that migratory birds
are of national and international importance, as numerous treaties on the
topic evidence. 65 Therefore, regulation of the intrastate waters pursuant to
the Migratory Bird Rule did not provide any of the offense found in Lopez.
The court concluded without discussion that "[e]ven less persuasive [than
the argument that migratory birds are 'local' concerns] is SWANCC's sug-
gestion that giving a federal agency (here, the Corps) the power to override
decisions by local land use and zoning boards to permit the filling of local
waters conflicts with notions of state sovereignty."
66
Additionally, the court addressed the issue of whether the CWA au-
thorized the Migratory Bird Rule. To do so, the court employed the so-
called Chevron test, which requires a two-part analysis.67  The first is to
ascertain if Congress was clear on the point. If it was, the inquiry ends. If
Congress, however, provided ambiguity or was silent, the reviewing court
should defer to the agency with expertise, so long as the agency interpreta-
tion is found to be reasonable. The particular interpretation challenged
62. The statistics the court cited included that "approximately 3.1 million Americans
spent $1.3 billion to hunt migratory birds in 1996, and that about 11 percent of them trav-
eled across state lines to do so. Fish & Wildlife Service et al., 1996 NationaL Survey ofFish-
ing, Hunting, and Wildlife-Associated Recreation 25 (U.S. Govt 1997). Another 17.7 million
people spent time observing birds in states other than their states of residence; 14.3 mil-
lion of these took trips specifically for this purpose; and approximately 9.5 million traveled
for the purpose of observing shorebirds, such as herons. Id. at 45; Solid Waste, 191 F.3d
at 850. It also noted its own prior consideration of the issue, Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA,
999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
63. 51 Fed. Reg. 41217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
64. Solid Waste, 191 F.3d. at 850.
65. Id. at 850-51.
66. Id. at 851.




Mansfield: By the Dawn's Early Light: The Administrative State Still Stands
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
was not the general regulation asserting jurisdiction over intrastate waters
that "could affect interstate or foreign commerce," but a particular applica-
tion of it, namely, jurisdiction based on the presence of migratory birds.68
This precision allowed the court to easily distinguish a contrary holding in
United States v. Wilson.69 The Seventh Circuit characterized its sister
court's opinion as concerned with jurisdiction based on activity that
"could" impact on interstate commerce.70  By contrast, the Solid Waste
situation was different: "[Tihe unchallenged facts show that the filling of
the 17.6 acres would have an immediate effect on migratory birds that ac-
tually use the area as a habitat. Thus, we need not, and do not, reach the
question of the Corps' jurisdiction over areas that are only potential habi-
tats."1
Because of its earlier analysis of the constitutional issue, the Seventh
Circuit, therefore, found little difficulty in aligning itself with courts that
had previously concluded that the scope of CWAjurisdiction is commensu-
rate with the scope of jurisdiction granted by the Commerce Power.72 The
Migratory Bird Rule was thus upheld. In so doing, the court rejected an
argument that the rule was unreasonable because its focus was wildlife
preservation, not water quality: 'This point overlooks the fact that the Act's
stated purpose is 'to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and bio-
logical integrity of the Nation's waters.'"Ta
The SWANCC then sought a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.
B. The Supreme Court and the Commerce Clause
1. The Majority's Non-Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.74 The resulting decision re-
sulted in two opposing opinions, with a familiar five to four split. Chief
Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion, in which Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Justice Stevens filed a
dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. The majority opinion purported to not broach the constitutional
issue because it decided the CWA did not authorize the Migratory Bird
Rule.75 Nevertheless, the opinion did provide some hint of its author's
predilection. The dissenting opinion directly confronted the issue and
68. Solid Waste, 191 F.3d at 851-52.
69. 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
70. Solid Waste, 191 F.3d at 851-52.
71. I& at 852.
72. Solid Waste, 191 F.3d at 851 (citing Rueth, 13 F.3d at 231; U.S. v. Huebner, 752 F.2d
1235, 1239 (7th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1209 (7th Cir. 1979)).
73. Id. at 852 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994)).
74. 529 U.S. 1129 (2000).
75. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 162.
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agreed with the Seventh Circuit.76
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, did not squarely reverse the Sev-
enth Circuit, but he did echo his frequent concerns about federalism. He
justifies his conclusion that the agency is not due Chevron deference be-
cause its interpretation had "invoke[d] the outer limits of Congress'
power,"77 a situation which required Congress to be very clear that it in-
tended to so stretch its authority78 In this situation, a court does not de-
termine whether a regulation under a statute violates constitutional
norms, but delineates the reasons why the regulation raises constitutional
concerns and attempts to interpret the statutue to eliminate these ques-
tions. The use of the canon provides hints as to what circumstances en-
gender Commerce Clause difficulties for those joining the majority deci-
sion.
First, Chief Justice Rehnquist notes that to engage in a commerce
clause analysis, the court would have to determine what "object or activity
that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. "79 Al-
though he cites to the evidence detailing the money those interested in mi-
gratory birds spent in interstate commerce, according to Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the alleged jurisdictional "hook" might not be the migratory
birds' use of waters because the government's brief refers to the commer-
cial nature of the landfill.80 To the Justice, "this is a far cry, indeed, from
the 'navigable waters' and 'waters of the United States' to which the statute
by its terms extends."81
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Rehnquist largest problem might not be
distinguishing what is being regulated and thus purportedly could sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce. The crux of his concern is that he
identifies the Corps'decisions as being land use regulation, not wildlife pro-
tection or environmental regulation. This characterization immediately
acts as a red flag: "Permitting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over
ponds and mudflats falling within the 'Migratory Bird Rule would result in
a significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over
land and water use. "82 Chief Justice Rehnquist declares that, in enacting
the CWA, Congress sought to act in the opposite manner. Pointing to
other sections of the CWA, he found Congress carefully preserves the fed-
eral-state balance.83 To Chief Justice Rehnquist, these constitutional and
76. Id. at 192-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 172.
78. This interpretive mode employs the "avoidance canon." See Sunstein, infra n. 215,
at 330.
79. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 173.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 174.
83. Id. ("Rather than expressing a desire to readjust the federal-state balance in this
manner, Congress chose to "recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities
and rights of States... to plan the development and use ... of land and water re-
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federalism issues negated any maxim that would have required the Court
to defer to the agency rule. The canon of avoidance of constitutional ques-
tions trumped Chevron.
2. The Dissent's Defense of Commerce Clause Jurisdiction
The dissent disagreed not only on whether the CWA authorized the
Migratory Bird Rule, but also on whether the Rule seriously challenged the
boundaries of the Commerce Clause. First, Justice Stevens had no diffi-
culty in identifying the activity that was jurisdictional: discharging fill in to
waters that serve as migratory bird habitat.8 4 As he notes, the waters or
land itself were not being regulated; only if fill was to be added to the wa-
ters would the Corps intrude. Discharging fill into such habit would defi-
nitely have an aggregate affect on migratory bird populations. In addition
to the intrinsic value of migratory birds, Justice Stevens noted that "it is
undisputed that literally millions of people regularly participate in bird-
watching and hunting and that those activities generate a host of commer-
cial activities of great value."8 5 Therefore, there was a direct, as opposed to
attenuated, relationship between the activity being regulated and the sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce; filled-in habit would quickly lead to
the demise of commercial activities dependent on migratory birds.8 6
Similarly, there was no doubt on Justice Stevens's part that the regu-
lated activity was of national, not local concern. Citing Justice Holmes, the
dissenting opinion finds protection of migratory birds is a classic national
problem.8 7 The cost of filling in habitat will often fall not on the state in
which the habitat is lost, but in other areas that will no longer be able to
benefit from stable migratory bird populations. Therefore, interstate exter-
nalities exist and states might enter into a "race to the bottom" in order to
foster local growth at the expense of the environment elsewhere. The
"cost," namely having fewer migratory birds, is dispersed. To Justice Ste-
vens, only at the national level could migratory birds, which are transitory
in nature, ever be truly protected. Protecting migratory bird habitat from
fill was an exercise of core Commerce Clause power, not at the fringe of
power: "The power to regulate commerce among the several States neces-
sarily and properly includes the power to preserve the natural resources
that generate such commerce. "88 Whether or not the Corps should allow
the particular waters to be filled was not at issue. Congress, however,
clearly had the authority to require a permit before activities began that
sources .... 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).").
84. Id. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. Solid Waste, 521 U.S. at 194-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Mo. v. Holland, 252 U.S. 382, 435 (1920),
"It is not sufficient to rely upon the States [to protect migratory birds]. The reliance is
vain... 1.
88. Id. at 196 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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could affect environmental quality across state lines.
Justice Stevens also countered Chief Justice Relinquist's assertion
that the Migratory Bird Rule would encroach on "traditional state power."8 9
He re-iterated the distinction laid down in California Coastal Commision v.
Granite Rock Company,90 namely that "[lhand use planning in essence
chooses particular uses for the land; environmental regulation, at its core,
does not mandate particular uses of the land but requires only that, how-
ever the land is used, damage to the environment is kept within prescribed
limits."91 According to Justice Stevens, the CWA was a "paradigm" envi-
ronmental protection statute and well within the Commerce Clause. He
also saw an irony in finding federalism concerns in a statutory regime that
had provided for state permitting if the state chose to issue section 404
permits for these types of waters.93 fllinois had not taken advantage of the
opportunity.94 The "federalism" specter, therefore, should not have been
invoked to take away Chevron deference.
The majority and dissenting opinions display very different Rorschach
test reactions. The same image provokes divergent world-view responses.
Even without Chief Justice Rehnquist fully developing his Commerce
Clause argument, this is apparent.
C. Supreme Court and Statutory Interpretation
1. The Majority Narrows the CWA
The dissent and the majority opinions both fully develop their argu-
ments in respect to statutory interpretation. Again, the disagreements are
distinct. In fact, the two opinions appear to be describing different stat-
utes, different cases, and different legislative activities. The majority found
that a "clear" Congressional pronouncement negated the Migratory Bird
Rule. 95 The dissenters, meanwhile, found it appropriate to defer to the
long-standing administrative interpretation.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority. His opinion is, to a
certain extent, terse. In the first substantive paragraph, what he empha-
sizes about the purposes of the Clean Water Act signals his result. Natu-
rally, he notes the environmental purpose of "restor[ing] and maintain[ing]
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."
9 6
89. Id. at 191 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
91. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 191 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Cal. Coastal Commn. v.
Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. at 587 (1987)).
92. Id. (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 282
(1981)).
93. Section 404(g) of the CWA authorizes state regulatory programs.
94. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 172.
96. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994)).
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Immediately after this, however, he subtly raises his federalism concerns
by next quoting provision in which Congress declares that the CWA is to
"recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of
States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development
and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land
and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in the exercise
of his authority under this chapter."97 Ultimately, these federalism con-
cerns will drive his statutory construction.
The statutory question is whether the Corps had jurisdiction over
"ponds that are not adjacent to open water"98 under § 401 of the CWA. The
response entails construing the meaning of the term "navigable waters,"
which is defined in the CWA as "the waters of the United States, including
the territorial seas."99 The Supreme Court had previously looked at this
statute in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.'0 0 The unani-
mous Court in Riverside Bayview Homes upheld the Corps in its assertion
of jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to waters that were in fact navigable.
Chief Justice Rehnquist confines the case to its facts, noting that the case
itself "did not 'express any opinion' on the 'question of the authority of the
Corps to regulate discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not ad-
jacent to bodies of open water ... '"1' He further explicated the earlier
ruling.
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, two concerns motivated the
Riverside Bayview Homes Court. First, Congress displayed an "unequivo-
cal acquiescence to, and approval of, the Corps' regulations interpreting
the CWA to cover wetlands adjacent to navigable waters."1 0 2 Second, there
was a "nexus" between the navigable waters and the wetlands so that
"Congress' concern for the protection of water quality and aquatic ecosys-
tems indicated its intent to regulate wetlands 'inseparably bound up with
the 'waters' of the United States."10 3  Hence, Chief Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged that the prior case held that "the term 'navigable' is of
'limited import' and that Congress evidenced its intent to 'regulate at least
some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable' under the classical
understanding of that term,'"'° 4 but Chief Justice Rehnquist looked for the
meaning of Congress as to these particular waters when Congress initially
97. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994)).
98. Id. at 167.
99. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994). The Corps has authority to issue permits "for the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites." Sec-
tion 404(a) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994).
100. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
101. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 167 (quoting Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 131-32
n. 8). As Justice Stevens correctly points out, the current case does not involve wetlands,
but so-called "isolated waters," waters not directly connected to any navigable system. Id.
at 191-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 167 (citing Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 135-39).
103. Id. (quoting Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 134).
104. Id. (quoting Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133).
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passed the CWA in 1972 and when it reconsidered the issue in 1977.
The Court quickly disposed of the suggestion that Congress could
have meant the term to have an expansive meaning, which could include
waters that impact on interstate commerce because they are migratory
bird habitat. The opinion simply cites the initial Corps interpretation:
Its 1974 regulations defined § 404(a)'s "navigable waters" to mean "those
waters of the United States which are subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide, and/or are presently, or have been in the past, or may be in the fu-
ture susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce."
33 CFR § 209.120(d)(1). The Corps emphasized that "[iut is the water
body's capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation or
commerce which is the determinative factor." § 209.260(e)(1). Respon-
dents put forward no persuasive evidence that the Corps mistook Con-
gress' intent in 1974.105
The initial agency interpretation is authoritative to Chief Justice
Rehnquist. In a footnote, he dismisses the legislative history as being in-
conclusive, soft-pedaling the oft-cited Senate Conference Report comment
that the conferees "intend that the term 'navigable waters' be given the
broadest possible constitutional interpretation. " '
Chief Justice Rehnquist then turned to subsequent legislative history.
In 1977, the Corps had finalized its revised regulations, asserting jurisdic-
tion over "isolated wetlands and lakes, intermittent streams, prairie pot-
holes, and other waters that are not part of a tributary system to interstate
waters or to navigable waters of the United States, the degradation or de-
struction of which could affect interstate commerce." 0 7 This regulatory in-
terpretation sparked legislative attempts to overturn it. 10 Although ac-
knowledging that occasionally subsequent legislative inactivity can aid in
interpreting what the initial legislation meant, he cautions that such activ-
ity might not be enlightening: "A bill can be proposed for any number of
reasons, and it can be rejected for just as many others. The relationship
between the actions and inactions of the 95th Congress and the intent of
the 92d Congress in passing § 404(a) is also considerably attenuated."0 9
Chief Justice Rehnquist, therefore, did not conclude that the failure of
Congress to over-rule this part of the Corps regulations meant acquies-
cence in it." 0 Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the hearings in
Congress centered on whether or not wetlands could be regulated, not
105. Id. at 168.
106. Id. at 168 n. 3 (quoting S. Con. Rpt. No. 92-1236, 144 (1972) (reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3822)).
107. Solid Waste, 521 U.S. at 168-69 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a)(5) (1978).
108. Failed House bill, H.R 3199, would have defined "navigable waters" as "all waters
which are presently used, or are susceptible to use in their natural condition or by reason-
able improvement as a means to transport interstate or foreign commerce. 123 Cong. Rec.
10420, 10434 (1977)." Id. at 169.
109. Id. at 170.
110. Id. at 171.
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whether or not so-called "isolated" waters could be subject to the permit-
ting requirement."1 Although there was some awareness of the latter
question, u 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized "the same report reiter-
ated that 'the committee amendment does not redefine navigable wa-
ters."'l
3
Chief Justice Rehnquist similarly found no guidance in how to define
"navigable waters" from the fact that Congress did pass an amendment to
section 404 in 1977. The Amendment included a new section, section
404(g), which authorized the States to administer their own permit pro-
grams over certain "other" nonnavigable waters." 4  Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted:
In Riverside Bayview Homes we recognized that Congress intended the
phrase "navigable waters" to include "at least some waters that would not
be deemed 'navigable' under the classical understanding of that term."
But § 404(g) gives no intimation of what those waters might be; it simply
refers to them as "other ... waters." Respondents conjecture that
"other... waters" must incorporate the Corps' 1977 regulations, but it is
also plausible, as petitioner contends, that Congress simply wanted to in-
clude all waters adjacent to "navigable waters," such as nonnavigable
tributaries and streams. 11
5
The Court, therefore, refused to move the CWA definition of "navigable wa-
ters" as far as requested.
In fact, the majority opinion kept the definition close to the traditional
definition of navigable waters, that is, "waters which are presently used, or
are susceptible to use in their natural condition or by reasonable im-
provement as a means to transport interstate or foreign commerce.""
6
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded:
We cannot agree that Congress' separate definitional use of the phrase
"waters of the United States" constitutes a basis for reading the term
"navigable waters" out of the statute. We said in Riverside Bayview Homes
111. Id. at 170.
112. See id. at 170 n. 6 (citing S. Rpt. 95-370, 75 (1977) (reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4326, 4400)).
113. Id.
114. Section 404(g)(1) provides, in relevant part:
The Governor of any State desiring to administer its own individual and general
permit program for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable wa-
ters (other than those waters which are presently used, or are susceptible to use
in their natural condition or by reasonable improvement as a means to transport
interstate or foreign commerce.. .. including wetlands adjacent thereto) within its
jurisdiction may submit to the Administrator a full and complete description of
the program it proposes to establish and administer under State law or under an
interstate compact.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1) (1994). Id. at 188 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 171 (citing Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133).
116. Id. at 188 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This is the definition of waters over which states
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that the word "navigable" in the statute was of "limited effect" and went on
to hold that § 404(a) extended to nonnavigable wetlands adjacent to open
waters. But it is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite another
to give it no effect whatever. The term "navigable" has at least the import
of showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the
CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been naviga-
ble in fact or which could reasonably be so made.
1 1 7
Therefore, the definition of navigable waters as "waters of the United
States" apparently only goes as far as traditional navigable waters, tribu-
tary waters, and wetlands adjacent to either type of water.118
To Chief Justice Rehnquist, the meaning of the Corps jurisdictional
grant in 404(a) was clear.1 9 Under the Supreme Court's Chevron doctrine
of administrative review, the analysis ends. Therefore, no deference to
agency interpretation would be due.1 20 Chief Justice Rehnquist, however,
also notes that even if the statute were not clear, Chevron deference would
not be appropriate because the agency interpretation was pushing at the
boundaries of Congress' constitutional power. 121 The Corps interpretation
was thus rejected as not only being contrary to the plain meaning of the
statute, but also because it would raise constitutional questions. The Su-
preme Court only directly held as follows: "33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1999),
as clarified and applied to petitioner's balefill site pursuant to the 'Migra-
tory Bird Rule,' exceeds the authority granted to respondents under §
404(a) of the CWA." 122 The dissent would disagree.
2. The Dissent Retains Broad CWA Jurisdiction
The disagreement in Justice Stevens' dissent is on a foundational
level, and obvious from the first note he struck. In contrast to Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's early invocation of federalism concerns, Justice Stevens'
first words resound with the environmental issue: "In 1969, the Cuyahoga
River in Cleveland, Ohio, coated with a slick of industrial waste, caught
fire."'2 Justice Stevens reads the CWA as a comprehensive response to a
comprehensive problem. Therefore, he disagrees with the narrow jurisdic-
tional scope the majority embraced.
The dissent introduces two main points immediately, namely that a
prior statute had a narrower jurisdiction than the CWA and that the earlier
Supreme Court case of Riverside Bayview Homes endorsed a broader in-
terpretation of the CWA than the majority acknowledged. Under § 13 of
117. IcL at 172.
118. Id. at 168 n. 3.
119. Id. 172. See the reference to the plain text and import of section 404(a). Id. at 170.
120. Id. at 172.
121. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 172-73.
122. Id. at 174.
123. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20011 225
21
Mansfield: By the Dawn's Early Light: The Administrative State Still Stands
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899("RHA"), 12 4 the scope of
the Corps concern was navigation in interstate or foreign commerce, but
the enlarged environmental role foreseen in the CWA necessitated the defi-
nition of "navigable waters" to become "waters of the United States, includ-
,,125ing the territorial seas. To Stevens, "[tihat definition requires neither
actual nor potential navigability."126 Moreover, Justice Stevens emphasized
that the actual wetland at issue in Riverside Bayview Homes was "not itself
navigable, directly adjacent to navigable water, or even hydrologically con-
nected to navigable water, but which was part of a larger area, character-
ized by poor drainage, that ultimately abutted a navigable creek."127 With
this introduction, Justice Stevens then musters his arguments.
First, the dissenting opinion details what he sees as being an impor-
tant backdrop for the Amendments; that is, the history of federal interest
in regulating water. Water regulation in the United States began with a
strong emphasis on protecting navigation. By 1899, Congress passed the
RHA,128 described by Justice Stevens as follows: "Section 13 of the 1899
RHA, commonly known as the Refuse Act, prohibited the discharge of 're-
fuse' into any 'navigable water' or its tributaries, as well as the deposit of
'refuse' on the bank of a navigable water 'whereby navigation shall or may
be impeded or obstructed' without first obtaining a permit from the Secre-
tary of the Army."129 When interest in preventing environmental degrada-
tion grew this statute became a tool to prevent industrial pollution, with
some success,l3 0 until a district court invalidated a general pollution con-
trol permit system based on Section 13.13 Justice Stevens also notes a
parallel development of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA)
from 1948 until the 1972 Amendments. 132 Of interest for jurisdiction, the
FWPCA had two different jurisdictional hooks before 1972. First, it re-
ferred only to "interstate waters." Congress then harmonized it with the
RHA and it encompassed "navigable waters. "1a To Justice Stevens, it was
important that none of the acts before 1972 were deemed "comprehen-
124. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1994).
125. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994).
126. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 175 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 176 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The disagreement on the meaning of Riverside
Bayview Homes goes even to how the two justices refer to the case: Chief Justice
Rehnquist uses the Riverside Bayview Homes appellation, while Justice Stevens employs
the shorthand Riverside Bayview.
128. 31 Stat. 1152 (1899), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1994). Justice Stevens also ref-
erences The Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1896, 29 Stat. 234; River and Harbor
Act of 1894, 28 Stat. 363; River and Harbor Appropriations Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 426; and
The River and Harbor Appropriations Act of 1886, 24 Stat. 329. See Solid Waste, 531 U.S.
at 177 n. 3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 177 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 178 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. v. Rep. Steel Corp., 362 U.S., 482,
490-91 (1960)).
131. Id. at 178 n. 4 (citing Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.C. 1971)).
132. Id. at 179. The 1972 Amendments initiated the "Clean Water Act" appellation.
133. See id. at 178 n. 5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sive.- '3 '
However, the 1972 Amendments, which ushered in the Clean Water
Act ("CWA) appellation, were creating a "comprehensive" program. Justice
Stevens details the numerous references to the CWA being "comprehen-
sive," including that of Chief Justice Rehnquist in Milwaukee v. Illinois.
1 3 5
The divergent goals of the CWA and the RHA underscore the "comprehen-
sive" nature of the CWA
Section 404 of the CWA resembles § 13 of the RHA, but, unlike the earlier
statute, the primary purpose of which is the maintenance of navigability, §
404 was principally intended as a pollution control measure. A compari-
son of the contents of the RHA and the 1972 Act vividly illustrates the
fundamental difference between the purposes of the two provisions. 16
The RHA is replete with funding for navigational projects, while the CWA
provided funding for research on pollution and its prevention.137 The re-
sult of the changed mandate was clear to Justice Stevens: "Because of the
statute's ambitious and comprehensive goals, it was, of course, necessary
to expand its jurisdictional scope."138 Justice Stevens then examines the
legislative history of the CWA in regard to this issue.
Through examination of the course of the Act through the House,
Senate, and Conference, Justice Stevens concludes that the narrow defini-
tion of the majority opinion was neither the intended, nor clear, meaning of
the statute. The CWA amendments began with the old term "navigable wa-
ters," which had been used previously, but added a definition. "Navigable
waters" would mean "the waters of the United States, including the territo-
rial seas."3 9 The failure to include "navigable" in the definition was mean-
ingful: "Indeed, the 1972 conferees arrived at the final formulation by spe-
cifically deleting the word 'navigable' from the definition that had originally
appeared in the House version of the Act. The majority today undoes that
deletion." 40 The dissent cautions that it is the statutory definition that
takes precedent in interpreting a statute, not any other definition that
might exist.
14
Justice Stevens bolsters his reading of what the removal of the word
"navigable" meant by reference to the Conference Report, which stated that
the definition in the CWA was intended to "be given the broadest possible
134. Id.
135. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 179-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Strikingly absent from its [the CWA's] decla-
ration of 'goals and policy' is any reference to avoiding or removing obstructions to naviga-
tion. Instead, the principal objective of the Act, as stated by Congress in § 101, was "to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(1994).").
138. Id. at 180 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994).
140. Id. at 180-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communi-
ties for Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697-98 n. 10 (1995)).
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constitutional interpretation." 14 2 To Justice Stevens, if all that was in-
tended was to assert authority over navigation, this comment and the defi-
nition would have been meaningless; Congress's jurisdiction over such
matters was clear.143 Moreover, to so limit jurisdiction would run counter
to the purpose of the CWA:
As we recognized in Riverside Bayview, the interests served by the statute
embrace the protection of "'significant natural biological functions, includ-
ing food chain production, general habitat, and nesting, spawning, rearing
and resting sites'" for various species of aquatic wildlife. For wetlands and
"isolated" inland lakes, that interest is equally powerful, regardless of the
proximity of the swamp or the water to a navigable stream. 44
Justice Stevens concluded the following about the 1972 legislation:
"Viewed in light of the history of federal water regulation, the broad §
502(7) definition, and Congress' unambiguous instructions in the Confer-
ence Report, it is clear that the term 'navigable waters' operates in the
statute as a shorthand for 'waters over which federal authority may prop-
erly be asserted." 145 In addition to the initial 1972 statute, there have also
been administrative interpretations and Congressional responses that Jus-
tice Stevens marshals to support his interpretation.
On the administrative side, the Corps of Engineers initially promul-
gated regulations that would have limited its jurisdiction under the CWA to
the same jurisdiction it had under the RHA. Contrary to the majority's as-
sertion that there were no indications that the Corps was incorrect in these
1974 regulations, 14 6 Justice Stevens consumes an entire page of his opin-
ion with footnotes citing court, EPA, and Congressional protests of the
Corps' interpretation.147 Moreover, the Corps then changed its opinion. By
1975, it concluded that the CWA mandated protection of waters to the ex-
tent of the Commerce Clause jurisdiction. 14 Justice Stevens appears frus-
trated that the majority so emphasizes the initial reaction of the Corps and
fails to respond to the position held since 1975. 149 Justice Stevens also
142. Id. at 181 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Con. Rpt. 92-1236, 144 (1972) (re-
printed in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3822)).
143. Id. at 181 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ('The majority's reading drains all meaning from
the conference amendment.").
144. Id. at 181-82 (citation omitted) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[nothing in the text, the stated purposes, or the
legislative history of the CWA supports the conclusion that in 1972 Congress contem-
plated-much less commanded-the odd jurisdictional line that the Court has drawn today.
The majority accuses respondents of reading the term "navigable" out of the statute. But
that was accomplished by Congress when it deleted the word from the § 502(7) defini-
tion.").
146. Id. at 168. ("Respondents put forward no persuasive evidence that the Corps mis-
took Congress' intent in 1974.").
147. Id. at 183 nn. 9-11. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. 40 Fed. Reg. 31320 (July 25, 1975).
149. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 183 n. 8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He also noted that the
jurisdiction the majority adopted was broader than that acknowledged in the 1974 regula-
tions because it includes jurisdiction over nonnavigable tributaries and adjacent wetlands.
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judges the Congressional response in 1977 to the Corps finalized regula-
tions15 0 differently than the majority.
Justice Stevens concludes that the actions of Congress in 1977 evi-
denced approval of the Corps' assertion of broad jurisdiction. Because the
jurisdiction the Corps claimed disturbed some members of Congress, bills
were introduced to pare back the scope of the CWA to traditional "naviga-
ble" waters, that is, waters that are used, or by reasonable improvement
could be used, as a means of transport in interstate or foreign commerce
and wetlands adjacent to such waters.' 5 ' Only the House of Representa-
tives passed such a bill. The issue was, however, extensively debated. Af-
ter recounting the Riverside Bayview Homes review of the debates, Justice
Stevens concludes:
The net result of that extensive debate was a congressional endorsement
of the position that the Corps maintains today. We explained in Riverside
Bayview: The scope of the Corps' asserted jurisdiction over wetlands was
specifically brought to Congress' attention, and Congress rejected meas-
ures designed to curb the Corps' jurisdiction in large part because of its
concern that protection of wetlands would be unduly hampered by a nar-
rowed definition of 'navigable waters.' Although we are chary of attribut-
ing significance to Congress' failure to act, a refusal by Congress to over-
rule an agency's construction of legislation is at least some evidence of the
reasonableness of that construction, particularly where the administrative
construction has been brought to Congress' s attention through legislation
specifically designed to supplant it."
152
The dissent chided the majority for not accepting that Riverside Bayview
Homes found that Congress had acquiesced in the Corps regulatory defini-
tion.' 53 Moreover, Justice Stevens finds not only what Congress did not do
in 1977 important, but finds what it did do to be even more important.' 4
Congress did not directly modify the meaning of "navigable waters" in
Id.
150. Id. at 184-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 42 Fed. Reg. 37127 (July 19, 1977), as
amended, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1977), which clearly asserted jurisdiction over "isolated
lakes and wetlands, intermittent streams, prairie potholes, and other waters that are not
part of a tributary system to interstate waters or to navigable waters of the United States,
the degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate commerce.").
151. H.R 3199, 95th Cong. § 16(1) (1977).
152. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 186 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Riverside Bayview
Homes, 474 U.S. at 137).
153. Id. at 186-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Having already concluded that Congress ac-
quiesced in the Corps' regulatory definition of its jurisdiction, the Court is wrong to reverse
course today."). Justice Stevens cites an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist for
this proposition. Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) ("[Tjhe doctrine [of stare de-
cisis] carries such persuasive force that we have always required a departure from prece-
dent to be supported by some special justification" (citations and quotations omitted)).
Both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens had joined the unanimous opinion of
the Riverside Bayview Homes case. Justice White authored the opinion. A total of three
justices from the earlier court are currently on the bench. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor joined the majority in Solid Waste.
154. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 187 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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1977.15 It did, however, amend section 404 of the CWA in ways that Jus-
tice Stevens hails as confirming the broad view of jurisdiction. First, the
amendments excluded certain activities from the need for a Corps' per-
mit.156 Included activities impacted on isolated waters. To Justice Ste-
vens, "Itihe specific exemption of these waters from the Corps' jurisdiction
indicates that the 1977 Congress recognized that similarly 'isolated' waters
not covered by the exceptions would fall within the statute's outer lim-
its." l 58 Moreover, the amendments included another provision that appar-
ently was tracking the Corps regulatory program.
The Corps' interim regulations of 1975 had referred to three "phases"
of implementation.' 59 The first phase covered traditionally navigable wa-
ters. Phase two covered nonnavigable tributaries, freshwater wetlands ad-
jacent to primary navigable waters, and lakes. Finally, the third phase
would require permits for other waters that the CWA covers, but which
were not included in the previous two phases. Examples were "intermit-
tent rivers, streams, tributaries, and perched wetlands that are not con-
tiguous or adjacent to navigable waters" that "the District Engineer deter-
mines necessitate regulation for the protection of water quality."160 These
three phases appear directly in the 1977 legislative history and indirectly
in a statutory amendment.
Justice Stevens finds it significant that the 1977 Congress amended
the federal permit system to allow states to implement their own permit
system for discharges into certain non-navigable waters. Specifically, the
following was added to the statute:
The Governor of any State desiring to administer its own individual and
general permit program for the discharge of dredged or fill material into
the navigable waters (other than those waters which are presently used, or
are susceptible to use in their natural condition or by reasonable im-
provement as a means to transport interstate or foreign commerce .... in-
cluding wetlands adjacent thereto) within its jurisdiction may submit to
the Administrator a full and complete description of the program it pro-
poses to establish and administer under State law or under an interstate
155. Justice Stevens noted that if the status quo was the Corps regulatory definition, this
comment in the legislative history of the 1977 Amendments means that the inclusive defi-
nition reigns. See id. at 190 n. 14, (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing S. Rpt. No. 95-370,
at 75 (1977) (reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4400)).
156. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(1) (1994).
157. The 1977 amendments expressly exempt the discharge of fill material "for the pur-
pose of construction or maintenance of farm or stock ponds or irrigation ditches, or the
maintenance of drainage ditches," and "for the purpose of construction of temporary sedi-
mentation basins on a construction site which does not include placement of fill material
into the navigable waters." Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 188 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
33 U.S.C. § 1344(l)(1O(C)-(D) (1994)).
158. Id.
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compact. 16 1
Justice Stevens argues that allowing the states jurisdiction over waters
other than those that are traditionally deemed navigable implies that more
than those waters are subject to the CWA 162 The legislative history of the
provision illuminates just what those "other waters" might be.
In the legislative history, Justice Stevens finds reference to the Corps
interim regulations, which provide guidance on Congress's meaning:
The Conference Report discussing the 1977 amendments, for example,
states that § 404(g) "establishes a process to allow the Governor of any
State to administer an individual and general permit program for the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material into phase 2 and 3 waters after the ap-
proval of a program by the Administrator." Similarly, a Senate Report
discussing the 1977 amendments explains that, under § 404(g), "the
Corps will continue to administer the section 404 permit program in all
navigable waters for a discharge of dredge or fill material until the ap-
proval of a State program for phase 2 and 3 waters."'
Congress was, therefore, allowing the states to administer a program to
protect nonnavigable tributaries, freshwater wetlands adjacent to primary
navigable waters, lakes, and other isolated waters or wetlands deemed im-
portant.' 64 The relevant conclusion was that "[tihe legislative history of the
1977 amendments therefore plainly establishes that, when it enacted §
404(g), Congress believed-and desired-the Corps' jurisdiction to extend
beyond just navigable waters, their tributaries, and the wetlands adjacent
to each."
165
Justice Stevens, before dismissing the majority's federalism con-
cems,166 made a passing shot at the statutory construction the majority
employed. He characterized it as being "unfaithful to both Riverside Bay-
view and Chevron:
" 167
Although it might have appeared problematic on a "linguistic" level for the
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1) (1994).
162. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 188-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 189 (citations omitted).
164. Id. ("'[P]hase 3' waters are all other waters covered by the statute, and can include
such 'isolated' waters as 'intermittent rivers, streams, tributaries, and perched wetlands
that are not contiguous or adjacent to navigable waters.'").
165. Id. at 189-90. Justice Stevens then chided the majority for over-relying on the com-
ment in the legislative history that there was no intent to change the meaning of the term
"navigable waters." See supra n. 113. In addition to noting the relevant status quo was
the broad Corps definition, Justice Stevens also points out the following:
[Tihe language appears in the course of an explanation of the Senate's refusal to
go along with House efforts to narrow the scope of the Corps' CWA jurisdiction to
traditionally navigable waters. Thus, the immediately preceding sentence warns
that '[tlo limit the jurisdiction of the [FWPCAl with reference to discharges of the
pollutants of dredged or fill material would cripple efforts to achieve the act's ob-
jectives.' The Court would do well to heed that warning.
Id.
166. See supran. 89.
167. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 191 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Corps to classify "lands" as "waters" in Riverside Bayview, we squarely
held that the agency's construction of the statute that it was charged with
enforcing was entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. Today, however, the majority refuses to
extend such deference to the same agency's construction of the same
statute. This refusal is unfaithful to both Riverside Bayview and Chevron.
For it is the majority's reading, not the agency's, that does violence to the
scheme Congress chose to put into place.
The disagreement with the majority runs deep.
D. Solid Waste in Perspective
1. Statutory Interpretation: Methods, Modes, and Camouflaged
Activism
Naturally, whenever there is a majority and a dissenting opinion, the
judges could not bridge a disagreement. However, some divisions are more
stark than others. The decisions in Solid Waste portray black and white
vistas. This section considers one question: whether the Clean Water Act
as a statute authorized assertion of jurisdiction over isolated waters that
had an effect on interstate commerce, more particularly, an impact on in-
terstate commerce because of being habitat for migratory birds. In other
words, the issue is, could the statute be interpreted in this manner? The
two opinions provide archetypes: they epitomize two distinct methods of
statutory interpretation and the two opinions reveal different visions of the
relationship between the judiciary and agency decision-makers. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist asserted judicial primacy, ignoring both agency, legislative,
and judicial precedents. By contrast, Justice Stevens aligned himself with
a more conventional reading of the CWA and, in so doing, deferred to the
agency. The opinions, therefore, provide textbooks in judicial temperament
and ideology.
The most obvious division between the authors is the split between
textualism and intentionalism, which are two schools of statutory con-
struction.16 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, is the textu-
alist. As he stated, the majority could not extend Corps jurisdiction to the
ponds because "we conclude that the text of the statute will not allow
168. See generally Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent. The Place for a "Legislative His-
tory" of Agency Rules, 51 Hastings L.J. 255, 264-74 (2000). Neither opinion reflects a third
strain of interpretation, namely "dynamic interpretation." Proponents of such a method
urge that judges may "update" statutes by interpreting them not only in light of intentions
and purpose when passed, but also in view of current needs, social trends, and beliefs.
See e.g. G. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Harv. U. Press 1982) (arguing
that judges could invalidate outdated statutes as they interpret them dynamically); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479 (1987) (statutory
interpretation should not be limited to text and historical context, but should also consider
present societal, political, and legal context).
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this."169 To a textualist, the words of the statute take precedent over any
legislative history or other indications of intent.17 0 The relationship of the
statute's wording to other parts of the statute would also be guideposts.
The presence of the word "navigable" in the CWA was, therefore, of prime
importance.17 1 It lead Chief Justice Rehnquist to conclude that Congress
only had in mind its power over navigation in giving the Corps jurisdic-
tion. 1
72
To a textualist, legislative history is of less importance, primarily be-
cause the statements contained in reports are not enacted into legislation
and legislators may not have read reports.173 Additionally, because Con-
gress is a collective body, it cannot have any true "intent" behind its ac-
tions; with "logrolling" and compromises, many different rationales may
color an individual legislator's vote, and hence, make it impossible to come
up with one true Congressional "intent."74 This explains Chief Justice
Rehnquist's short-shrift of legislative history and subsequent legislative ac-
tion. Therefore, if a textualist needs to "interpret" a statute to get to its
"clear meaning," the judge will often employ dictionaries and lay definitions
of words.' 75 Also of import would be judicial canons of construction." 6
169. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 168 (emphasis added).
170. Pa. v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (Congress enacts texts, not intentions).
171. This led to Chief Justice Rehnquist's declaration that "it is one thing to give a word
limited effect and quite another to give it no effect whatever." Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 172.
Compare to the dissent of Justice Scalia, which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Tho-
mas joined, in Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687, 719 (1995) (the dissent criticized the Court's
statutory construction of the word "harm" and argued that the nine words surrounding
"harm" required "conduct ... which [is] direct immediately and intentionally against a par-
ticular animal-not acts or omissions that indirectly and accidently cause an injury to a
population of animal." (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
172. "The term "navigable" has at least the import of showing us what Congress had in
mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that
were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made." Solid Waste,
531 U.S. at 172.
173. Naturally, in addition to formal House, Senate, and Conference Reports, individual
legislators can insert comments in the Congressional Record that may or may not have
been actually made on the floor and heard by others. Many reasons exist for such com-
ments; legislators may want to speak to constituents, influence an agency interpretation,
or to "hoodwink" the judiciary. Noah, supra n. 168, at 271. There is a traditional hierar-
chy to assess the reliability of legislative history, which place the official reports and com-
ments of floor managers of a bill above other sources. Id. at 274.174 Zellmer, infra n. 206, at 993-94.
175. For example, Justice Scalia employed six definitions of the word "take," definitions
he drew from dictionaries, common law, and international treaties; he then found a core
traditional meaning of the term at variance with the majority's reading of the word in the
Endangered Species Act Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 718 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. "What is of paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a
background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it
adopts." Finley v. U.S., 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (Scalia, J.) But see Mark Siedenfeld, A
Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmading in Reviewing Agency Interpre-
tations of Statutes, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 83, 114 (1994) (legislators only know such canons to the
extent they reflect common sense and general linguistics); Abner J. Mikva, Reading and
Writing Statutes, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 627, 629 (1987) (asserting his lack of knowledge of
canons as a legislator).
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The use of particular words have particular meanings. 177
An intentionalist might also find a clear meaning in a statute. How-
ever, the relevant information such a judge would consider is broader.
Justice Stevens, therefore, displays a greater interest in legislative history.
Not only does he give credence to language in the Conference Report for
the 1972 CWA amendments, 7 8 he also looked at the general intent of Con-
gress in passing a "comprehensive" act.179 Moreover, subsequent legisla-
tive history and statutory enactments were deemed relevant. Justice Ste-
vens does not quite say that the meaning of "navigable waters" in the CWA
for § 404 permitting authority is "clear." He refers to prior deference to the
Corps' interpretation by the Court in Riverside Bayview Homes,180 and
urges the same result in Solid Waste.
The differing interpretative techniques not only arrive at differing
views of the clarity of the statute, but also re-align the relationship between
the judiciary and the executive, as well as the legislature. Judicial review
of an agency regulation or other interpretation of law is theoretically gov-
erned by the Chevron process. This two-step process ascertains if Con-
gress has clearly spoken on an issue and, if not, whether the agency inter-
pretation is reasonable.' 8 ' When ambiguity is found, then Congress has
impliedly given the agency additional power to interpret the statute.
82
This brings decision-making to a branch with some accountability.1s3 Un-
177. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 752 (1995)
(criticizing what he calls "hypertextualism," defined as "finding linguistic precision where it
does not exist, and relying exclusively on the abstract meaning of a word or phrase even
when other evidence suggests strongly that Congress intended a result inconsistent with
that usage."). See Noah, supra n. 168, at 272 ("Naive textualism may demand the impossi-
ble of Congress, and, thereby, actually work to undermine the legislative power relative to
the other branches of government.").
178. See supra n. 145.
179. He concluded:
Congress' choice to employ the term 'navigable waters' in the 1972 Clean Water
Act simply continued nearly a century of usage. Viewed in light of the history of
federal water regulation, the broad § 502(7) definition, and Congress' unambigu-
ous instructions in the Conference Report, it is clear that the term 'navigable wa-
ters' operates in the statute as a shorthand for 'waters over which federal author-
ity may properly be asserted.'
Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 191 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]n Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131-132, we
squarely held that the agency's construction of the statute that it was charged with enforc-
ing was entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat Resources Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984).").
181. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
182. Deference as a default principle fits into a democracy-enhancing model of law by
presuming that Congress delegated the decision-making after ambiguity to the agency.
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 978-79
(1972).
183. Additionally, if it is true that there is no perfect way to understand the collective
congressional intent in passing a statute, resolution of the statute's meaning would require
a factual understanding and involve policy choice. Therefore, Chevron rationally places the
decision point in the agency. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2086-87 (1990).
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der this framework, a textualist, who seeks clear meaning, would, if such a
meaning were found, have no need to defer to agency interpretations: the
Chevron test for judicial review ends upon the finding of a clear meaning
for the statute.184 Justice Scalia, the epitome of an textualist, acknowl-
edged that he would be less likely to have to defer to an agency interpreta-
tion. Such a tendency elevates the judicial role to the point of potential
activism.
1 86
The interpretive mode Chief Justice Rehnquist adopts contains an
element of hubris, which is apparent in reading his account of the CWA's
jurisdictional reach. Almost no one who had looked at the words of the
statute, other than the writers of the Corps' initial regulations, had come to
the majority's conclusion. 8 7 After 1974, the Corps of Engineers consis-
tently had asserted that Congress intended the CWA to reach as far as the
Commerce Clause would allow. Its regulations since 1975 have required
permits for discharge of fill into waters that were in no way navigable but
were capable of affecting interstate commerce. 18 The terminology chosen
in the regulations, namely "affecting interstate commerce," was chosen to
mirror Supreme Court jurisprudence on the scope of the Commerce Clause
power. 8 9 Moreover, the particular peculiarity at issue in Solid Waste, the
Migratory Bird Rule, was presented as an example of such an interstate
impact in 1986. Additionally, the EPA concurred in the Corps of Engi-
neers' interpretation of the scope of the CWA.' 90 Therefore, administrative
interpretation has been consistent.' 91 However, a judge who is capable of
finding "clear meaning" could find the long-term consistency immaterial.
92
The executive branch, however, was not the only branch of govern-
184. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. See Merrill, supra n. 182, at 990-91 (noting that the
first Chevron inquiry began, in 1988, to no longer refer to finding the specific intention of
Congress, but focused on whether the statute is unclear or ambiguous, thus reflecting the
search for "plain meaning" under the "new textualism" of Justices Scalia and Kennedy).
185. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
Duke L.J. 511, 521 ("One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is
apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often
that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists."). Of course, other judges
have the opposite predilection. U.A.W. v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. Div., 815 F.2d 1570,
1575 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987) ("[Siome will find ambiguity in a
'No Smoking' sign ..... ).
186. See Merrill, supra n. 182, at 970 (1992) ("[Ilnstead of functioning as a 'counter-
Marbury,' there are signs that Chevron is being transformed by the Court into a new judi-
cial mandate 'to say what the law is.'").
187. See Robin Kundis Craig, Navigating Federalism: The Missing Statutory Analysis in
Solid Waste Agency, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10508 (2001) (noting the "pervasive view that CWA
jurisdiction extends to the limits of the federal government's Commerce Clause power).
188. Interim regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 31320 (July 25, 1975).
189. See infra nn. 228-234.
190. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (1993).
191. This strengthens the argument for deference. Cal. v. FERC, 110 S. Ct. 2024, 2029
(1990) (referring to "the deference this Court must accord to long-standing and well-
entrenched decisions, especially those interpreting statutes that underlie complex regula-
tory regimes.").
192. Scalia, supra n. 185, at 521 (under Chevron, "there is no longer any justification for
giving 'special' deference to 'longstanding and consistent' agency interpretations of law.").
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ment to examine what the statute might have meant. Numerous courts
also weighed in. Although not always considering the same exact issue as
in Solid Waste, courts have almost uniformly found that the CWA defini-
tion was intended to go to the farthest reach of the Commerce Clause. 
193
Therefore, jurisdiction was found over intrastate waters used in agricul-
ture. 194 More pertinently, some courts also found the Migratory Bird Rule
delineated "waters" within the scope of Congress's definition. 195 Even ig-
noring lower court precedent, the Supreme Court itself has acknowledged
the cornerstones of the Corps argument, namely, that there is no unitary
definition of the word "navigable" and jurisdiction over water under the
Commerce Clause does not hinge on a finding of navigability. 6 More spe-
cifically, the Supreme Court considered the scope of the Corps' § 404 ju-
risdiction in Riverside Bayview Homes.1 9 7 Although primarily concerned
with whether the Corps had jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to naviga-
ble waters, one natural reading of the decision is that Congress asserted a
quite broad reach in light of Congress's over-arching concerns with aquatic
environments.' Therefore, prior courts have held or intimated that what
Congress meant to say in the CWA was clearly the opposite of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's clarity.
193. NaL Resources Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C 1975) (in a
suit objecting to the Corps' failure to assert jurisdiction over wetlands, the court held that-
Congress "asserted federal jurisdiction over the nation's waters to the maximum extent
permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution."). No appeal was taken. In
U.S. v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997), the Fourth Circuit found that the Commerce
Clause was more limiting than the Corps of Engineers had asserted in a regulation control-
ling wetlands that "could affect" interstate commerce. Id. at 257. The Fourth Circuit's
conclusion, therefore, is consistent with the earlier assessment of the CWA's jurisdiction
because the court acknowledged that jurisdiction goes as far as the Commerce Clause may
properly extend.
194. Residents Against Indus. Landfill Expansion v. Diversified Sys., Inc, 804 F. Supp.
1036, 1039 (E.D. Tenn. 1992) (two intrastate creeks were within Commerce Clause juris-
diction because cattle drank from them and therefore there might be an affect on interstate
commerce); U.S. v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 374-75 (10th Cir. 1979) (intrastate
stream subject to CWA because crops irrigated by its waters were sold in interstate com-
merce).
It is noteworthy that even after Solid Waste, courts have continued to find such wa-
ters subject to regulation. Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 533
(9th Cir. 2001) (irrigation canals were "waters of the United States" because they were
"tributary to" intrastate waters which affect or could affect interstate or foreign commerce);
U.S. v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Mont. 2001).
195. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993), replacing prior opinion,
961 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1992); Leslie Salt Co. v. U.S., 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991), on remand, 820 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Cal. 1992), appeal
after remand, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995), cert denied sub nom., Cargill, Inc., v. U.S., 516
U.S. 955 (1995). Later cases found the regulation not within the CWA definition. See U.S.
v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997); Tabb Lakes, Ltd v. U.S., 715 F. Supp. 726, 728-29
(E.D. Va. 1988), affd per curiam, 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that the Migratory
Bird Rule was not properly promulgated and, in dicta, noted that even if had been, there
was a question as to whether the Commerce Clause allowed it to apply to the isolated wet-
land involved in the case).
196. Kaiser Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 173-74 (1979).
197. U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
198. See Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 181 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In addition to administrative and judicial interpretations, Congres-
sional committees also have repeatedly said that the scope of the meaning
of "waters of the United States" was meant to stretch beyond jurisdiction
over navigation. 199 Indeed, Congress in 1977 considered the problem of
whether the Corps exceeded the bounds set for it. Because of this, Justice
Stevens found that Congress acquiesced in the Corps' definition when it
failed to pass a limiting amendment and instead drafted explicit excep-
200tions. In fact, Justice Stevens read Riverside Bayview Homes as also so
holding.20 ' In considering whether or not Congress has indicated approba-
tion of an existing regulatory scheme through deliberative inaction,20 2 Chief
Justice Rehnquist notes that the Court is hesitant to read too much into
inaction. 2 0 3 It is true that the cases do not all point in the same direc-
tion.204 Because the Congress is not a static body but changes composi-
tion every two years, 20 divining intent of one Congress from the actions of
another is reading tea leaves from two separate cups. Recognition of the
nature of Congress also cautions against over-reliance on inaction's signifi-
cance. Inaction in Congress is more the norm than action because of the
basic forces of inertia and other institutional problems in legislating.0 6
Nevertheless, if a distinct rejection of an agency interpretation is pre-
sented to Congress and the proposal is the subject of hearings that result
in a differing piece of legislation, this provides a "new" legislative intent and
a new statute that can be interpreted. That is, the amending language and
its inter-relationship to the previously enacted wording must be looked at
anew. Moreover, if Congress is looking at an agency interpretation that
goes to the heart of regulatory authority, the lack of reversal is more impor-
tant than if the issue was peripheral. 20 7 In this instance, interpreting "wa-
199. See id. at 186 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 67, 69
(1988), in which he identifies three scenarios in which meaning is sometimes attached to
the fact that Congress did not act- "(1) the 'acquiescence rule, positing that if Congress
does not overturn a judicial or administrative interpretation it probably acquiesces in it; (2)
the 'reenactment rule,' which posits that a reenactment of the statute incorporates any set-
tled interpretations of the statute by courts or agencies; and (3) the 'rejected proposal rule,'
which posits that proposals rejected by Congress are an indication that the statue cannot
be interpreted to resemble the rejected proposals." Congressional activities in 1977 fall
into both category 1 and 2. Moreover, the resulting legislation also must be compared to
the proposal.
203. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 170.
204. See Eskridge, supra n. 202 (arguing that for every case praising use of subsequent
history, there are others condemning it).
205. Id. at 93-94, 99.
206. Id. at 105; George I. Lovell, That Sick Chicken Won't Hunt: The Limits of a Judicially
Enforced Non-Delegation Doctrine, 17 Const. Commentary 79, 96-97 (2000); Sandra B.
Zellmer, The Devil, The Details, and the Dawn of the 21" Century Administrative State: Be-
yond the New Deal, 32 Ariz. St. L.J. 941, 993 (2000).
207. Cf. Eskridge, supra n. 202, at 111 (presume Congressional intent to continue "build-
ing block interpretations," which are "authoritative and settled" and upon which parties
have probably relied and public decisionmakers have apparently relied in developing fur-
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ters of the United States" to include waters that affected interstate com-
merce was central to the § 404 permit program. Whether this interpreta-
tion was praised or damned, it was known in 1977, and remained known
until 2001. Social scientists tell us that legislators and regulators often re-
spond to interest groups that are organized and funded.2 °8 Courts, there-
fore, might be leery of reading inaction to disadvantage the disenfran-
chised. However, the Corps' rules affect real estate developers and
landowners;20 9 these are not powerless groups. Not only has Congress not
over-ruled the agency, but the regulatory interpretation has lasted since
1975; a time frame in which both Democratic and Republican hands con-
trolled the administrative agency itself.210 There have been opportunities to
change the interpretation both administratively or legislatively. Neverthe-
less, no one read the statute as "clearly" tying jurisdiction to some connec-
tion with traditional navigable waters until the majority opinion in Solid
Waste.
To bolster his conclusion that the statute was clear, Chief Justice
Rehnquist applied a canon of construction. Judges employ canons when
the words of a statute cannot be construed without some aid. Therefore,
on one level, this might be an admission that Congress was not clear and
therefore require Chevron deference to an agency interpretation. 2 1 Textu-
alists, however, tend to assume, rightly or wrongly, that legislators incor-
porate these canons into their drafting process.21 2 They also assume that
minute wording changes indicate conscious policy choices, belying the fact
that legislators do not always even read the statute as passed and fewer yet
ponder the results that would emerge from minor linguistic changes.1 3
Employing canons of construction is one way a judge can "clearly" point an
interpretation in a desired direction.
Canons can reflect ideological views. Some can be used to arrive at
contrary results in interpreting the same statute. For example, the "liberal
construction rule," or the canon that "remedial statutes are to be liberally
construed," could have been employed to broaden the reach of the CWA. 2- 4
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, chose to use the canon that agencies
ther legal rules).
208. Id. at 105.
209. See discussion about whether not activities in dredging and filling isolated waters or
wetlands tend to be "commercial", infra nn. 266-291.
210. The rules were promulgated under a Republican administration. Counting up to
January of 2001, there were Republican administrations in approximately 13 of the 25
years.
211. Merrill, supran. 182, at 988.
212. Id.
213. Noah, supran. 168, at271.
214. See Joel A. Mintz, Can You Reach New "Greens" if You Swing Old "Clubs"? Underuti-
lized Principles of Statutory Interpretation and Their Potential Applicability in Environmental
Cases, 7 Envtl. Law. 295, 302-08 (2001). Justice Scalia denigrates these particular can-
ons. Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 581, 581 (1990).
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cannot construe statutes in a way that raises serious constitutional ques-
215tions unless Congress gave a clear direction. Justice Stevens would not
have used this particular canon here; he thought both that Congress was
clear in its intention to stretch the Commerce Clause and also that the Mi-
gratory Bird Rule was constitutional. The canon, however, is used spo-
radically even when constitutional issues are acknowledged. An example
of a failure to use the canon is Rust v. Sullivan,21 6 in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist himself declares that the constitutional arguments about limit-
ing free speech by the so-called "gag" rule forbidding mention of abortion
are "not without some force," but were not enough to "carry the day."21 7 In
this instance, the canon was ignored; the majority deferred to agency in-
terpretation of a statute, Canon use is selective and subject to manipula-
tion.1 8 It therefore can undercut Chevron and elevate the judiciary above
the agency.
2 19
On all grounds, therefore, the statutory analysis in Solid Waste comes
across as strained and forced. The analysis differs from the earlier unani-
mous opinion in Bayside Riverview Homes, which Justice O'Connor and
Chief Justice Rehnquist had joined. The prior case devoted several early
pages to explaining why it was wrong to insist on reading a statute or regu-
lation narrowly in order to avoid the possibility of creating a taking,22 °
while the Solid Waste majority curtly states that there will be no Chevron
deference to the Corps of Engineers because the majority, including
O'Connor and Rehnquist, does not want to raise the spectre of constitu-
tional questions. Bayside Riverview Homes extensively reviews legislative
history, while Solid Waste almost ignores it. In sum, Solid Waste does not
do a convincing job of statutory interpretation. Entering the hazardous
realm of mind reading, it seems that the majority found something "foul"
about the Migratory Bird Rule, but could not muster the votes to find that
215. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 172. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Can-
ons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 316 (2000); EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Build-
ing & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (court allowed the canon of construing to
avoid constitutional issues trumped the result of Chevron).
216. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
217. Rust, 500 U.S. at 191. See Siedenfeld, supra n. 176, at 103 (arguing the case em-
bodies a pluralistic view of Chevron as it openly approved of an interpretation of statute
that was blatantly political).
218. Rust, 500 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that while the majority does
not dispute this canon of construction, it refuses to apply it).
219. William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86
Cornell L. Rev. 831, 866 (2001) (avoidance doctrine constrains Chevron and thus interferes
with the role of the Executive). The tactic may also denigrate the legislative branch. Jerry
L. Mashaw, Textualsm, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 827, 840 (1991) ("A court that sustains and applies a statute inter-
preted by reference to the [avoidance] canon shows no greater solicitude for legislative pref-
erences that does a court that attempts to understand what was meant and then engages
in a serious constitutional analysis of the validity of the statute."). In fact, whenever
judges choose to say "what the law is" pursuant to the first step of Chevron, there is the
tendency to elevate the judiciary.
220. Bayview Riverside, 474 U.S. at 126-29.
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it violated the Commerce Clause. Therefore, it ruled on statutory, not con-
stitutional grounds.
2. Commerce Clause: Preserving Battle Lines
The majority in Solid Waste refused to determine whether or not the
Migratory Bird Rule exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause and thus was invalid. Justice Stevens, however, argued that the
assertion of authority was constitutional.2 ' Prior to United States v. Lo-
pez, 22 2 most would have concurred with Justice Stevens. 2 2 The Lopez de-
cision heralded a potential change in attitude toward Commerce Clause ju-
risdiction. This happenstance strengthened the argument that the
Commerce Clause did not authorize federal regulation of an intra-state wa-
ter simply because it actually, or potentially, was a habit for migratory
birds. Therefore, if the majority had invalidated the regulation on constitu-
tional grounds, the Solid Waste decision would have been more intellectu-
ally honest, albeit more damaging for federal enforcement of environmental
law and an opinion, which would have ignored years of precedent. The
Supreme Court had allowed federal action under the Commerce Power in a
myriad of similar situations.
The Court signaled the power's breadth early in Gibbons v. Ogden.224
The State of New York had granted Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton
the exclusive right to operate steamboats. These men in turn assigned
Ogden an exclusive territory, which included trips to New Jersey. Gibbons
also desired to provide steamboat service between New York and New Jer-
sey and received a license from the United States government, enabling
him to conduct coastal trade. Before New York courts, Gibbons lost out to
the New York exclusive right. However, the Supreme Court reversed. In so
doing, the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Marshall, first had to
define "commerce" in the grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate
commerce. The Court noted that commerce was more than "buying and
selling." As the Court put it, "Commerce undoubtedly is traffic, but it is
something more; it is intercourse." More particularly, the constitutional
provision applies "to those internal concerns which affect the states in gen-
eral; but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which
do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere,
for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of government. 225
221. Some believe the presence of the argument in a dissent does not bode well. Christy
H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce By another Name: Lopez, Morrison, SWANCC and
Gibbs, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10413, 10428 n. 141 (2001] (arguing that finding the eloquent
commerce clause defense in the dissent of Solid Waste "may be worse for the future of en-
vironmental laws than not finding the arguments in the decision at all.").
222. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
223. Solid Waste, 191 F.3d at 849 (citing Rueth v. EPA, 13 F.3d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1993);
Leslie Salt Co. v. U.S., 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1990)).
224. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
225. Id. at 195.
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Steamboat service between two states, therefore, obviously would come
within this view of "commerce."
By 1937, the Supreme Court recognized that "direct" contact with in-
terstate commerce was not necessary. In National Labor Relations Board v.
Jones & Lughlin Steel Corporation,226 the Court turned to examining
whether there was a rational basis to believe there would be such contact.
The Court found that Congress could regulate intrastate activities that
"have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that
their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from
burdens and obstructions."22 7 Because the case involved a large, inte-
grated steel company, the stretch to include the activity in the federal in-
terstate commerce power was not too great. However, when the Court de-
cided in Wickard v. Filbun 2 8 to allow for aggregation of impacts, what
might be trivial in individual effect on interstate commerce became subject
to regulation when the total of the potential effects are added together.
229
Indeed, the Commerce Clause extended to Congress's desire to right the
moral wrongs of segregation, so long as the activities regulated had a real
and substantial relation to interstate commerce. 230 Therefore, the power
could be invoked to regulate a restaurant selling food locally if some of the
food traveled in interstate commerce.2 1 Because the economy is so much
more "national"-if not "global"-than the founders of the nation could ever
anticipate, the growth of the Commerce Clause is not surprising.
232
The extension of federal authority under the Commerce Clause, how-
ever, was not to the liking of everyone. In a concurrence, Chief Justice
Rehnquist once stated that:
[O]ne of the greatest 'fictions' of our federal system is that Congress exer-
cises only those powers delegated to it, while the remainder are reserved to
the States or the people. The manner in which this Court has construed
the Commerce Clause amply illustrates this fiction ... one could easily get
the sense from this Court's opinions that the federal system exists only at
the sufferance of the Congress.2
3
Nevertheless, it was clear by 1995 that Commerce Clause jurisdiction ex-
226. 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding National Labor Relations Act).
227. Id. at 37.
228. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the application of the Agricultural Adjustment Act to
the growing of wheat for home consumption).
229. Some argued this meant that just about anything could pass the test. Richard A.
Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 167, 173
(1996) (Wickard test "facilitated unlimited expansion of the scope of the commerce power.").
See Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1089, 1150 (2000) (decision in Wickard abandoning judicially enforced limita-
tions on the commerce clause representing assuming a posture more related to the age).
230. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
231. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 304, 304-05 (1964).
232. It would, of course, be distressing to those who desire to follow either the original
linguistic meaning of the Constitution or the original intent of the drafters as founders of
the government. See Barnett, infra n. 254.
233. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 307-08 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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tended to three areas: "(1) regulation of the channels of interstate com-
merce; (2) regulation or protection of the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; or (3) regulation of
activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce."234 The last ele-
ment was critically examined in the Lopez case.
In Lopez, the Supreme Court reviewed a statute that made it a federal
crime to possess a firearm in a school zone. The statute had difficulties
crossing the "substantially affects interstate commerce" threshold for three
reasons. First, it was a criminal statue and therefore was not directly re-
lated to commercial activity. Second, the statute did not require any fire-
arm in question to have affected interstate commerce. Third, the Court be-
lieved that Congress offered no legislative findings sufficient to show that
possessing a gun in a school zone affected interstate commerce.ms Addi-
tionally, the Lopez Court, like Chief Justice Rehnquist in Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining Association,236 emphasized that the impact on interstate
commerce must be "substantial," not merely an impact on interstate com-
merce. 2 37 Some courts which had previously upheld the Migratory Bird
Rule as constitutional did so because they believed that the government
need only show destruction of an isolated wetland would have "some
minimal, potential effect on interstate commerce" to assert jurisdiction and
the minimal potential effect was shown by proof that the subject wetland
provided suitable habitat for migratory birds.238 Passing a test requiring a
minimal "substantial" impact is not necessarily the same as passing a rig-
idly imposed substantial impact test.23 9 Nevertheless, the Migratory Bird
Rule could meet the test through aggregation. Each habitat alone might
not be crucial to the survival of a species, but removal of habitats one by
one may lead to a death by a thousand cuts.
2 4 °
Cases since Lopez have examined the Rule and grappled with the is-
234. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
235. Id. at 559-62.
236. Hodel 452 U.S. 264.
237. Compare idL at310-11:
Our cases have consistently held that the regulated activity must have a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce.... Moreover, simply because Congress may
conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does
not necessarily make it so. Congress' findings must be supported by a "rational
basis" and are reviewable by the courts.
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring), with Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-67.
238. Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1993).
239. Compare the problem of changed standards with Justice Souter's belief that the
statute struck down in U.S. v. Morrison would have passed muster at anytime after
Wickard and before Lopez. U.S. v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1764 (2000) (arguing the ma-
jorities in Lopez and Morrison maintained only a nominal adherence to the substantial ef-
fects test).
240. See U.S. v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1993), cert denied 510 U.S. 1110 (1994)
(need no individual, site specific impact on interstate commerce; adjacent wetlands, as a
class, have substantial impact on interstate commerce). Lori J. Warner, The Potential Im-
pact of United States v. Lopez on Environmental Regulation, 7 Duke Envtl. L. & Policy 321.
352 (1997) (aggregation will allow the Rule to reach the substantial threshold).
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sue of substantiality. One post-Lopez case did not change its prior ruling
that the Migratory Bird Rule passed muster. 2 A Justice Thomas, however,
in dissenting from a denial of certiorari in the case, expressed his belief
that the Rule might not remain viable: "The point of Lopez was to explain
that the activity on the land to be regulated must substantially affect inter-
state commerce before Congress can regulate it pursuant to its Commerce
Clause Power."2 2 Moreover, he questioned whether the relationship to
commerce was sufficient, suggesting the fact "that substantial interstate
commerce depends on the continued existence of migratory birds does not
give the Corps carte blanc authority to regulate every property migratory
birds could use as habitat."
2 4 3
Some people have difficulty recognizing that habitat control is related
to interstate commerce because they believe that the birds are not in com-
merce until they are photographed or shot at. Essentially, they argue that
people, not birds, are engaged in commerce.24 To a certain extent, this is
a truism. But requiring people to be in the picture does not end the analy-
sis. People travel to bird watch or hunt only if there is a possibility that
they will be able to indulge in their avocation. If all habitat is destroyed,
there will be no migratory birds and thus no opportunity to pursue the in-
terstate commerce. Although people may be necessary to have com-
merce,245 the habitat of the birds is a part of that commercial setting even
before a person sees a particular bird. 6 Migratory birds, by definition,
need habitat in places along their routes. Placing a bag limit on hunters is
meaningless if there are no ducks. Moreover, because the loss of habitat
in one place endangers the ability of the birds to make it to another state,
241. Leslie Salt Co. v. U.S., 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995), cert denied sub nora., Cargill, Inc.
v. U.S.. 516 U.S. 955 (1995).
242. Cargill Inc., v. U.S., 516 U.S. 955 (denial of certiorari) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
243. Id. See Jonathan H. Adler, wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Com-
merce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 Envtl. L. 1,
38 (1999) ("The particular activities-hunting, bird watching, and so on-may, at times,
be subject to federal authority, but that does not place every environment upon which
these activities rely, or in which they may occur, within federal jurisdiction.").
244. The Plaintiffs made this point when they argued that because the area was closed to
the public, it could not affect commerce, and was discussed in Solid Waste, 998 F. Supp.
at 949. See discussion in Hoffman Homes, 961 F.2d 1310, 1320 (7th Cir. 1992)(Manion,
J.) and picked up in a later concurrence in the case, 999 F.2d at 262; Douglas v. Seacoast
Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 285-86 (1977) (holding that the Commerce Clause authorizes
regulation of taking of fish in state waters, but analyzed the interstate commerce aspect as
not being that fish naturally moved, but that fishing boats and fish to be processed after
capture crossed state lines).
245. Especially if one views "commerce" as being limited to "buying and selling" and not
all engagement in economic activity. Justice Thomas takes the former view. See Randy E.
Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 101, 101-02
(2001).
246. Palila v. Haw. Dept of Land and Nat. Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 995 (D. Haw.
1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981). See Julia A. Olson, The Environmental Takings
Doctrine, Lopez's Return to State Power, and Impacts on Environmental Protection: A Look at
isolated Wetlands Regulation, 4 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. & Policy 187, 192-93 (1998).
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concerted federal protection is appropriate. 247 The need to preserve habi-
tat, however, creates another barrier to federal jurisdiction in some minds.
Chief Justice Rehnquist identifies the Corps' decisions as being land
use regulation, not wildlife protection or environmental regulation. There-
fore, he voices concern that federal regulation under the Migratory Bird
Rule "would result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional
and primary power over land and water use."248 The Lopez case, and its
successor, United States v. Morrison,249 talk of preserving traditional state
functions to the state.25 ° If land use regulation is such a state function,
defining it is crucial. The Supreme Court has attempted to distinguish
land use decision making from environmental protection:
The line between environmental regulation and land use planning will not
always be bright; for example, one may hypothesize a state environmental
regulation so severe that a particular land use would become commercially
impracticable. However, the core activity described by each phrase is un-
doubtedly different. Land use planning in essence chooses particular uses
for the land; environmental regulation, at its core, does not mandate par-
ticular uses of the land but requires only that, however the land is used,
damage to the environment is kept within prescribed limits. 251
It is not clear that requiring a permit, which could create a modification of
the planned development in certain ways, is anything but environmental
regulation under this definition. Apparently, Chief Justice Rehnquist is
concerned with the ability of the Corps to veto development plans, which
arguably would determine what particular use could be made of the
land. 252
Accepting, arguendo, both that § 404 permitting equals land use
planning and that land use is a "traditional state function," the federal sys-
tem in the CWA exempts many activities from the need to obtain a permit.
These exempted activities include "normal farming, silviculture, and ranch-
ing activities such as plowing, seeding, cultivating, minor drainage, har-
vesting for the production of food, fiber and forest products or upland soil
247. But see Adler, supra n. 243 (arguing that there will be no "race to the bottom" by the
states; state regulation will not sacrifice wetlands in the state in favor of development);
Ruhl, supra n. 11, at 1474-88 (arguing against the expanded commerce clause and con-
tracted nondelegation doctrine in favor of state led experiments with environmental law
enforcement). States are, however, allowed to implement their own programs in regard to
fill of most waters that are not navigable. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(i)(1)(A), 404(i)(1)(A) (1994).
248. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 174.
249. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (invalidating § 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act,
which allowed for civil federal suit against sexual assaulters).
250. See generally id.; Lopez, 514 U.S at 567-68; Adler, supra n. 243, at 17 (for criminal
laws, states do not have an impetus to lessen the strength of laws).
251. Cal. Coastal, 480 U.S. at 587.
252. Cf Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 407
(1995) (mere requirement of permit changes the balance and makes a landowner into a
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and water conservation practice3s as well as "maintenance... of cur-
rently serviceable structures such as dikes, dams, levees, groins, riprap,
breakwaters, causeways, and bridge abutments or approaches, and trans-
portation structures."254 Moreover, there is an exemption for any activity
for which a state has a area-wide waste treatment plan. 5 5 Therefore, the
CWA expressly exempts many land-use type decisions from federal
hands.5 6 Moreover, as Justice Stevens notes, it is hard to fault a statute
on federalism grounds when the statute allows a state to assume jurisdic-
tion over the questioned activities if it so chooses.
25 7
Moreover, whatever might have at one point supported the conclusion
that land use is a "traditional state function," the view is out of date, just
as the elusive search for traditional state functions has been discredited.
Land use very well may be a federal venue in reality. As Justice Powell
noted earlier:
The Surface Mining Act mandates an extraordinarily intrusive program of
federal regulation and control of land use and land reclamation, activities
normally left to state and local governments. But the decisions of this
Court over many years make clear that, under the Commerce Clause,
Congress has the power to enact this legislation.25 8
As knowledge of ecology increases, the recognition that purportedly "local"
activities are inter-connected grows. An isolated wetland or water is not
truly "isolated" if it is part of a system that is linked and used in concert
with other lands. Land use, just like air and water pollution, has the po-
tential to create impacts that are interstate in character. Moreover, if
states or local governments devalue the natural resource over other values,
the loss is distributed on those who have had no participation in the deci-
sion. Both in legal and scientific reality, therefore, the rhetoric that land
use is of peculiarly local concern should remain rhetoric.
There is an additional problem with curbing federal commerce clause
jurisdiction because it might encroach on matters that are traditionally
within the province of states. The United States is a federal system, with
two levels of government. The wording of this gloss on Commerce Clause
jurisdiction is reminiscent of the debate on the limitations the Tenth
Amendment places on federal jurisdiction. In a Tenth Amendment chal-
lenge, a pair of cases considered whether the minimum-wage and overtime
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) applied to state enter-
prises. In the first, National League of Cities v. Usery,2 5 9 the Supreme
Court found Congress could not impose these regulations against the
253. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344()(1)(A), 404()(1)(A) (1994).
254. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(I(1)(B) (1994).
255. 33 U.S.C. § 1344()(1)(F) (1994).
256. Craig, supran. 187.
257. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
258. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 305 (Powell, J., concurring).
259. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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States because the Tenth Amendment limited Congress's ability when the
federal legislation could "displace the States' freedom... in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions."260 The Court did not offer a general expla-
nation of how a "traditional" function is to be distinguished from a "non-
traditional" one. In the second case considering the issue, the Supreme
Court backed off of this test.26 ' It found that attempting to define state
sovereignty in a search for traditional governmental functions lead to an
abyss. Instead, it relied on a structural mechanism to avoid federal intru-
sions by general laws on state functions.6 2 Justices Burger, Powell,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor dissented from the later case. Therefore, it is not
necessarily surprising to hear the echoes of this abandoned theory in the
more recent Commerce Clause cases.26
Another theme running through the recent Commerce Clause cases is
the distinction between commercial and non-commercial activity. Suppos-
edly, simply possessing a gun is not a commercial or economic activity;26 4
nor is gender-based violence.2 65 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that there
might have been some confusion over what was being regulated in Solid
Waste because of some references to the activity being a landfill.26 6 Al-
though Chief Justice Rehnquist did not expressly make the commer-
cial/non-commercial or economic/non-economic distinction in Solid
Waste, some commentators emphasize that many people required to get §
404 permits are not engaged in "commercial" activities, but are seeking to
do something such as improve a house.26 7 Although an individual derives
personal pleasure from a home, the improved house will also become an
asset that may be the basis of a loan or other commercial activity. The
house will, of course, be sold at some time. It is very rare that a land use
regulation totally destroys a life-long dream with no financial implica-
tions.2 68 Because of the central part that land and its development plays in
260. Idl. at 852.
261. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
262. Id.
263. In N.Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Justice O'Connor stated that Commerce Clause
jurisdiction and the Tenth Amendment limitation on it may simply be two sides of one ar-
gument: "In the end, just as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference
whether one views the question at issue in this case as one of ascertaining the limits of the
power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative provisions of the Consti-
tution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth
Amendment." Id. at 159.
264. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-65. See Lori J. Warner, The Potential Impact of United States
v. Lopez on Environmental Regulation, 7 Duke Envtl. L. & Policy Forum 321, 341 (1997)
(Lopez requires two findings: activity is "economic" and the regulated activity substantially
affects interstate commerce).
265. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751 ("Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any
sense of the phrase, economic activity").
266. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 173.
267. See e.g. Adler, supra n. 243, at 34.
268. But see Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997) (widow un-
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wealth accumulation, it is not an untoward stretch to view all land devel-
opment as commercial. Justice Breyer warns that the commercial/non-
commercial distinction is subject to manipulation,269 which might be the
case with the argument that any person's home is also "commercial" or
"economic." The distinction between types of land development, however,
is artificial and could lead to irrational results.2 7 0 Nevertheless, the major-
ity in Morrison, which was the same majority as in Solid Waste and Lopez,
implies that there could be an import in the distinction: "While we need not
adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of an noneconomic
activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's history our
cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only
where that activity is economic in nature."27 1 Therefore, whether or not the
regulation is viewed as commercial or economic will influence how "sub-
stantial" the impact on interstate commerce habitat destruction will have.
Based on current precedent and predilections of the Justices,2 7 2 there
is a plausible argument that the Migratory Bird Rule goes beyond Con-
gress's authority under the Commerce Clause, and thus could not be
promulgated by the Corps of Engineers. This argument, however, can also
be more than plausibly rebutted. The fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas did not invalidate
the regulation on constitutional grounds may indicate some hesitancy in
the coalition to directly dismantle either the basic framework of environ-
mental laws or their more seemingly attenuated applications. The Su-
preme Court has also denied certiorari to review two cases arising under
the Endangered Species Act ("ESA). 27 3 One of the cases had presented en-
ticing facts for a Commerce Clause attack on the particular application of
the ESA. the case dealt with a fly native to only California that blocked im-
provements at a hospital27 4 In both this case and the other unreviewed
27*5circuit court case, the judges had vigorously argued the interstate com-
merce aspects of species protection and upheld the use of the statute's
269. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
270. For example, it might be appropriate to make a federal crime out of arson of an
apartment building, but not of a house. See generally Dral & Phillips, supra n. 221 (citing
Jones v. U.S., 120 S. Ct 1904 (2000)).
271. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751.
272. Justice Thomas joined majority in Morrison and also wrote a concurrence in which
he expressed the opinion that the "substantial effect" on interstate commerce test goes be-
yond the original meaning of the framers, namely that commerce means "buying and sell-
ing." Therefore, the Justices should trim back Commerce Clause authority even more. Id.
at 1759 (Thomas, J., concurring). He also expressed this opinion in Lopez, 514 U.S. at
586((Thomas, J., concurring). See Barnett, supra n. 245.
273. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994).
274. Nat Assn. of Home Bldrs. v. Babbitt 130 F.3d 1041, 1041-57 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (ESA
"take" provision as applied to an endangered fly found only in California was within Com-
merce Clause), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
275. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 492-94 (4th Cir. 2000) (prohibition of acts on private
property that would "take" a red wolf even if the same were re-introduced to historic range
was valid), cert. denied sub nom., Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).
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"take" provisions to deter activity on private lands. The Supreme Court
has not over-ruled this precedent, but simply continues to pull at some
dangling threads from its prior Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
IV. NONDELEGATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: AMERICAN TRUCKING
The Supreme Court looked at a second question, which is related to
the Commerce Clause issue of whether the federal government can regu-
late private activity. The second question is whether Congress may regu-
late in the manner it chose. The Constitution vests "[a]ll legislative Powers
"276herein granted... in a Congress of the United States. In Whitman v.
American Trucking Association, Inc.,277 the Court considered if Congress
could regulate air pollution by delegating standard setting to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency in the manner it did. No one questioned that the
Commerce Clause authorized Congress to act in response to air pollution.
A. Background of the Case
1. Factual and Regulatory Predicate
The factual predicate for the decision was that the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency ("EPA) had revamped the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards ("NAAQS") for ozone and particulate matter ("PM"). Under the
Clean Air Act ("CAA"), the EPA sets standards that delineate how much of a
pollutant will be allowed in the outdoor air.278 The EPA is therefore looking
at pollution's effects, because it is seeking to attain a certain environmental
quality for the air. The NAAQS look to the receiving medium-the air. For
example, a standard may read "no more than x parts of the pollutant per
million parts of air." Once the standards are set, someone must determine
how to get to the standards, that is, how to remove pollutants from the air
if the amount currently emitted exceeds the NAAQS. The Clean Air Act
implements the standards by allowing states to tell polluters how to reach
the goal. 279 The Act also envisions that the EPA will re-examine the NAAQS
every five years to see if they need revision.28 °
276. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
277. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
278. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (1994). See Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitu-
tional?, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 303, 314 (1999): Scott R. Humphrey, Drawing Lines: The D.C. Cir-
cuit Forces the EPA and Congress to Clean Up the Process of Setting Air Quality Standards in
American Trucking, 37 Hous. L. Rev. 859, 863-865 (2000).
279. The Clean Air Act ("CAA7) envisions that states will come up with a State Implemen-
tation Plan (or "SIP") for each conventional pollutant. The SIP tells polluters how to cut
down on the regulated pollutant. The SIP includes "emission limitations, schedules, and
timetables." The SIP should enable the state to attain (which is a word of art under the
statute) compliance with the standards. Obviously, the time patterns Congress initially set
did not work; the 1970 Act anticipated standards being attained within three years of mak-
ing a SIP. See generally Train v. Nat Resources Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
280. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1) discussed in Sunstein, supra n. 278, at 321-22.
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The EPA did the same in regard to ozone28l and PM28 2 on July 17,
1997. Both these pollutants are non-threshold pollutants, that is, scien-
tists do not believe there is any level that would be a "safe" exposure
level.28 3 Therefore, the only standard that would completely protect human
health would be one that refused to allow any of the pollutant in the ambi-
ent air. The EPA did not set the NAAQS at zero. For ozone, it set the level
at 0.08ppm, or parts per million, which was down from 0.09 ppm. 284 The
CAA requires the standard to be set, both initially and upon revision, at
the level "requisite to protect the public health" with an "adequate margin
of safety."285 It is this portion of the CAA that the Court of Appeals found
violated the principles of nondelegation.
2. The D.C. Circuit's "Bombshell" on Delegation
The Court of Appeals, in an opinion authored by Judge Williams, also
looked at the factors the EPA considered in setting the standard at a level
other than the risk-free zero. These are "the nature and severity of the
health effects involved, the size of the sensitive population(s) at risk, the
types of health information available, and the kind and degree of uncer-
tainties that must be addressed."2s Judge Williams had no problem with
the factors in and of themselves. In line with a prior case of the Circuit2 7
American Trucking I held that the factors were appropriate and, most im-
portantly, consideration of the cost to meet them was not appropriate.
What created the difficulty was that the EPA did not specify how it would
determine the degree to which residual harm would be acceptable:
For EPA to pick any non-zero level it must explain the degree of imperfec-
tion permitted. The factors EPA has elected to examine for this purpose in
themselves pose no inherent nondelegation problem. But what EPA lacks
is any determinate criterion for drawing lines. It has failed to state intelli-
gibly how much is too much.28 8
In other words, the EPA determined that it would make the cut based on
height, but never answered how tall was tall?2 9
281. NAAQS for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38856 (codified in 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.9, 50.10 (2001)).
282. NAAQS for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38652 (codified in 40 C.F.R. 50.7 (2001)).
283. There is some scientific indeterminancy for particulate matter, but the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals believed that this distinction was immaterial for either its analysis or that
of the EPA. Am. Trucking Assns., Inc. v. U.S. EnvtL Protection Agency, 175 F.3d at 1034, on
rehearing, 195 F.3d 4, affd in part and rev'd in part, 121 S. Ct. 903. On the administrative
record for these particular standards, see Sunstein, supra n. 278, at 324-330.
284. See Patricia Ross McCubbin, The D.C. Circuit Gives New Life and New Meaning to the
Nondelegation Doctrine in American Trucking Ass'ns. v. EPA, 19 Va. Entl. L.J. 57, 65-66
(2000). Issues specific to the particulate matter standard were not included on certiorari.
285. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994).
286. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1033-34 (quoting the Ozone Final Rule, 62 Fed Reg. 8818,
8832 (Feb. 26, 1997)).
287. Lead Indus.Assn. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
288. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1033.
289. Id. at 1033-35.
20011 249
45
Mansfield: By the Dawn's Early Light: The Administrative State Still Stands
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
This lack of determinate guidance in either the statute or the imple-
menting agency criteria violated the prohibition against delegating legisla-
tive power to agencies. Judge Williams did not find the EPA's explanation
that more people would be protected at the lower standard sufficient; the
argument could just as easily apply to an even lower standard.2 9 ° Without
an "intelligible principle" to guide an agency, the agency could not simply
say that it could set the standard within a reasonable range based on "pol-
icy."291 According to Judge Williams, the EPA would have the discretion to
set the standard from zero to just below the concentration that led to the
London killer fog.
292
The remedy for this violation was not invalidation of the CAA provi-
sion. According to Judge Williams, the court should remand to the agency
so that it could attempt to interpret the statute in a manner that will pass
constitutional muster:
Where (as here) statutory language and an existing agency interpretation
involve an unconstitutional delegation of power, but an interpretation
without the constitutional weakness is or may be available, our response
is not to strike down the statute but to give the agency an opportunity to
extract a determinate standard.29 3
This would curb possible arbitrary agency action because its interpretation
on remand would bind the agency in the future.294 Additionally, according
to Judge Williams, the interpretation would facilitate judicial review. Curb-
ing arbitrary action and enabling judicial review are two goals of the non-
295delegation doctrine.
In remanding to the agency, the circuit court opinion rejects a
"strong" nondelegation principle, which would have required the statute to
be struck down. In the opinion on rehearing, the rationale for rejecting
this course of action is elaborated. In a prior Supreme Court case, known
29
as the Benzene case, the Supreme Court's plurality expounded that the
court itself should ascertain the "intelligible principle" of a questioned stat-
ute from the purpose of the statute, its background and the statutory con-
text of the language being examined 297 The D.C. Circuit of Appeals, how-
ever, believed that the "approach of the Benzene case, in which the
Supreme Court itself identified an intelligible principle in an ambiguous
290, Id. at 1035-37.
291. Id. at 1037 ("The latter phrase [,policy judgment,] is not, after all, a self-sufficient
justification for every refusal to define limits.").
292. Id. at 1037.
293. Id. at 1038.
294. Cass Sunstein describes this as a true new doctrine, which would require an agency
to place "floors" and "ceilings" on its discretion. Sunstein, supra n. 278, at 348-49.
295. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038. Judge Williams acknowledges a third goal would
not be met, namely, requiring Congress to make any policy choices.
296. Indus. Union Dept. v. Am Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
297. Id. at 642, 646 (Stevens, J., plurality).
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statute has given way to the approach of Chevron."298 The Chevron case
held that when a statute is ambiguous, it is up to the agency to make the
relevant policy choices, so long as its reading of the statute is reason-
able.299 Therefore, the agency itself must provide a binding interpretation
of what the statute requires of it in setting the NAAQS.
On rehearing, the EPA said that the Act required them to do what was
"necessary", no more or less, and that a standard 95 percent confidence
interval separates health effects that could be the product of chance from
health effects a regulated pollutant caused.300 The panel, however, contin-
ued the remand for the EPA to apply the purported standard.30 l The D.C.
Circuit panel also modified the statement of its ruling on the EPA's inter-
pretation of how to implement the new standards in areas that have not
attained the revised standard, so-called nonattainment areas. The portion
of the CAA that dealt with implementation plans for nonattainment areas
had two subparts. At issue was which one applied: either Subpart 1 or
Subpart 2.302 The court revised its conclusion to read: "In sum, because
the reference to § 107(d) in § 181(a) 1) includes the designation of an area
as nonattainment for ozone under a revised ozone NAAQS, that is, under §
107(d)(1), the EPA can enforce a revised primary ozone NAAQS only in con-
formity with Subpart 2. 3 Specialized schedules for compliance with the
standard would be applicable; these would grant potentially more time for
attainment than the general schedule of Subpart 1. The panel also rein-
forced its ruling that the beneficent impacts of ozone should be considered
in setting the standard.3 0°4 The D.C. Circuit refused to hear the case en
banc.30
5
B. Supreme Court and the Nondelegation Doctrine
The questions raised on certiorari were four-fold.306 First, did the CAA
298. Am. Trucking, 195 F.3d at 8 (referring to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S.
837 (1984)).
299. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
300. Am. Trucking, 195 F.3d at 6 n. 1.
301. Id. at 7.
302. The references in the cases to "Subpart 1 and Subpart 2" can be confusing without
an understanding of the structure of The Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 to 7671(q)
(1994)). The first division of the Act is into seven subchapters: Subchapter I - Programs
and Activities; Subchapter II - Emission Standards for Moving Sources; Subchapter III-
General Provisions; Subchapter IV - Noise Pollution; Subchapter IV-A - Acid Disposition;
Subchapter V- Permits; and Subchapter VI - Stratospheric Ozone Protection. These Sub-
chapters are also referred to as "Titles" and some of them are further divided into Parts.
For example, Subchapter or Title I, which is at issue in the case, is divided into 4 parts.
Part D is entitled "Plan Requirements for Nonattainment Areas." Part D contains 6 sub-
parts, which include subparts 1 and 2. Subpart I is entitled "Nonattainment Areas in
General" and Subpart 2 is entitled "Additional Provisions for Ozone Nonattainment Areas."
43 USC §§ 7501-7509(a), 7511-7511() (1994).
303. A. Trucking, 195 F.3d at 10.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 14.
306. See An. Trucking, 121 S. Ct. at 907.
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in § 109(b)(1) delegate legislative power to the EPA? Second, whether the
EPA may consider costs in setting the NAAQS? Third, whether there was
jurisdiction to review the EPA's interpretation of Part D in regard to imple-
menting the revised ozone NAAQS? And finally, if there was jurisdiction,
whether the EPA's interpretation of the statute was reasonable? The first
two questions could have been explosive if answered positively. In these
major constitutional and environmental law interpretations, however, the
Supreme Court continued the status quo. The Court unanimously found
that the CAA did not require nor allow the costs of implementation to be
considered in setting the NAAQS. 3 °7 It had a similar response to the dele-
gation issue.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the D.C. Circuit's finding that the
EPA's interpretation of § 109(b)(1) of the CAA violated the nondelegation
doctrine because it did not provide an "intelligible principle," namely, a de-
terminate method to "draw lines."30 8 Justice Scalia, speaking for seven jus-
tices including himself,30 9 emphasized that the D.C. Circuit invalidated not
the statute, but the agency interpretation. 310 The statute, of course, in-
structs the EPA to "set ambient air quality standards which in the judg-
ment of the Administrator, based on [the] criteria [documents of § 1081 and
allowing an adequate margin of safety are requisite to protect the public
health."
311
The Court quickly rejected the "new" brand of nondelegation the D.C.
Circuit forwarded, which focuses on an agency interpretation, rather than
a statute. Justice Scalia noted that the Supreme Court had never allowed
an agency to cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power to itself by the
agency limiting its own discretion:
307. There was a disagreement on why this was so. All the justices but Justice Breyer
joined in Justice Scalia's discussion of the matter. Justice Scalia found the words "public
health," protection of which is the goal of the NAAQS, to mean the "health of the public."
Am. 7ucking, 121 S. Ct. at 909. Because the CAA directly imposes the requirement to
consider costs in other portions of the CAA, Justice Scalia held that to require cost-
consideration on the NAAQS-setting process would require a "textual commitment of au-
thority to the EPA... [which] must be a clear one." Id. at 909-10. The Court did not find
such a commitment. Justice Breyer agreed with the result, but not the reasoning. He
would find silence in a statute about whether the important policy question of whether
costs could be considered to indicate, all other things being equal, that the agency could
decide whether or not to include such a factor as part of "rational regulation." Id. at 921
(Breyer, J., concurring.). However, he believed that legislative history and the CAA's struc-
ture, showed a congressional decision to not allow cost consideration. For example, the
history is clear that Congress meant the Act to be "technology forcing." Id. at 922. More-
over, the CAA did not require regulation to the point of destroying industrialization because
the statute does not require elimination of all risk and provides for discretion. Id. at 923-
24. For a contrary argument, see C. Boyden Gray, The Search for an Intellgible Principle:
Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 5 Tex. Rev. L. & Policy 1, 28-37
(2000).
308. Am. Tucking, 121S. Ct. at 912.
309. Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, but with a dif-
ferent rationale. Justice Souter joined with him. Justice Thomas joined in Justice Scalia's
opinion and also wrote a special concurrence.
310. Am. Trucking, 121 S. Ct. at 912.
311. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994).
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The idea that an agency can cure an unconstitutionally standardless dele-
gation of power by declining to exercise some of that power seems to us in-
ternally contradictory. The very choice of which portion of the power to
exercise that is to say, the prescription of the standard Congress omitted
would itself- be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority. Whether
the statute delegates legislative power is a question for the courts, an
agency's voluntary self-denial has no bearing upon the answer.
3 12
In Justice Scalia's opinion, it was crucial to determine whether the statute
granted legislative power to the agency or not.313 He reads Article I, § 1 as
being exclusive when it vests "[all legislative powers herein granted... in a
Congress of the United States." Therefore, the Court had to determine
what constituted legislation.
Justice Scalia returns to the idea that if Congress, in the statute,
supplies an "intelligible principle" for the agency, then it is Congress, not
the agency, that is legislating. Such an intelligible principle had been
found in the past when Congress required an agency to make certain that
holding companies are not "unduly or unnecessarily complicate[d]"3 14 or
required agencies to regulate in the "public interest."315 Therefore, the
delegation to the EPA was not of legislative power; the guidance given it
was within the parameters of what had been approved in the past. The
statute instructs the EPA to set the standards at a level that is "requisite"
to protect the public health with an adequate margin of safety. The Court
interpreted "requisite" to mean "not lower or higher than is necessary."3 16
This guidance was similar to instructing the Attorney General in a criminal
setting to designate a drug as a controlled substance if "necessary to avoid
an imminent hazard to the public safety."317 Moreover, the statutory word-
ing also resembled the standard for the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, which was litigated in the Benzene case.3 18 Justice Scalia noted that
the only justice hearing the Benzene case who objected to the statute on
nondelegation grounds would not have done so if OSHA did not have dis-
cretion to consider costs in setting standards. In the CAA, the EPA was
not given such discretion3 1 9 Therefore, the discretion afforded the EPA in
American Trcking was deemed acceptable and not legislative power.
312. Am. Trucking, 121 S. Ct. at 912.
313. Id.
314. Id. (citing Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946)) (upholding the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935).
315. Id. (citing Nat. Broad. Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190, 225-226 (1943) (regulation of air-
waves), N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. U.S., 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932) (approval of railroad merg-
ers).
316. Id. at 914.
317. Id. at 912 (quoting statute at issue in Touby v. U.S., 500 U.S. 160, 163 (1991)).
318. Am. Trucking, 121 S. Ct. at 912 (quoting the statute at issue in Indus. Union Dept
AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.607, 646 (1980) (instructing OSHA to set the stan-
dard "which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best avail-
able evidence, that no employee will suffer any impairment of health")).
319. Id. (citing to Indus. Union, 448 U.S. at 671 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) and Am. Tex-
tile Mfr. Inst., Inc., v. Donovan, 452, U.S. 490, 545 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
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Justice Scalia found no need for "determinant criterion:"
But even in sweeping regulatory schemes we have never demanded, as the
Court of Appeals did here, that statutes provide a 'determinate criterion'
for saying 'how much [of the regulated harm] is too much.' In Touby, for
example, we did not require the statute to decree how 'imminent' was too
imminent, or how 'necessary' was necessary enough, or even-most rele-
vant here-how 'hazardous' was too hazardous.
320
The majority opinion, therefore, made no startling developments in non-
delegation law precedents.
The only potential "quirk" the decision places in constitutional law is
the acknowledgment that "the degree of agency discretion that is accept-
able varies according to the to the scope of the power congressionally con-
ferred."3 21 Justice Scalia, by way of illustration, notes that Congress need
give no direction for the EPA to define "country elevators" exempt from
some requirements, but Congress would have to give more guidance on
"setting air standards that affect the entire national economy."322 Thus,
Justice Scalia seems to make distinctions on how much discretion is ap-
propriate based on the impact of the regulation.3 2 3 The two concurring
opinions, however, called for more linguistic honesty, yet arived at diamet-
rically opposed conclusions.
In one concurrence, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, called
for acknowledging that agency rule-making is delegation of legislative au-
thority, but is not unconstitutional if an "intelligible principle" is pro-
324
vided 4. Justice Stevens noted that the EPA set prospectively binding
standards. If Congress had enacted the rules, its activity would definitely
be deemed legislative; the characterization of the activity should not vary
with the player. The fiction of stating that what agencies do is not legisla-
tion arises from the erroneous belief that Article I, section 1 of the Consti-
tution (which states that "all legislative Powers" are vested in Congress)
precludes delegation of the power. These justices would therefore prefer
that the law be more straightforward and honest about what is being done,
both pragmatically and in regard to constitutional theory.
3 2 5
Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, also seemed to promote linguis-
tic purity, but with an opposite conclusion. At some point, he believes that
agency rule making is legislation and therefore constitutionally suspect
even with an "intelligible principle:" "I believe that there are cases in which
320. Id. at 913.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Others have suggested that differing amounts of discretion without running afoul of
delegation norms is tied to whether or not the Executive has independent power to deal
with the issue. See e.g. David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It
Substance?, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1223, 1260-61 (1985).
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the principle is intelligible, yet the significance of the delegated decision is
simply too great for the decision to be called anything other than 'legisla-
tive.'"326 He emphasizes the "All" in Article I, § 1 of the Constitution; to him
this precludes any delegation of "true" legislative authority.327 Because the
parties to this case had not attacked the precedents allowing an "intelligi-
ble principle" to govern whether or not legislative authority was delegated,
this question was not broached. As with the majority, Justice Thomas ap-
pears to consider the problem of assigning responsibility to be one of de-
gree in order to ascertain the boundaries of constitutional separation of
powers.
C. Supreme Court and Judicial Review
The Court also looked at questions of administrative law and was
unanimous in the response to the question of whether the EPA correctly
assessed its authority to implement the revised ozone NAAQS in areas in
which the ozone levels exceed the maximum amount allowed by the stan-
dard. First, the Court determined both that there had been final agency
action and that it was ripe for judicial review.328 The Court then had to as-
certain if the EPA's interpretation was correct. The EPA stated that sub-
part 1 of Part D-"Nonattainment Areas in General"329-- would apply im-
mediately to the new hour-hour ozone standards. Subpart 2 -"Additional
Provisions for Ozone Nonattainment Areas"330 -would continue to apply to
those areas until the old one-hour standard is met. When that standard is
attained, then Subpart 2 would no longer apply.
331
The Supreme Court disagreed with both the Court of Appeals and the
EPA The Court of Appeals had held that the statute was clear and Sub-
part 2 controlled the implementation of the revised ozone standard. 32
However, the Supreme Court, in employing the two-step review process of
Chevron,333 found that Congress had not spoken clearly on the matter. It
326. Id. at 920 (Thomas, J., concurring).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 914-16. Section 397(b)(1) of the CAA provides for jurisdiction in the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for review of "any... nationally applicable regulations promul-
gated, or final action taken, by the Administrator." 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1994). The
Court found "final action" because the agency had promulgated a proposed Interim Imple-
mentation Policy, the White House published a Memorandum on the subject, and the EPA
responded to comments and published a reconsidered interpretation in the Preamble to the
final ozone standard. Looking at practicalities, the court found that "[tihough the agency
had not dressed its decision with the conventional accoutrements [sic - accouterments] of
finality, its own behavior thus belies the claim that its interpretation is not final." Id. at
915. The policy was ripe for review because the CAA allows for pre-enforcement review of
regulations and also because the States must comply with the policy in coming up with
their State Implementation Plans, which require lengthy processes.
329. 43 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7509(a) (1994).
330. 43 U.S.C §§ 7511-7511() (1994).
331. See Am. Trucking, 121 S. Ct. at 915 (citing the Federal Register publication at 62
Fed. Reg. 38856, 38884-85 (1997)).
332. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1048-50.
333. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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found that the language of Subpart 1 noted that if another section applies,
then it should have precedence. The crux of the difficulty is that while the
scope of Subpart 2 might not be limited solely to areas that were not in at-
tainment of the 1989 standard, the subpart does not clearly state what it
covers. Moreover, some gaps in coverage would occur if Subpart 2 alone
applied to the new standard because of the specificity of the subpart.
3 4
Therefore, in reviewing the agency interpretation, the Supreme Court
moved to the second prong of the Chevron test, namely, asking if the
agency interpretation of the statute is reasonable.
Although the Chevron doctrine is often viewed as a deferential one,335
the Court did not defer to the EPA's interpretation. The Supreme Court
noted that Subpart 2 had provisions that were intended to apply into the
future. 33 6 Therefore, it found that the EPA's intent to make Subpart 2
"abruptly obsolete,"337 was unreasonable. The Court agreed with the EPA
that Subpart 1 had some applicability to the revised standards, but not the
sweeping applicability that the EPA granted it. In other words, Congress
was not clear on which provisions should apply to revised ozone standards,
but had worked hard on some provisions and classifications which appar-
ently were designed to bind the EPA. Therefore, the EPA could not erase
Subpart 2 in favor of the more highly discretionary subpart 1. This refusal
to defer to the EPA, while slightly unusual for a situation where ambiguity
was found in a statute, did not result in an upheaval of long held beliefs
and interpretations.
As will be detailed below, the American Trucking decision is more
noteworthy for what it could have done and did not do than for what it did.
D. American Trucking in Perspective
1. Supreme Court Precedent on Delegation
The decision in American Trucking is not surprising in light of Su-
preme Court precedents. There have only been two situations in which the
Supreme Court has invalidated a law because Congress invalidly delegated
338legislative power. Despite this, the Supreme Court has discussed the
possibility from an early date. The origins of the nondelegation principle lie
in separation of powers doctrine.
334. Ar. Trucking, 121 U.S. at 918.
335. See Chief Justice Rehnquist's reference to "Chevron deference" in Solid Waste, 531
U.S. at 172.
336. Am. Trucking, 121 U.S. at 919.
337. Id.
338. As Cass Sunstein put it, there was only one "good year" for the nondelegation doc-
trine, namely 1935. Sunstein, supra n. 215, at 318. But see U.S. v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.,
255 U.S. 81 (1921), which did not involve Congress and the Executive. In this case, the
Court invalidated a statute that made it a crime to charge "unjust or unreasonable" prices
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The doctrine's constitutional predicate resides in the fact that the
Constitution vests "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted... in a Congress
of the United States." 339 One relatively early case, Field v. Clark, stated the
proposition as follows:340
That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a prin-
ciple universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the
system of government ordained by the Constitution... "The true distinc-
tion.., is between the delegation of power to make the law, which neces-
sarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority
or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made.
34 1
Despite this statement of the distinction between legislating and executing,
which might be a tautology, the Supreme Court found a way to uphold the
statute at issue in Field, which gave the Executive the authority to suspend
certain duty-free provisions of the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 if he deter-
mined that the importing country's tariffs were "reciprocally unequal."34 2
The statute gave what may be classified as conditional or contingency
power. If a certain foundation is laid, then the Executive has an obligation
to act in a designated way.343 Other such statutes have been upheld.3€4 In
essence, in this type of binary legislation, the executive was merely
"executing" the Congressional policy. The finding that a fact does or does
not exist is not a core legislative function.
In a second set of cases, the Supreme Court also found no legislation
by the executive if the executive was simply "filling up the details" of the
law Congress declared. The Supreme Court used this very language in
United States v. Grimaud345 The case involved whether or not the Secre-
tary of Agriculture could designate grazing in a forest reserve without a li-
cense as a misdemeanor. The Supreme Court analyzed the Organic Act of
1897,a 6 which provided criminal sanctions for violations of rules the Sec-
retary established. These rules were to "insure the objects" of the national
forest reserves by regulating "their occupancy and use" so as to protect the
resources. According to the Court, Congress did the legislating, setting
forth purposes and sufficient detail to guide the Secretary of Agriculture in
339. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
340. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
341. Id. at 692-94 (quoting Ohio Supreme Court Judge Ranney's opinion in Cincinnati,
Wilmington&ZanesvilleR.R. Co. v. Commrs., 1 Ohio St. 77, 88 (1852)).
342. Id.
343. See e.g. Steven F. Huefner, The Supreme Court's Avoidance of the Nondelegation Doc-
trine in Clinton v. City of New York More than "A Dime's Worth of Difference," 49 Cath. U. L.
Rev. 337, 342-43 (2000).
344. See Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. U.S., 11 U.S. 382, 387-88 (1813) (allowing the Presi-
dent to revive a trade law if a certain factual predicate was met).
345. 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
346. Currently codified at 16 U.S.C. § 478 (1994).
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filling in details.347 Similarly, the Supreme Court had earlier upheld a
delegation to "establish uniform standards" for importing tea; Congress
had gone as far as it could go.3
48
In these two situations, interstitial and conditional "administration,"
the Supreme Court declared that no legislation was taking place.349 A
third method of allowing delegation of some discretion was posited in J.H.
Hampton & Co. v. United States.35° To a certain extent, the test enunciated
was simply a synthesis of the earlier phraseology. 351 The Court in Hamp-
ton upheld the Flexible Tariff Act of 1922, which authorized the President
to adjust import tariffs to protect domestic companies. The Supreme Court
found the President merely fills in details and looks to contingencies: "If
Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle [to govern
exercise of the delegated power], such legislative action is not a forbidden




Using these tools, the Supreme Court found almost all statutes that
came before it passed muster. 53 The two exceptions came in cases in
1935, both reviewing parts of the National Industrial Recovery Act
("NIRA). 35 4 In one case, Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 355 the dis-
allowed delegation allowed private companies to accede to "codes of fair
competition," with the President enabled to enforce these privately-drawn
agreements so long as they were not creating monopolies. The element of
private "law-making" therefore muddied the waters.356 The second case
that found an improper delegation also involved some intermediary in rule-
making. The Court invalidated a provision of the NIRA that enabled the
347. Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 517 (authority may be given "to fill up the details" to those who
are to act under a general legislative mandate).
348. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904) (upheld act allowing Treasury Secretary
to establish uniform standards of purity, fitness and quality for imported tea). The Court
here maintained that "Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practi-
cable, and from the necessities of the case was compelled to leave to executive officials the
duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute." Id. at 496.
349. But see Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 483 (1989), where she argues that there was a
change in analysis in Grimaud from the definition of legislation in Field. The earlier defini-
tion emphasized that legislation encompassed the presence of discretion to determine what
is wise or expedient. Therefore, "[u]nder the pressure of the broader statutory delegation in
Grimaud, the early formalistic analysis began to shift. Nondelegability was coming to turn
not simply on the nature, but also on the extent, of the power delegated."
350. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
351. Huefner, supra n. 343, at 348-49 (identified Buttfield as combining interstitial and
contingency authority to get to policy guidance).
352. Hampton, 176 U.S. at 406-07.
353. See e.g. Fed. Radio Commn. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285
(1933) (finding the "public convenience, interest, or necessity" standard to be not so indefi-
nite as to confer an "unlimited power" when interpreted in context).
354. National Industrial Recovery Act, June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 195, as amended by Act of
June 14, 1935, 49 Stat. 375.
355. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (reviewing NIRA § 3, 48 Stat. 196 (1933)).
356. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (due process violated when
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President to prohibit interstate transportation of petroleum produced in
violation of state conservation laws. According to the Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan,35 7 general delegation principles were violated. The purposes of the
Act were so broad, namely general desires to "rehabilitate" and "correct"
economic woes, that the President had in effect been given "unlimited au-
thority to determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition.., as he
may see fit."35 8 These two cases were the last in which a majority of the
Court found delegation to be a problem; the New Deal was rescued as
pressure mounted and the Court reversed positions.35 9
The Court then resumed its approval of arrangements whereby the
executive could exercise considerable discretion 3 60  The inquiry became
one of whether sufficient policing of Congress's delegee could come to pass:
The standards prescribed by the present Act, with the aid of the 'state-
ment of considerations' required to be made by the Administrator, are suf-
ficiently definite and precise to enable Congress, the courts and the public
to ascertain whether the Administrator, in fixing the designated prices,
has conformed to those standards. Hence we are unable to find in them
an unauthorized delegation of legislative power.361
The focus of review began to move from whether or not a particular action
was legislative in character to whether there was sufficient process to pro-
tect the governed and the governing.
362
The role judicial review and other administrative process may play in
approving a delegation of discretion to the executive became more pro-
nounced in time. The Administrative Procedures Act was passed in
194636 and greatly clarified controls on agency activity, providing for a
presumption that judicial review would be available 64 and for participation
357. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
358. Id. at 415.
359. See W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Zellmer, supra n. 206, at 960 (describes the retreat from court-
packing when, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, Justice Owen Roberts, a Hoover ap-
pointee, changed his vote and found the Washington State minimum wage law valid).
360. See e.g. Nat. Broadcasting Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (upholding the
standard for regulation of broadcast licenses, namely, "public convenience, interest, or ne-
cessity").
361.- Yakus v. U.S., 312 U.S. 414, 426 (1944). See Farina, supra n. 349, at 486 (1989)
("The constitutionally relevant inquiry is no longer whether Congress resolved certain types
of issues, but whether it supplied enough policy structure that someone can police what its
delegee is doing.") Cass Sunstein notes that even in Schecter the Supreme Court recog-
nized the importance of procedural guidelines; it contrasted the statute it invalidated with
that governing the FTC, noting with approval that the latter had procedural guarantees to
limit arbitrary agency action. Sunstein, supra n. 278, at 344 (citing Schecter Poultry, 295
U.S. at 533).
362. Cf. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976)
(En banc) (Leventhal, J., concurring) ("Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative
powers broadly and courts have upheld such delegation-because there is court review to
assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory limits.")
363. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
364. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1994). See Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. 546, 583-85 (1963) (upholding
delegation to Secretary of Interior where Secretary's power to apportion the waters of the
20011 259
55
Mansfield: By the Dawn's Early Light: The Administrative State Still Stands
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
in rule making.365 The Court noted this in American Power & Light Co. v.
SEC:36 6 "[It is] constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the
general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries
of this delegated authority. Private rights are protected by access to the
courts to test the application of the policy in the light of these legislative
declarations. "367 In fact, the accent on procedural safeguards led the au-
thor of a premier administrative law commentary, Kenneth Culp Davis, to
propose that the nondelegation doctrine be refocused to account for the
desire to constrain arbitrary administrative action, thus concentrating on
"legislative and administrative standards and procedural requirements to
determine whether administrative discretion has been confined to the
greatest degree practicable."368 Traditional, strong non-delegation doctrine,
which would invalidate a statute for crossing the line between legislative
and executive function, appeared moribund.
369
In fact, the most intriguing discussion of the possibility of nondelega-
tion being "alive" came in the oft-cited Rehnquist concurrence in Industrial
Union Department AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute.37 ° Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist acknowledged that the doctrine was not an absolute bar to
executive decision-making: "The rule against delegation of legislative power
is not, however, so cardinal of principle as to allow for no exception. The
Framers of the Constitution were practical statesmen, who saw that the
doctrine of separation of powers was a two-sided coin."37 1 However, when
granting the Occupational Safety and Health Administration authority to
set standards to protect workers from toxic substances,37 2 Justice Rhen-
quist argued that Congress gave insufficient guidance in all of the sources
Colorado River was subject to judicial review).
365. Id. at § 553.
366. 329 U.S. 90, 105-09 (1946).
367. Id. at 105. Lower courts followed suit. See e.g. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Con-
nally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746-47 (D.C.C. 1971) (Levanthal, J., for three-judge panel) (broad
delegation upheld, noting the availability of procedures under the APA to rein in discre-
tion).
368. Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 3:15, 211 (2d ed., K.C. Davis
1978) [hereinafter Treastise]. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary
Inquiry 50 (1969) (arguing emphasis should be on administrative clarification, not Con-
gressional wording); Kenneth Culp Davis, "A New Approach to Delegation," 36 U. Chi. L.
Rev, 713, 713 (1969) [hereinafter Davis, New Approach] ("The key should no longer be
statutory words; it should be the protections that administrators in fact provide, irrespec-
tive of what the statutes say or fail to say.") See discussions in Zellmer, supra n. 206, at
964; Sunstein, supra n. 278, at 340-41.
369. Davis, New Approach, supran. 368, at 713.
370. 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
371. Id. at 673.
372. At issue in Indus. Union was the interplay of 29 U.S.C. § 652 (1994), which defines
an "occupational safety and health standard," with 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1994), which
states that for toxic substances, "The Secretary... shall set the standard which most ade-
quately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such em-
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generally employed to locate the "intelligible principle," namely, the wording
of the statute, the statute as a whole, Congressional purpose, or legislative
history:
Read literally, the relevant portion of § 6(b)(5) is completely precatory, ad-
monishing the Secretary to adopt the most protective standard if he can,
but excusing him from that duty if he cannot. In the case of a hazardous
substance for which a "safe" level is either unknown or impractical, the
language of § 6(b)(5) gives the Secretary absolutely no indication where on
the continuum of relative safety he should draw his line. Especially in
light of the importance of the interests at stake, I have no doubt that the
provision at issue, standing alone, would violate the doctrine against un-
canalized delegations of legislative power. For me the remaining question,
then, is whether additional standards are ascertainable from the legisla-
tive history or statutory context of § 6(b)(5) or, if not, whether such a stan-
dardless delegation was justifiable in light of the "inherent necessities" of
the situation.
373
Chief Justice Rehnquist found the statue wanting, even with the interpre-
tive aids.
The plurality opinion, however, disagreed. It read the statute so as to
skirt the delegation question: "A construction of the statute that avoids this
kind of open-ended grant should certainly be favored."3 74 It therefore ruled
that the definition of a "standard" applied to setting standards for toxic
substances.375 The definition required a "standard" be "reasonably neces-
sary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment"376 By this method of statutory interpretation, the delegation
to the Secretary of Labor had a sufficient "intelligible principle" to avoid be-
ing an improper delegation of legislative power.
373. Id. at 675. It is in this opinion that Chief Justice Rehnquist refers to the inconclu-
sive legislative history of the Act as follow: "far from shedding light on what important pol-
icy choices Congress was making in the statute, [it] gives one the feeling of viewing the
congressional purpose 'by dawn's early light.'" Id. at 676. Although Chief Justice
Rehnquist used the phrase to impart a sense of murkiness, it is used in the title of this ar-
ticle as embodying a sense of miraculous or reassuring survival, such as that felt by Fran-
cis Scott Key in penning a song about the Star-Spangled Banner still standing despite
bombardment.
374. Id. at 646 (plurality opinion).
375. The opinion found that the statute thereby limited the discretion of OSHA:
By empowering the Secretary to promulgate standards that are "reasonably nec-
essary or appropriate to provide safe or healthfil employment and places of em-
ployment," the Act implies that, before promulgating any standard, the Secretary
must make a finding that the workplaces in question are not safe....
Therefore, before he can promulgate any permanent health or safety standard, the
Secretary is required to make a threshold finding that a place of employment is
unsafe-in the sense that significant risks are present and can be eliminated or
lessened by a change in practices. This requirement applies to permanent stan-
dards promulgated pursuant to § 6(b)(5), as well as to other types of permanent
standards. For there is no reason why § 3(8)'s definition of a standard should not
be deemed incorporated by reference into § 6(b)(5)....
Id. at 642.
376. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1994).
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It is this active judicial interpretive role that Judge Williams rejected
in American Trucking in favor of remanding the case to the agency to come
up with a binding statutory interpretation that would pass constitutional
muster.3 77 Although some applauded the move as serving some of the
functions of the nondelegation doctrine, 8 it was not strongly intimated in
more recent United States Supreme Court cases. Rather than remanding,
the Supreme Court appeared to adopt two strategies in regard to the doc-
trine: it either upheld a statute as not violating nondelegation principles or
it invalidated the statute on independent grounds. An example of the first
technique is Mistretta v. United States, 79 which rejected finding a delega-
tion problem in the procedure to establish federal sentencing guidelines.
An example of the second technique, skirting the issue, is Clinton v. New
York. 8 ° The Court invalidated the Line Item Veto Act38 1 because it violated
the Presentment clause of the Constitution, that is, the "finely wrought"
process in which legislation is only made by votes of both houses of Con-
gress with the opportunity for the President to veto the same. The Court
did not decide the delegation issue, although Justice Scalia opined that
there is greater flexibility in delegating budgetary matters to the Execu-
tive.
38 2
In two additional recent cases before American Trucking, the Supreme
Court avoided the delegation issue by resorting to administrative law,
rather than constitutional law. The Supreme Court found questioned
regulations unauthorized as a matter of statutory interpretation. In FDA v.
Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation, the Court employed the first
analytical step of the Chevron test and found that Congress was clear and
did not give control over cigarettes to the Federal Drug Administration.
38
In AT& T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,384 a regulation was invalidated by
using step two of Chevron, namely, finding the regulation an unreasonable
interpretation of the statute. In light of these alternative modes of resolv-
ing regulatory disagreements, many believed it was unlikely that the Su-
preme Court would either reactivate a strong non-delegation doctrine,
which would invalidate a statute, nor the "weak" doctrine of American
377. Am. Tucking, 175 F.3d at 1038.
378. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Shecter Poultry at the Milleniun: A Delegation Doctrine for the
Adniistrative State, 109 Yale L.J. 1399, 1406-42 (2000) (arguing remand to the agency
would curb abuses of discretion while exercising deference to agency expertise).
379. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
380. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
381. 110 Stat. 1200, 2 U.S.C. § 691 etseq. (1994), described in Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436.
The Act enabled the President, upon following precise procedures and making requisite
findings, to "cancel in whole" certain types of provisions that had been enacted into law.
These included "(1) any dollar amount of discretionary spending; (2) any item of new direct
spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit." 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (1994).
382. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 466-68.
383. 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
384. 525 U.S. 366, 392-93 (1999).
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Trucking .385
Therefore, the failure of the Supreme Court to adopt either of these
postures is not surprising. The Supreme Court did make one statement
that should be expanded upon in light of precedent. Justice Scalia, in ac-
knowledging that an agency may get discretion, notes that "li]t is true
enough that the degree of the agency discretion acceptable varies accord-
ing to the scope of the power congressionally conferred."8 6 In context,
Justice Scalia then discusses the impact of the conferred power on the
public, contrasting the power to define a "country elevator" for a regulatory
exemption with the power to effect the economy as a whole. 7 The cases
he cites, however, point to another way to distinguish the extent of discre-
tion that may be delegated.
In the first case Justice Scalia cites, Loving v. United States,38 8 Con-
gress delegated the duty to define aggravating factors, the presence of
which would determine when a sentence of capital punishment could be
imposed in a court martial. The pragmatic answer may be that the delega-
tion was to the President, who was acting as Commander-in-Chief. There-
fore, the Court found less explicit guidance was necessary.38 9 The second
cited case has a similar theme. In United States v. Mazurie,390 Congress
delegated to Indian tribes the ability to regulate use of alcoholic beverages;
the tribe's independent authority over its members and territory enhanced
Congress's ability to delegate. 9 ' These two cases recognize that greater
discretion-and hence delegation-may be granted when the delegatee
has pre-existing power over the subject matter. 39  In essence, there is
shared jurisdiction.
Still one additional gloss could be put on Justice Scalia's statement
about degrees of allowable delegation. Chief Justice Rehnquist also ac-
knowledged a situation rooted in practicality: greater discretion also may
be given where it would be "unreasonable and impracticable to compel
Congress to prescribe detailed rules."393 This might be construed to cover
instances of scientific uncertainty. Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, re-
jected allowing discretion when scientific uncertainty was at issue, de-
manding instead that Congress set policy guidelines in such a situation, or
385. Zellmer, supra n. 206, at 1012 ("The Court's decisions in both ... indicate that it
has no interest in reviving the nondelegation doctrine as a constitutional ground for invali-
dating congressional enactments.").
386. Am. Trucking, 121 S. Ct. at 913.
387. Id.
388. 517 U.S. 748, 772-73 (1996).
389. Id. at 772 ("Perhaps more explicit guidance would be necessary if delegation were
made to a newly created entity without independent authority in the area.").
390. 419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975).
391. Id. at 557 ("[I~t is an important aspect of this case that Indian tribes are unique ag-
gregations possessing attributes of sovereignty.. ").
392. See Schoenbrod, supran. 323, at 1260-61; Zellmer, supran. 206, at 1014.
393. Am Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 683 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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at least preclude cost consideration. 394 Nevertheless, the situation of scien-
tific uncertainty may trigger additional discretionary lee-way.
2. Why Justice Thomas Stands Alone: The Pros and Cons of a
"Strong" Non-Delegation Doctrine
One question that some champions of lesser government intrusion
may raise is why the Supreme Court did not make more of an explosion
with American Trucking?. In other words, why did only Justice Thomas
raise the question of re-examining precedent to see if there should be more
than an "intelligible principle" before a statute escapes nondelegation scru-
tiny?395 The ability to allow agencies to implement policy through regula-
tion and adjudication is central to the administrative state.3 96 Environ-
mental regulation requires both good science and good economic data.
Often neither discipline can give strict "answers." Policy choices will be
necessary even within the policy guidelines Congress might provide. Regu-
lation, which by definition includes prescribing future conduct, is legisla-
tive in character and goes beyond mere fact-finding.397 Nevertheless, the
basis for all federal government is the Constitution, which has been con-
strued to require Congress to pass all legislation.
Proponents of a "strong" nondelegation doctrine, which would invali-
date statutes allowing "legislation" by agencies, often cite not only the
words of the Constitution, but those of James Madison in the Federalist
3 98
and John Locke, who said that "[tihe legislative cannot transfer the power
of making laws to any other hands... nor can the people be bound by any
laws, but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen, and au-
394. Id.
395. See Am. Trucking, 121 S. Ct. at 919-20 (Thomas, J., concurring). His opinion is not
without academic support. See e.g. Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise
of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of Second Best, 80 Cornell L.
Rev. 1, 30 (1994); David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20
Cardozo L. Rev. 731 (1999) (cannot leave to Congress the "policy" choice of which parts of
the constitution are to be enforced).
396. Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of the "New" Nondelegation Doctrine,
76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 2 (2000) (asserting that benefits of new nondelegation doctrine in
promoting values underlying rule of law not commensurate with doctrine's impact on
agencies' abilities to address particularities of problems they are to remedy).
397. The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") defines rule in part as "the whole or part of
an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to im-
plement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy..." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1994). See Albert-
son's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2171 (1991) (Department of Transportation's
rule specifying visual requirement for truck drivers "have the force of law"). Even before
the APA, judges recognized the effect of a rule. Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Athchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 386 (1932) (a rulemaking agency "speaks as the legislature,
and its pronouncement has the force of a statute").
398. The Federalist No. 47, 303 (James Madison) (Clinton Rositer ed., N.Y. New Am. Li-
brary 1961), cited e.g. by Sunstein, supra n. 215, at 320 (discussing arguments of propo-
nents), and Steven F. Huefner, The Supreme Court's Avoidance of the Nondelegation Doc-
trine in Clinton v. City of New York: More than "A Dime's Worth of Difference," 49 Cath. U. L.
Rev. 337, 342 (2000).
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thorized to make laws for them."399 In this light, the nondelegation doc-
trine is a pillar of separation of powers. To some, therefore, a sharing of
legislative power would simply be unconstitutional.4 ° °
Practicality quickly made the purity of this linguistic and philosophi-
cal premise murky. Early in the nation's history, Congress passed acts
delegating authority to the Executive. Congress in 1794 authorized the
president to embargo ports or vessels "whenever, in his opinion, the public
safety so require."4° ' Similarly, Congress allowed the President "to remit
and discontinue" the prohibitions of an act forbidding trade with France "if
he should deem it expedient and consistent" with the interest of the United
States.40 2 Those close to the drafters (indeed, some of them as legislators)
did not view the Constitution as prohibiting Congress from delegating to
the executive policy decision-making, which is akin to legislation.
Opponents of delegation, however, forward an argument that is re-
lated to the Constitutional separation of powers argument, namely, that
nondelegation protects individual liberty by requiring Congress to go
through the rather burdensome method of enacting legislation before pass-
ing rules that impact on individuals. Legislation is supposed to be diffi-
cult.40 3 That is the reason why Article I requires both houses of Congress
to pass a bill in addition to presentment to the President. The checks and
balances inherent in the process control improvident action, dampen fac-
tionalism, and preserve liberty. Therefore, Congress should have to come
to more exacting resolution of an issue, rather than passing the job on to
an administrative agency, which is not elected.
This argument, however, may be countered by the realization that
Congress may not be able to resolve the issues legislatively. Although pub-
lic choice analysis may say that Congress delegates in order to not appear
on the radar screen of interested parties on a particular issue, some of
the reasons that Congress delegates are not cynical or rooted in self-
399. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 74-75 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
PubIblishing Co. 1980) (1690), cited in Ernest Gelhom, Returning to First Principles, 36,
Am. U. L. Rev. 345, 347-48 (1987); Sunstein, supra n. 215, at 320 (discussing arguments
of proponents).
400. Am. Trucking, 121 S. CL at 920 (Thomas, J., concurring); McCutchen, supra n. 395,
at 30.
401. Act of June 4, 1794 Ch. 41 § 1, 1 Stat. 372, 372. This was, however, limited to peri-
ods when Congress was not in session and the closure was to be terminated fifteen days
after Congress was next in session. Id. at §§ 1-2.
402. Act of Feb. 9, 1799, ch. 2, § 4, 1 Stat. 613, 615. See Sunstein, supra n. 215, at 321
(detailing early delegations to the President on military pensions and for Indian trading).
403. Sunstein, supra n. 215, at 320 (detailing arguments); Schoenbrod, supra n. 395, at
1283 (purpose behind reinvigorating delegation rules is not only accountability and review,
but also the "protection of private persons' liberty and property").
404. Donald A. Dripps, Delegation and Due Process, 1988 Duke L.J. 657, 668; David B.
Spense & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 Geo. L. Rev. 97
(2000) (public choice (i.e. rational maximizing) analysis can show that delegation to non-
majoritarian agency experts may be the desired outcome of voters); Eskridge, supra n. 202,
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preservation. Especially in the area of environmental regulation, Congress
may not have the expertise nor the time to devote to solving scientific di-
405 406lemmas. Moreover, there are institutional barriers to collective action °
such as committee turf wars.4 °7 Policy, as well as scientific conclusions,
may be impossible to resolve. Delegation is therefore responsible action. 8
Nevertheless, one of the most resilient arguments for refusing to allow
Congress to delegate legislative power, especially as to policy, is that ac-
countable parties should make such decisions.40 9 Representatives, Sena-
tors, and the President are elected and thus responsive to the voters. To
move policy making or other legislative activity to an unelected body un-
dermines democracy. Indeed, some argue that to enact appropriate legisla-
tion, Congress should not simply state its policy preference and allow the
agency to determine how to arrive at the desired end; in regulating private
conduct, Congress itself should determine the rules, that is, what behavior
is or is not allowed.410
Delegation, however, does not remove either Congress or the public
from the legislative arena. Agency rule making procedures are perhaps
more participatory than the legislative process. Both venues, however, can
be subject to pressure from well-financed lobbies. Wherever discretion lies,
it will be lobbied. But an agency must respond to comments publicly, in
both rule making4 and other settings. 12 Moreover, the agency must ac-
count to Congress: the power of the purse strings through appropriations
can be quite persuasive.1 3 More directly, agencies are responsible to the
President, who is an elected official. 414 In fact, if the D.C. Circuit's brand of
405. Sunstein, supra n. 215, at 323-24.
406. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Inherent Limits on Judicial Control of Agency Discretion:
The D.C. Circuit and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 63, 80 (2000);
Siedenfeld, supra n. 176, at 98-99 (with inherent difficulties of legislating, Congress cannot
generate sufficient laws to satisfy demands of interest groups).
407. Zellmer, supra n. 206, at 993; Eskridge, supra n. 202, at 105 (institutional process
theorists conclude subgovernments tend to pander to special viewpoints and are not nec-
essarily broadly representative.)
408. But see Schoenbrod, supra n. 323, at 1226 (delegates are often less capable than
Congress to resolve the political conflicts in an issue).
409. Schoenbrod, supra n. 395 (delegation undermines democracy because it removes re-
sponsibility; it is also simply unconstitutional).
410. Schoenbrod, supran. 323, at 1227.
411. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
412. See e.g. the National Environmental Policy Act, which requires an Environmental
Statement for "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1994).
413. Sunstein, supra n. 215, at 324. But see Schoenbrod, supra n. 323, at 1243-46
(1985) (arguing that altemative accountability by Congressional oversight, ability to amend
statute is responsive and not initial lawmaking and would require Congress to fight inertia,
which was not what the Framers anticipated).
414. Pierce, supra n. 406, at 68-69 (explaining that the discretion of EPA in the ozone set-
ting was not between a tad less than the killer fog and zero; the killer fog was fifty times
current standard and would produce 3,900 deaths per week, which no agency nor court
would accept, and no president would allow a standard set at zero because it would be
unattainable and political suicide).
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nondelegation doctrine was adopted, an agency is made a binding interpre-
tation of the law before issuing a particular application could render the
election of a new President meaningless.415 Political reality means that
agencies are not ivory towers unto themselves that are allowed to regulate
in isolation without accountability. In fact, there is perhaps more oversight
over agency action than any other portion of the federal government. Every
other part of the government is involved: higher executives, judges, and
Congress.
4 16
Requiring more specificity from Congress, moreover, may make legis-
lation more removed from the electorate. Often, statutes are passed in as-
pirational terms because this is the only way to arrive at a compromise; a
compromise that will at least get the ball rolling toward solving a problem.
The alternate route, specificity, at times results from the concerted effort of
special interests. Additionally, specificity in a bill might not represent the
true considered opinion of a legislator. In order to pass legislation, logroll-
ing can replace true assent by the legislators to a particular bill, as could
inclusion of substantive matters in amendments to unrelated bills and ap-
propriation riders.417 Specificity has not been shown to necessarily im-
prove agency performance or conformity with social welfare.418 Moreover, if
judges must determine how specific is specific enough, it is the unelected
judiciary who resolve the policy determination.41 e
Nevertheless, perhaps paradoxically, more specific standards from
Congress have been touted as enhancing judicial review. Hand-in hand
with this justification for the prohibition against delegation is that it pre-
vents arbitrary and capricious agency action. Greater detail in legislation,
however, is not necessarily required to foreclose such activity. Since 1946
and the development of the APA, it is presumed that agency action is sub-
ject to judicial review.420 Agencies must explain their decision-making. If
they do not, judges impose remand as an oft-implemented remedy. Trans-
parency requirements force rationality and serve some of the values of
separation of power, such as protecting individuals from actions bordering
on despotism. 4 2 1 In addition, numerous statutes delineate procedural re-
415. Id. at 92-93.
416. Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20
Cardozo L. Rev. 775, 783-84 (1999) (rule of law served because there are many "watchdogs
with sharp, penetrating teeth" on agency). But see Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serf-
dom: Liberalism, Conservatism, and Administrative Power, Am. U. L. Rev. 195, 296 (1986)
("[Dlelegation of broad and undefined discretionary power from the legislature to the execu-
tive brand deranges virtually all constitutional relationships and prevents attainment of
the constitutional goals of limitation on power, substantive calculability, and procedural
calculability.").
417. Lovell, supra n. 206, at 96-97 (alternative way to compromise if vague language not
allowed).
418. Sunsteln, supra n. 278, at 338-39.
419. Sunsteln, supran. 215, at 321; Schuck, supran. 416, at 790.
420. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1994).
421. See Sidney A Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch:
Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons fo Agency Decisions, 1987
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quirements for agencies. These also assist in judicial review and in reining
422in arbitrary action.
All told, allowing agencies to exercise discretion, which includes the
legislative function of prescribing future action, does not do injustice to
American ideals of accountability and individual liberty. The "intelligible
principle" rationale the Supreme Court developed over time need not be re-
examined, as Justice Thomas might desire. It has allowed for a flexible
government, which must, of course, be one of practical people. 423 The doc-
trine, whether entirely kosher or not, has become part of our law.42 4 To
disturb it would greatly disrupt the current statutory framework, because
425many statutes have less detailed guidance than the Clean Air Act .
Moreover, this arrangement of responsibility does not violate the Con-
stitution. The provision of the Constitution that vests "[a]l legislative Pow-
ers herein granted... in a Congress of the United States" 426 means that
the executive and the judiciary cannot usurp the same, not that Congress
cannot decide to give some legislative power to another if necessary. The
decision as to how much discretion an agency is to have in implementing
policy is an important legislative policy decision in and of itself.427 Confer-
ring the discretion may be the most telling decision of all. Congress can
specifically limit discretion to foreclose some policy "play" by the agency or
it can defer to the agency for delineation. By way of example, the Clean Air
Act initially allowed the agency to determine what substances would be
regulated as toxic; in the 1990 Amendments to the Act Congress listed
substances to be regulated. 428 Similarly, Justice Scalia, in American Thuck-
ing, determined that Congress decided to circumscribe EPA discretion on
how to implement ozone standards. 9  Movement in a legislative stance
toward specificity could reflect several happenings, such as a distrust of
Duke L.J. 387(adequate reasons requirement of judicial review related to separation of
powers doctrine).
422. Zellmer, supra n. 206, at 964; Lowi, supra n. 416, at 306-07 (recognizing the efficacy
of procedure but considering a palliative for unconstitutional vagueness).
423. Government is for practical people, to paraphrase an earlier court, which found that
government is of "practical men." U.S. v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S 459 (1915); Lovell, su-
pra n. 206, at 112 (Constitution establishes a loose framework that has accommodated
many different choices about important factors; the United States has experienced numer-
ous successive democratic systems within the same constitutional framework).
424. Compare McCutchen, supra n. 395, at 37 (delegation is so entrenched it is like intel-
lectual adverse possession), with Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the
Constitution, 98 Yale L.J. 1013, 1053-55 (1984) (structural changes and acquiescence
amount to a Constitutional amendment).
425. Zellmer, supra n. 206, at 982-83 (by some accounts, ninety-nine percent of the regu-
latory statutes found in the United States Code could be struck down) (citing Lovell, supra
n. 206, at 86 (citing Richard J. Pierce, Jr, Political Accountability and Delegated Power. A
Response to Professor Lowi, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 391, 401 (1987)).
426. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
427. Schuck, supra n. 416, at 781. But see McCutchen, supra n. 395, at 2 (arguing that
delegation to agencies of legislative power is unconstitutional, but the administrative state
cannot be dismantled, so the legislative veto of rules should be allowed).
428. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994).
429. Am. Trucking, 121 S. Ct. at 919.
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the agency, or a coalescence of either scientific information or policy initia-
ive.
Giving Congress the option of conferring an agency with an imple-
menting role that includes the ability to exercise some policy choice is not
only practical, but necessary, for two reasons. The first is that requiring
either Congress or an agency to develop determinant criteria may be ask-
ing for the impossible. For example, in toxic regulation, it might be impos-
sible to determine what level of exposure will cause either no harm or a
specific level of acceptable harm.43 0 Economics also cannot give conclusive
answers as to either how people will react to incentives or whether a pro-
posed activity is cost justified. Cost-benefit analysis can at best give
ranges of costs and benefits. The analyses can differ greatly based on the
subjective evaluation of what various lives or limitations on lifestyle may be
"worth."4 3 1 Therefore, although Congress should decide the general direc-
tion of regulatory activity, an agency must be able to have some discretion-
ary lee-way or there will be an inability to change the status quo.
432
The reality of governmental structure requires agencies to do what
approaches legislation, but also enables the exercise to be restrained. Only
at the pinnacle of government can the judiciary, executive, and legislative
powers even resemble strict separation.4 3 3 Agencies are hybrids, and all
three branches of the federal government control them. This control pro-
vides the necessary checks and balances to prevent the arising of the tyr-
anny so feared by the drafters of the Constitution.434 The majority of the
Supreme Court appears to recognize and accept this. They also rejected
the intermediary step, remand to the agency for binding line-drawing. Al-
though some had praised Judge Williams' construct as enabling some form
of accountability,435 it is Congress which must give at least a signpost to
the agency telling it where to go with the legislative construct, which in-
430. Pierce, supra n. 406, at 73-77; Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk
Regulation, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1613 (1995).
431. Pierce, supra n. 406, at 81; Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions,
107 Yale L.J. 1981 (1998) (arguing outcomes of CBAs can vary significantly depending on
which estimates are used by entity conducting CBA).
432. See Indus. Union Dept v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Marshal, J., dis-
senting); and Sunstein, supra n. 278, at 340-41 (arguing scientific uncertainty militates
against a successful change of standards if judicial review requires certainty).
433. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 579 (1984).
434. Id. at 579 (an agency is neither Congress, executive, nor court, but an inferior part of
government and the agency's relationships to the three is what keeps its power in check
and thus serves the purposes of separation of powers). But see Lowi, supra n. 416, at 297-
98 (arguing that delegation is risky because the constitutional interest balancing mecha-
nisms are not available at the agency point of discretion).
435. Michael Richard Dimino. D.C. Circuit Revives Nondelegation Doctrine... Or Does It?,
23 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Policy 581, 592-93 (2000) (calling the case an "admirable attempt to
ensure that a semi-accountable governmental body divines an intelligible principle" but
ultimately rejecting it); Gabriel Clark, The Weak Nondelegation Doctrine and American
Trucking Associations v. EPA, 2000 B.Y.U. L. Rev, 627, 651-53 (arguments in support of
weak nondelegation include that it is more judicially manageable, more politically feasible,
and forwards the goals of accountability).
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cludes the statute and the regulation. The agency need not determine be-
fore it regulates how it will regulate.4 36 It simply should regulate pursuant
to the statute. Judicial, congressional, and political review will then con-
trol the agency.
4. American Trucking and the Chevron Doctrine
The Supreme Court did perform a judicial review of the EPA regula-
tion implementing the new ozone standard. In so doing, the Court used
the Chevron test, with its two-part analysis.43 7 The test is deemed to be a
deferential one. Indeed, the Supreme Court, when it refused to employ
Chevron in Solid Waste, stated it "would not extend Chevron deference. 
" 43 8
The story was different in American Trucking, but the result was the same;
the Court overturned the agency rule. Nevertheless, the decision does not
have major impact.
The decision is slightly unusual because the Court invalidated the
rule under the second prong of Chevron. This means that the court first
ascertained that Congress was not clear on the interrelationship of the two
Subparts for implementation of the new ozone standard. Therefore, in the
face of this ambiguity, the reviewing court generally defers to the agency
with expertise, so long as the agency interpretation is found to be reason-
able. 439 Because a court has already found that a statute is not clear, it
becomes difficult to determine on what rationale the agency interpretation
could be found to be unreasonable. 440
The Court in American Trucking, however, had an explanation: the
agency interpretation could not be made to correspond with the statute
and Congressional intentions.441 Although Congress was less than clear, it
seemed to mean something and the agency interpretation tried to "wipe
out" the effectiveness of a particular statute that had been intended to gov-
ern the future. The EPA's reading appeared to go beyond the discretion
granted. 442 The Supreme Court did not attempt to substitute a particular
436. Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra n. 396, at 4 ("American Trucking can be interpreted as a
judicial effort to require agencies to self-impose ex ante constraints on their discretion,
rather than as a traditional application of ex post judicial review); Sunstein, supra n. 278,
at 311 ("new" nondelegation is not nondelegation at all and improved judicial review would
better serve purposes).
437. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
Because notice and comment rule-making was involved, the Court did not discuss whether
Chevron provided the proper standards of review. The Supreme Court has given quidance
on when Cheveron might apply in tweo recent cases. See U.S. v. Mead, 121 S. Ct. 2164
(2001) (custom service's ruling letter not entitled to Chevron deference, but is subject to
Skidmore deference); Christiansen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
438. Solid Waste, 513 U.S. at 172.
439. Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp., 843 F.2d 144, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(only reverse agency determination if it actually frustrates Congressional policies).
440. Gray, supra n. 307, at 18 (arguing that the reasonableness test of the second step of
Chevron is both poorly defined and circular).
441. Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 485.
442. An agency desiring to change the meaning of words is not new. See U.S. v. Symond,
270 [Vol. 37:205
66
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 37 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss1/6
BY THE DAWN'S EARLY LIGHT
manner of interpretation. It simply said that this one was incorrect. The
unanimity of the decision shows that at least nine reasonable persons rec-
ognize an unreasonable interpretation when they see it.
American Trucking is part of a trend in which the Supreme Court is
more ready to invalidate regulations based on their unreasonableness. 443
Although unremarkable in this setting, the opinion could allow for more
active judicial intervention in the administrative state.
V. FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS: PALAZZOLO
A. Background of the Case
1. Facts
The town of Westerly, Rhode Island444 is the setting for this term's
takings saga. The story, however, began in 1959, when Mr. Palazzolo in-
vested in three undeveloped tracts that bordered on a street and a popular
"pond." He and other investors formed Shore Gardens, Inc. (SGI) to hold
the property. In 1960, Mr. Palazzolo became the sole shareholder of SGI.
Therefore, when SGI's corporate charter was revoked in 1978, ownership of
the property devolved to Mr. Palazzolo individually. He is the case's plain-
tiff.
Potential development schemes for the parcels, however, began long
before the case was filed. For example, in 1959, SGI submitted a plat to
the town. The plat subdivided the entire property into eighty lots; between
1959 and 1961, SGI sold eleven of the lots to various grantees, who were
able to build in these upland sections with little alteration to the land.445
The remaining lots encompassed about twenty acres. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court described the land as follows:
The property consists primarily of coastal wetlands and marshlands.
Some of the lots laid out in the subdivision plat include a substantial
amount of land that is under the waters of Winnipaug Pond. Additional
land that is not permanently under water is subject to daily tidal inunda-
tion, and "ponding" in small pools occurs throughout the wetlands. The
area serves as a refuge and feeding ground for fish, shellfish, and birds,
120 U.S. 46, 48-49 (1887) (Secretary of Navy cannot do what is contrary to statute; cannot
declare a training mission to not be "at sea" so as to affect naval officers' pay.).
443. See AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd, 525 U.S. 366, 392-93 (1999); NLRB v. Ky. River
Community Care Ctr., Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1861 (2001).
444. Justice Kennedy provides a historical paean to the town in his majority opinion. Pa-
lazzolo v. R.L, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2454-55 (2001). He also notes that the petitioner was "a
lifelong Westerly resident." Id. at 2455. What relevance this detail has can only be
guessed at; possibly, Justice Kennedy was portraying both Mr.Palazzolo and the seaside
town as the salt of the earth and embodiments of Yankee tradition.
445. Palazzolo v. I., 746 A.2d 707, 710 (RI. 2000). Arguably, the return SGI gained
from the property might have foreclosed it from claiming the subsequent regulation inter-
fered with the corporation's investment backed expectations.
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provides a buffer for flooding, and absorbs and filters run-off into the
pond.4 6
A considerable amount of fill would have to precede building any signifi-
cant structure on the wetland portions of the land.
Mr. Palazzolo fied several applications to fill the property over the
years, but the proposals could be characterized as poorly thought out or
not serious. The first proposal sought to dredge from Winnapaug Pond
and fill the entire property. This incomplete application was denied. The
second proposal was similar and, while it was pending, SGI submitted its
third proposal in 1966. This proposal did not seek a complete fill, but a
more limited filling, with the end result to be a private beach club. The
Rhode Island Department of Natural Resources in April of 1971 initially
approved these applications, but this approval was withdrawn on Novem-
ber 17, 1971. SGI did not appeal.4 7 Applications to develop ceased for
more than ten years.
In the interim, the regulatory regime in regard to wetlands and coastal
areas evolved. First, Rhode Island enacted legislation in 1971 that created
the Coastal Resources Management Council ("CRMC), which assumed the
duty of protecting the coastal properties in Rhode Island.' 4 In 1977, the
CRMC promulgated a set of regulations that prohibited the filling of coastal
wetlands without a special exception from the CRMC.4 4 9 To obtain a spe-
cial exception, a fill must forward "a compelling public purpose which pro-
vides benefits to the public as a whole as opposed to individual or private
interests.' 50 The regulations covered SGI's lands, which Mr. Palazzolo be-
came the owner of in 1978.
In 1983, Mr. Palazzolo again sought to develop the property. This
proposal mirrored the 1962 application, and simply sought to build a
wooden bulkhead along the shore of Winnapaug Pond and to fill the entire
marsh area. The rejection of this application noted that it "was 'vague and
inadequate for a project of this size and nature.' ' 45 1 There was no appeal of
this refusal, but another proposal was submitted in1985. This one recy-
cled the 1966 proposal to build a private beach club. The Supreme Court
described this plan succinctly: "The details do not tend to inspire the
reader with an idyllic coastal image, for the proposal was to fill 11 acres of
the property with gravel to accommodate '50 cars with boat trailers, a
446. Id.
447. Id. at 710. See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2455-56. The review of the proposals was
pursuant to 1965 Rhode Island legislation on inter-tidal wetlands protection that author-
ized restrictions on filing in coastal wetlands. 1965 R.I. Pub. Laws, ch. 140, § 1, codified
as G.L. 1956 §§ 2-1-13 through 2-1-17, repealed P.L. 1990, ch. 461, § 9 (1990).
448. 1971 R.I. Pub. Laws, ch. 279, § 1 etseq., codified as G.L. 1956 chapter 23 of title 46.
449. Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program ("CRMP") § 210.3 (as
amended, June 28, 1983).
450. CRMP § 130A(1) (1983).
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landowner is known.4 6 3 To this end, the landowner must have presented a
rational plan that the regulating agency could examine so as to determine
what could appropriately be allowed to proceed on the land. One grandi-
ose plan would not be enough if a more tempered approach could be ap-
proved.4 4 The court had two problems with the case as currently pos-
tured.
The two difficulties revolved around the scope of the projects proposed
and rejected.461 First, damages were based on a plan for a 74-plot residen-
tial development, which was never analyzed by the CRMC. This plan,
however, would probably, like the total fill proposal that was never fleshed
out, be categorized as a grandiose plan. The court notes that a submitting
a "grandiose" plan would not be sufficient, because a lesser plan might
have been approved. Therefore, the second objection was that there had
been no final decision on what could have been allowed on the property.
Although there were numerous applications for development, there were
only two different proposals: a total fill (for unspecified purposes) 466 or a
partial fill for an unaesthetic and unfinctional beach club. There had
been no requests to make a lesser fill or to develop the upland acres. To
ascertain the dimensions of prohibited and allowable use requires different
applications, not repeated requests to do the same thing.
467
One reason why the court was insisting on additional proposals was
the same reason that the court, in what might be dicta, rejected finding a
"per se" or "categorical taking" under Lucas. For such a taking, there must
have been a total deprivation of all economic value of the property. Here,
however, there was evidence that the upland portion of the tract would ac-
commodate at least one single family home; the specific words of the court
found that "[tihere was undisputed evidence in the record that it would be
possible to build at least one single- family home on the existing upland
area, with no need for additional fill."468 Therefore, value remained:
There was undisputed evidence, however, that had he developed the up-
land portion of the land, its value would have been $200,000. Further,
there was testimony that the wetlands would have value in the amount of
$157,500 as an open-space gift.469
Because of the residual value, there was no deprivation of all beneficial
value.
The court also opined that even if there had been a total deprivation,
there would not have been a Lucas taking. The rule in Lucas acknowl-
463. Id. at 713-14.
464. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351 (1986).
465. Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 714.
466. The court noted that in the 1983 hearing, Mr. Palazzolo stated that he had no inten-
tion to build on the filled land. Id.
467. Id. at 714 n. 6.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 715.
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dumpster, port-a-johns, picnic tables, barbecue pits of concrete, and other
trash receptacles.' 452 In addition, the "club" would not provide direct ac-
cess either to the ocean or the pond from the filled property.4 53 The Coun-
cil found the proposal did not meet the standards for an exception and a
Rhode Island court upheld the rejection.4 4 While this case was pending,
Mr. Palazzolo filed an additional suit, alleging that the denial of permission
was a "taking" of his private property. He sought damages of $3,150,000,
the alleged profits he would generate by filling the wetlands and selling the
property as seventy-four lots for single-family homes. The trial judge found
no taking and, therefore, no compensation was due.4 55
2. The Rhode Island Supreme Court Decision
The supreme court of Rhode Island concluded that the "case is not
ripe for judicial review and that the trial justice did not err in granting
judgment to the CRMC."456 The court followed a "three-step process" to
analyze the takings issue.4 5 7  First, it assessed whether the claim was
458
ripe. Second, the court examined whether a categorical taking under
Lucas459 could have occurred; this would have required a total deprivation
of the property's value. The third step was ascertaining whether or not a
taking could have occurred under a Penn Centra 6 ° analysis, which,
among other criteria, examines whether there was too great an interference
with a private party's reasonable investment backed expectations. Al-
though the case could have been resolved at the first step, the court an-
nounced its appraisal of the second and third issues.4 6 1
The court's ripeness analysis concluded that the case was not yet
ready for judicial review. Ripeness concerns arise from the need to prevent
advisory opinions.4 62 The court noted that in the takings venue, the basic
question is whether or not the impact of the regulation on the particular
452. IL
453. There would be a fifty-foot strip left unfilled between the filled area and the pond in
each of the beach club proposals. Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 714. See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at
2473 n. 1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("to get to the club's water, i.e., Winnapaug Pond
rather than the nearby Atlantic Ocean, 'you'd have to walk across the gravel fill, but then
work your way through approximately 70, 75 feet of marsh land or conservation grasses'").
454. Palazzolo v. Coastal Resources MgL Council, 1995 WL 941370 (R.I. Super., Jan. 5.
1995) (C.A. No. 86-1496) (Israel, J.).
455. Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 711.
456. Id. at 709.
457. I& at 712-13.
458. Williamson County Regl. Plan. Comn. v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S.
172 (1985).
459. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
460. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
461. The court stated that "the determination that the claim was not ripe is dispositive of
the case, [but] we shall briefly discuss the merits of Palazzolo's claim." Palazzolo, 746 A.2d
at 714.
462. Id. at 713.
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edged that if the state was simply forbidding a development that was not
part of the private party's property title to begin with, the state could en-
force its regulation without paying compensation.4 70 The court upheld the
finding that Mr. Palazzolo obtained the property in 1978; up until that time
title was in SGI. Despite the fact that he received the property by operation
of law, the state of title so acquired is judged as of the date acquired. In
1978, the regulations required a special exception to develop the coastal
wetlands. The court rejected Mr. Palazzolo's argument that the date of ac-
quisition is irrelevant in a setting of total deprivation.47 '
The first of the court's reasons involved a straight-forward reading of
Lucas:
Not only is this argument unsupported by precedent, it is flawed. First, it
violates the Supreme Court's dictate in Lucas, instructing reviewing courts
to determine whether a landowner originally possessed the right to engage
in a particular use. Here, when Palazzolo became the owner of this land in
1978, state laws and regulations already substantially limited his right to
fill wetlands. Hence, the right to fill wetlands was not part of the title he
acquired.472
Lucas requires examining the state of title when a party claiming a taking
became an owner of the property to determine the rights of the private
party. The court offered a second rationale for finding such an examina-
tion relevant. It maintained that to not do so would allow for strategic
transfers of property; holding "the time of acquisition... irrelevant could
lead to pernicious 'takings claims' based on speculative purchases in
which an individual intentionally purchases land, the use of which is se-
verely limited by environmental restrictions, and then seeks compensation
from the state for that 'taking.'" 473 Additionally, to ignore the state of title
at acquisition would put total regulatory takings on a different footing than
physical takings, and the Court in Lucas judged the two situations to be
equivalent. Therefore, "[riegardless of whether the government physically
takes property in the form of an easement or promulgates regulations re-
stricting the property's use, all subsequent owners take the land subject to
the pre-existing limitations and without the compensation owed to the
original affected owner."47 4 Mr. Palazzolo thus took title subject to the
regulations, which limited development.
The court then turned to the third step of its process, namely, ascer-
taining whether there had been a taking under the Penn Central analy-
sis. 47 95 The court concentrated on whether Mr. Palazzolo had any reason-
470. Id. at 715 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027).
471. Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 716.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. I& at 716-17.
475. This requires examining the following three elements: 1) the character of the gov-
ernment action; 2) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; and 3) the inter-
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able investment-backed expectations of being able to develop the property.
The court again looked to the status of regulations in 1978: "In light of
these regulations, Palazzolo could not reasonably have expected that he
could fill the property and develop a seventy-four-lot subdivision."476 With
no reasonable expectations of unfettered filling, the court found no taking
occurred even without examining the remaining Penn Central factors.
Faced with a finding that he was not owed compensation, Mr. Palaz-
zolo sought certiorarL With a change of counsel, he received it. James S.
Burling of the conservative Pacific Legal Foundation represented Mr. Palaz-
zolo in front of the Supreme Court. Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent,
commented that the change of counsel led to a change of tactics.4 77
B. Supreme Court and the Takings Issue
1. The Majority Opinion
The resulting decision in the Supreme Court is one of those in which
a scorecard is needed to keep the players straight. The ultimate decision,
remanding the case to the state courts, was concurred in by five justices,
namely Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia,
and Thomas. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, which, with ad-
ditional concurrences by Justices O'Connor and Justice Scalia, was em-
braced by only by five justices in its substantive discussion. Justice Ste-
vens also concurred that the case was ripe for decision, but expressly
dissented from the majority opinion's treatment of a purchaser who ob-
tained property after the enactment of regulation, and dissented from the
judgment of remand. Two completely dissenting opinions came, one from
Justice Ginsburg and one from Justice Breyer. Both Justice Breyer and
Justice Souterjoined in the opinion of Justice Ginsburg. Therefore, on the
"merits" of the case, the familiar five-four line-up emerges.
As noted, one major element of Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
was its conclusion that the case was ripe for decision. His analysis started
at the same place the state courts did, with a discussion of the Williamson
County 478 case. According to the Court, Williamson County stands for the
ference, if any, with investment-backed expectations. Penn. Central, 438 U.S. 104.
476. Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 717.
477. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2475 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting):
This Court likely would not have granted certiorari to review the application of
MacDonald and Lucas to the facts of Palazzolo's case. However, aided by new
counsel, Palazzolo sought-and in the exercise of this Court's discretion ob-
tained-review of two contentions he did not advance below. The first asser-
tion is that the state regulations take the property under Penn Central. See Pet.
for Cert. 20; Brief for Petitioner 47-50. The second argument is that the regula-
tions amount to a taking under an expanded rendition of Lucas covering cases
in which a landowner is left with property retaining only a "few crumbs of
value."
IcL
478. WilUiamson County Reg. Plan. Commui v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S.
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proposition that "a takings claim challenging the application of land-use
regulations is not ripe unless 'the government entity charged with imple-
menting the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the applica-
tion of the regulations to the property at issue."-47 9 Agency review of per-
mitted uses of the property is necessary to ascertain what impact the
regulation truly had on the property owner's rights.480 The majority of the
Supreme Court, however, read the record differently than the state court.
Justice Kennedy found that there had been sufficient definition of the
regulation's effect. Unlike the state court, he did not believe there had to
be applications for a "less grandiose" project than the 74-lot subdivision;
that is, there need not be successive applications until the threshold of al-
lowable development is discovered. The key to his conclusion was the "un-
equivocal nature of the regulations." 481 They indicated that there would be
no complete fill allowed and no filling of 11 acres for a beach club. The
Court noted that the rejection of the beach club fill was not dependent on
how many acres would be filled; on the type of wetlands present on Mr. Pa-
lazzolo's land, no fill would be authorized unless a special exemption was
granted, and the CRMC would only grant one "where a 'compelling public
purpose' is served." 482 As for the beach club, the activity itself was not a
compelling public purpose.
Therefore, the size of the project was immaterial; there was no room to
soften the impact of the regulation:
While a landowner must give a land-use authority an opportunity to exer-
cise its discretion, once it becomes clear that the agency lacks the discre-
tion to permit any development, or the permissible uses of the property are
known to a reasonable degree of certainty, a takings claim is likely to have
ripened. The case is quite unlike those upon which respondents place
principal reliance, which arose when an owner challenged a land-use au-
thority's denial of a substantial project, leaving doubt whether a more




The majority opinion concluded that the regulation would not allow any
filling for "ordinary" land use.484 Therefore, no more applications would be
needed in regard to the wetlands.
Justice Kennedy still had to determine whether development potential
for the upland portion of the land was unsettled sufficiently to make the
172 (1985).
479. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2458 (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186).
480. Id. (quoting, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351(1986)
("These matters cannot be resolved in definitive terms until a court knows 'the extent of
permitted development' on the land in question.").
481. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2458.
482. Id. at 2459.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 2459 ('here can be no fill for its own sake; no fill for a beach club, either rus-
tic or upscale; no fill for a subdivision; no fill for any likely or foreseeable use. And with no
fill there can be no structures and no development on the wetlands.").
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regulation's impact unknown.4 5 The strict "compelling public purpose"
test would not apply to this land.48 6 The Court, however, concluded the is-
sue of the upland's value was settled: "The trial court accepted uncon-
tested testimony that an upland site located at the eastern end of the prop-
erty would have an estimated value of $200,000 if developed. "487 Justice
Kennedy downplays the wording of the state supreme court, which might
have left open the question of how much development could take place on
the property; that court had determined "it would be possible to build at
least one single-family home on the upland portion of the parcel."48 Jus-
tice Kennedy found it inappropriate to rely on this statement; "[the at-
tempt to interject ambiguity as to the value or use of the uplands, however,
comes too late in the day for purposes of litigation before this Court."489
References to the $200,000 value were consistent. Moreover, Justice Ken-
nedy sternly rejected the state of Rhode Island's claim that valuation had
only been made for the purposes of refuting a claim under Lucas that the
tract was left with no economic value. The evidence, the state claimed,
would have been presently differently if the question was whether or not
investment-backed expectations were disturbed under a Penn Central
analysis. Justice Kennedy, however, determined that Penn Central was
"discussed" at the trial level and the state should have addressed the fac-
tual issue.490 Therefore, ripeness concerns did not require applications
dealing with development of the upland portion.
Justice Kennedy then disposed of the final objection the state court
had presented against ripeness. He found the court's concern irrelevant.
It did not matter that Mr. Palazzolo had never applied for the particular 74-
unit subdivision on which he based his claim for damages. According to
Justice Kennedy, the state court had relied on Williamson County for its
unripeness conclusion.49' Under Williamson, the private party did not have
to make meaningless proposals; the CRMC had made it known that it
would not allow any filling. This is sufficient for "finality." Naturally, how-
ever, Justice Kennedy notes that "Itihe mere allegation of entitlement to the
value of an intensive use will not avail the landowner if the project would
not have been allowed under other existing, legitimate land use limita-
tions."492 When damages for a taking are computed, the market value of
485. Id. at 2460 (quoting, Palazzolo, 746 A.2d. at 714) (The State Supreme Court found
petitioner's claim unripe for the further reason that he "has not sought permission for




488. Id. (quoting Palazzolo, 746 A.2d. at 714).
489. Id.
490. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2461.
491. Id. at 2462. Other potential rationales could have been a state exhaustion of reme-
dies argument or a state procedural requirement that zoning approval precede submission
of a permit request to the CRMC. The Court did not have to discuss these issues.
492. Id. at 2461.
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the property would be limited to what could have been its highest and best
use consistent with other valid requirements, such as zoning and septic
tank restrictions. This concern, however, was a different issue than
whether the case was ripe for decision.
Justice Kennedy, therefore, proceeded to the next reason the state
court rejected Mr. Palazzolo's claim, which goes to the merits.49 3 The lower
court found that the timing of his acquisition of the land was of crucial im-
portance. Mr. Palazzolo acquired the land from the corporation in 1978,
after the regulations detailing the permit system were in place. Therefore,
the regulations were part of the "background principles of law" that limited
his use of his property under a Lucas analysis and also destroyed any pos-
sibility of reasonable investment-backed expectations of development un-
der a Penn Central balancing. As Justice Kennedy summarizes: "the two
holdings together amount to a single, sweeping, rule: A purchaser or a
successive title holder like petitioner is deemed to have notice of an ear-
lier-enacted restriction and is barred from claiming that it effects a tak-
ing."
4 9 4
Justice Kennedy rejects the idea that, because a state defines prop-
erty rights, it could by legislation automatically redefine those rights and
thereby deprive future landowners of any ability to object to restrictions:
The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bun-
dle. The right to improve property, of course, is subject to the reasonable
exercise of state authority, including the enforcement of valid zoning and
land-use restrictions. The Takings Clause, however, in certain circum-
stances allows a landowner to assert that a particular exercise of the
State's regulatory power is so unreasonable or onerous as to compel com-
pensation. Just as a prospective enactment, such as a new zoning ordi-
nance, can limit the value of land without effecting a taking because it can
be understood as reasonable by all concerned, other enactments are un-
reasonable and do not become less so through passage of time or title.
Were we to accept the State's rule, the postenactment transfer of title
would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting
land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be al-
lowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause.
495
Justice Kennedy asserts that future generations have the right to protest
unreasonable regulation.49 6
Additionally, Justice Kennedy does not believe the notice argument
should be conclusive. A pre-enactment owner may not be able to establish
a taking because of ripeness requirements before the owner dies or other-
wise needs to transfer title to another. Under the Rhode Island rule, the
493. This portion of the decision is Section II.B. Six justices either dissented from this
part of the decision or attempted to clarify their understanding of it in concurring opinions.
494. Palazzolo, 121 S. CL at 2462.
495. Id. at 2462-63.
496. 1& at 2463.
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new owner could not assert the takings claim. This would be unfair:
The State's rule would work a critical alteration to the nature of property,
as the newly regulated landowner is stripped of the ability to transfer the
interest which was possessed prior to the regulation. The State may not
by this means secure a windfall for itself.
497
The vagaries of the age or resources of a landowner should not determine
whether or not a regulation caused a taking. Justice Kennedy's problem is
with a per se rule: "A blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no
compensation right when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument
to accord with the duty to compensate for what is taken."498 In order to
maintain this position, he needed to counter two arguments.
The first problem was to distinguish the regulatory takings situation
from that of direct condemnation. To Justice Kennedy, it is justified to re-
strict compensation to the owner at the time of physical invasion or emi-
nent domain proceedings because the extent of the impact on the private
party is known immediately. A regulatory taking, however, must be made
"ripe" by ascertaining the particular affect of the regulation on a particular
tract of land: "It would be illogical, and unfair, to bar a regulatory takings
claim because of the post-enactment transfer of ownership where the steps
necessary to make the claim ripe were not taken, or could not have been
taken, by a previous owner."499
Next, the opinion addressed the argument that the Lucas case modi-
fied the legal setting, increasing scrutiny of the title existing when the
claimant took ownership. Before Lucas, the majority of the Court rejected
a claim that notice of a restriction precluded a subsequent owner's taking
claim in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. ° Justice Kennedy em-
phasized that the prior case held that "'[s]o long as the Commission could
not have deprived the prior owners of the easement without compensating
them,'... 'the prior owners must be understood to have transferred their
full property rights in conveying the lot.'" '  Writing for a five-justice ma-
jority in Palazzolo, Justice Kennedy rejected the idea that Lucas completely
limited the Nollan holding. He therefore disagreed with the assertion "that
Lucas stands for the proposition that any new regulation, once enacted,
becomes a background principle of property law which cannot be chal-
lenged by those who acquire title after the enactment."502
Justice Kennedy's rejection of a per se rule that would integrate new
regulations or legislation into background principles is nuanced. He ac-




500. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
501. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2463-64 (quoting No!lan, 483 U.S. at 834 n. 2).
502. Id. at 2464.
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when a regulatory pronouncement may become "inherent" in someone's
land title, either generally or in particular.5 0 3 A search for background
principles looks for "common, shared understandings of permissible limita-
tions derived from a State's legal tradition... [and] whether an existing,
general law can limit all economic use of property must turn on objective
factors, such as the nature of the land use proscribed."504 He did not be-
lieve the principles should vary for different owners. Therefore, mere en-
actment of a rule does not prospectively limit only new owners on an
automatic basis.
Justice Kennedy did agree with the Rhode Island state court in one
respect: there had not been a total deprivation of the economic value of the
property.50 5 Although the $200,000 value for a residence is not the $3.15
million that Mr. Palazzolo claims the property is worth, the ability to build
one residence on a twenty-acre plot is not a "token interest" and the prop-
erty is not left "economically idle."50 6 The Court refused to separate the up-
land and wetlands areas into distinct parcels to ascertain whether there
was a total deprivation because the argument was not asserted in the
lower courts. Therefore, the Court did not make any contribution to the
dilemma of defining the "denominator" of the takings equation.,
0 7
The bottom line of the majority opinion was a remand. The state
courts would have to examine the case on the merits. These courts would
not, however, have to consider the "total taking" theory of Lucas; it was not
a total taking. The taking analysis therefore would examine the Penn Cen-
tral factors. In so doing, the courts could not conclude that mere passage
of a regulation precluded any reasonable expectations for development.
2. The Concurrence of Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor wrote to expand on her understanding of how to
implement part II-B of the majority opinion, which dealt with the impor-
tance of acquiring property after the date of the regulation.0 8 She agreed
with the conclusion that the "mere fact of enactment" should not preclude
the possibility of a Penn Central taking for a landowner who acquired land
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Id. at 2464-65.
506. Id. at 2465 (quoting the "economically idle" language from Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019).
507. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2465. The so-called "denominator" problem can be illus-
trated in this situation as follows. If the property is simply the eighteen acres of wetlands,
the deprivation of development would be eighteen (numerator) over eighteen (denominator).
This would be total. If, however, the denominator is the uplands combined with the wet-
lands, then the numerator would be eighteen and the denominator twenty. This would not
be a total deprivation. In this case, no one clearly knew what the exact size of the tract
would be if the uplands were included in the denominator. See id. at 2473 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). As Justice Kennedy notes, the current legal rule is to not subdivide the prop-
erty into various tracts and keep a "whole" denominator, although dictum has questioned
this. I&. at 2465.
508. Id. at 2465-66 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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after the legislation or rule's promulgation. However, she gave insight on
how a regulation or law could affect the takings equation.
To Justice O'Connor, the ultimate question is one of "fairness and jus-
tice."509 The Penn Central test is not simply one that searches for interfer-
ence with investment backed expectations. It is one that balances this
study with the nature of the government act and the financial impact on
the claimant. The nature of the governmental interest at stake is impor-
tant: "The purposes served, as well as the effects produced, by a particular
regulation inform the takings analysis."510 To O'Connor, it would be an er-
ror to make any of the factors conclusive.
Therefore, ruling that the passage of a limitation on land use is not
material would be as mistaken as the sweeping rule the Rhode Island court
posited:
If investment-backed expectations are given exclusive significance in the
Penn Central analysis and existing regulations dictate the reasonableness
of those expectations in every instance, then the State wields far too much
power to redefine property rights upon passage of title. On the other
hand, if existing regulations do nothing to inform the analysis, then some




The regulatory climate at acquisition would be an influence on the reason-
ableness of the private party's expectations. 51 2 She asserts that the Palaz-
zolo opinion does not foreclose consideration of this climate.
3. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia wrote to emphasize that his opinion of the meaning of
513Section II-B was not that of Justice O'Connor. To Justice Scalia, if a
statute or regulation not granting compensation is at any time an uncon-
stitutional assertion of power, it will always be so. He chides Justice
O'Connor for intimating that "it may in some (unspecified) circumstances
be '[un]fai[r],' and produce unacceptable 'windfalls,' to allow a subsequent
purchaser to nullify an unconstitutional partial taking (though, inexplica-
bly, not an unconstitutional total taking) by the government. " 514 Justice
Scalia sees nothing reprehensible in the prospect of a potential gain for an
509. Id. at 2466 (quoting Penn. Central, 478 U.S. at 124 (quoting Goldblatt v, Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
510. Id.
511. Id. at 2467. Justice Scalia will respond to her categorization of some landowners
reaping "windfalls." See Justice O'Connor's later statement: "The temptation to adopt
what amount to per se rules in either direction must be resisted." Id. at 2467 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
512. Id. at 2466. Justice O'Connor also notes that individual investment is not always
required to protect a property interest. Id. at 1467 (citing Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,
714-18 (1987)).
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astute real estate speculator.
The speculators gain is what Justice Scalia posits that Justice
O'Connor disdains.5 l5 Justice Scalia, however, finds nothing wrong with a
party buying land at a discount from a seller, who believes the land to be
constitutionally restricted, and then reaping the benefits of a land value
based on finding the restriction invalid. To him, this is nothing more than
the gains an astute buyer of antiques could make by buying from an un-
knowledgeable seller or a savvy stock purchaser could make by purchasing
from a risk-averse seller. Although Justice Scalia acknowledges some
might argue it "fair" to give the seller some of the benefit or "windfall"
gained, he could not ascertain any rationale to give any of the increased
value to the government.
516
In essence, if the government retained the restriction without giving
compensation, the result, to Justice Scalia, would be assigning some of the
non-restricted value of the property to the government. The government,
however, was not an "innocent" party, as the hypothetical unknowledge-
able seller might be. It was, according to Justice Scalia, the government
who caused the problem by acting "ulawfully-indeed unconstitution-
ally."5 17 He concluded that to allow the unconstitutional regulation to af-
fect the property's value would be "rather like eliminating the windfall that
accrued to a purchaser who bought property at a bargain rate from a thief
clothed with the indicia of title, by making him turn over the 'unjust' profit
to the thief."5s
Justice O'Connor took umbrage at her purported beneficence to a
thief. She opined that Justice Scalia was conflating two inquiries: 1)
whether the purpose behind the regulation was a valid exercise of the po-
lice power, and 2) whether the property owner seeking compensation was
entitled to such.5 9 The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the po-
lice power is very broad, but the question at hand was not the first issue
according to Justice O'Connor. The timing of a regulation and the acquisi-
tion of the property goes to the second issue, namely, whether compensa-
tion is due to the particular claimant. If the regulatory setting at the time
of acquisition is not considered for that particular claimant, this would re-
write the Penn Central factors.
5 20
Naturally, Justice Scalia did not conclude without a rejoinder to Jus-
515. Or, how he phrases it: "the situation in which a sharp real estate developer, realizing
(or indeed, simply gambling on) the unconstitutional excessiveness of a development re-
striction that a naive landowner assumes to be valid, purchases property at what it would
be worth subject to the restriction, and then develops it to its full value (or resells it at its
full value) after getting the unconstitutional restriction invalidated." Id. Justice Scalia
here talks of invalidating the regulation, not that the transferee can receive compensation
from the government This is a difference, one which is central to Justice Stevens's dissent.
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. Pakazzo/o, 121 S. Ct at 2467.
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tice O'Connor. He assured her that he understood the two issues and had
not accused the government of wrongdoing in the form of exceeding its po-
lice power.5 2 ' To him, the only restrictions that are of import in a Lucas
analysis are those of "background principles of the State's law of property
and nuisance,"5 22 and these seemingly are not to include legislative or
regulatory pronouncements. He also instructs that for an analysis of Penn
Central reasonable expectations, the only regulations or statutes that are of
import are valid ones: "The 'investment-backed expectations' that the law
will take into account do not include the assumed validity of a restriction
that in fact deprives property of so much of its value as to be unconstitu-
tional."523 An unconstitutional taking is an unconstitutional taking to Jus-
tice Scalia; any subsequent transfer of title is immaterial.
4. The Concurrence and Dissent of Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens concurs in part, and dissents in part. His concur-
rence is in the finding that the case is ripe for decision, but the concur-
rence is limited to his reading that the Court found the taking occurred
when the regulations were passed, not at a later date. 5 24 With the earlier
dating of the taking, Mr. Palazzolo had no standing to seek monetary com-
pensation. The partial concurrence, therefore, did not mean he would re-
mand the case: he concluded that "the judgment of the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court should be affirmed in its entirety. "5 2 5 Moreover, he did not
join in the Court's handling of the matters discussed in Part II-B, because
he found "the Court has over- simplified a complex calculus and conflated
two separate questions."526 The two questions referred to involve what
remedies may be available for a regulation that goes "too far" to be consti-
tutional: compensation or injunction.
One remedy for a regulation that unconstitutionally restricts property
development is to invalidate the regulation. Justice Stevens finds his first
521. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2468 n. * (Scalia, J., concurring)
522. Id. at 2468 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029).
523. Id.
524. Justice Stevens stated:
In the final analysis, the property interest at stake in this litigation is the right
to fill the wetlands on the tract that petitioner owns. Whether either he or his
predecessors in title ever owned such an interest, and if so, when it was ac-
quired by the State, are questions of state law. If it is clear-as I think it is and
as I think the Court's disposition of the ripeness issue assumes -that any such
taking occurred before he became the owner of the property, he has no standing
to seek compensation for that taking. On the other hand, if the only viable tak-
ings claim has a different predicate that arose later, that claim is not ripe and
the discussion in Part II-B of the Court's opinion is superfluous dictum. In ei-
ther event, the judgment of the Rhode Island Supreme Court should be affirmed
in its entirety.
Id. at 2472 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
525. Id. If the taking occurred at a date later than the regulation's passage, then the case
would not yet be ripe for decision. Id.
526. Id. at 2468.
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proposition to be very clear: if a regulation has adversely affected a party
individually, that party may seek to enjoin its application regardless of
when the party acquired his or her property. The date property was ac-
quired would be immaterial. 27 Justice Stevens asserts that it does not
necessarily follow, however, that such a johnny-come-lately could present
a case for the second type of remedy.
5 2 8
The second remedy provided for an unconstitutional taking is to allow
the restriction to stand, but to give the party who suffered a taking com-
pensation. To alleviate the unconstitutionality, "due compensation" would
be ordered for a taking. A taking, however, has a temporal element:
A taking is a discrete event, a governmental acquisition of private property
for which the state is required to provide just compensation. Like other
transfers of property, it occurs at a particular time, that time being the
moment when the relevant property interest is alienated from its owner.5
2 9
The importance of the date of taking is obvious and clear in the physical
appropriation model. Property is valued as of the take-over date and the
owner of the property at that date is the sole person compensated. 530 Jus-
tice Stevens notes that the Court's insistence that regulatory takings are
differ from physical appropriations is troublesome, in that their similarity
in impact on private property was the reason for recognizing that a regula-
tory taking could exist.
31
To Justice Stevens, the crux of the matter is confusion between two
separate dates: the date a taking occurs and the time a claim for compen-
sation becomes appropriate for litigation. Before litigating a regulatory tak-
ings claim in which compensation is sought, the appropriate agency must
clarify the regulatory impact on the particular property. Nevertheless, the
injury was inflicted earlier and the procedures before the implementing
bodies are simply measuring the damage. 532 Justice Stevens then explores
when the alleged taking could have been completed.
The parties disputed precisely when filling and developing Mr. Palaz-
zolo's wetlands was restricted. According to Mr. Palazzolo, the lands were
developable up until 1971; the State of Rhode Island asserted that there
were restrictions that pre-dated the 1971 statute. The argument of the pe-
titioner, however, was that the regulations of the CRMC effectively pre-
vented filling, thus denying the development right:
The most natural reading of petitioner's complaint is that the regulations
527. Id. at 2468-69.
528. Justice Stevens acknowledges that this remedy had been favored as of late, but
muses that invalidation was what was in the mind of Justice Holmes in Penn. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922). See id. at 2469 n. 1 (Stevens, J. ,concurring and dis-
senting).
529. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2469.
530. Id.
531. Id at 2469 n. 2.
532. Id. at 2469.
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in and of themselves precluded him from filling the wetlands, and that
their adoption therefore constituted the alleged taking. This reading is
consistent with the Court's analysis in Part II-A of its opinion (which I join)
in which the Court explains that petitioner's takings claims are ripe for
decision because respondents' wetlands regulations unequivocally provide
that there can be "no fill for any likely or foreseeable use."
533
If the regulations were the taking, Justice Stevens concludes that Mr. Pa-
lazzolo is simply the wrong plaintiff. The compensable injury was done to
the owner of the property at the time the regulations were promulgated,
which owner was not Mr. Palazzolo. 3 4
To Justice Stevens, the rationale for denying Mr. Palazzolo monetary
recovery is not that he had "notice" of the restrictions at the time he ac-
quired the property. He simply acquired only the property as restricted by
the regulations. Mr. Palazzolo could assert that the regulation was invalid,
but he could not seek damages for property that had been "taken" before
he was the property owner. Justice Stevens provided an analogy: "A new
owner may maintain an ejectment action against a trespasser who has
lodged himself in the owner's orchard but surely could not recover dam-
ages for fruit a trespasser spirited from the orchard before he acquired the
property."535 Like Justice Kennedy, Justice Stevens believes his construc-
tion is consistent with Nollan v. Califomia Coastal Commission.536 He notes
that the Nollan case found a taking when a land use agency required the
dedication of an easement in exchange for a permit to construct a larger
house. To Justice Stevens, even if the prospective homebuilders knew of
the policy before requesting a permit, the actual "taking" of the easement
took place only when a landowner had to grant it.537 Therefore, these later
landowners could receive compensation.
If the taking in the subject case, however, occurred prior to 1978, Mr.
Palazzolo could not receive compensation. Justice Stevens notes that Mr.
Palazzolo, at times, argued that the taking occurred in 1986, when his final
application for development was denied. In this situation, Justice Stevens
concluded that he would still be an inappropriate plaintiff. The title he
took in 1978 was subject to regulations validly promulgated under the po-
lice power. Therefore, his ownership did not contain the right to fill in the
lands, or at most, contained the right to do so only after the CRMC exer-
cised discretionary consideration. If the CRMC provided him with proce-
dural due process, it had respected Mr. Palazzolo's rights.
5 38
533. Id. at 2470.
534. Id.
535. Id. at 2471.
536. CaL. Coastal, 483 U.S. at 825.
537. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2471 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Ste-
vens also notes that the notice of the Nollans could impact on their reasonable expecta-
tions. Id. at 2471 n. 6.
538. Id. at 2471-72.
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Justice Stevens concluded his discussion by noting that the ruling of
the Court could be a limited one. He fears, however, that providing a right
to compensation to the first purchaser after the enactment of valid land-
use regulations could extend to "the second, the third, or the thirtieth pur-
chaser."5 39 Of course, Justice Stevens was analyzing this case by presum-
ing that the regulation could have potentially created a taking of private
property; he continued to register his belief that "even a newly adopted
regulation that diminishes the value of property does not produce a signifi-
cant Takings Clause issue if it (1) is generally applicable and (2) is directed
at preventing a substantial public harm. It is quite likely that a regulation
prohibiting the filling of wetlands meets those criteria. "540
5. The Dissenting Opinion of Justice Ginsburg
Justice Ginsburg dissented, with Justices Souter and Breyer joining
her opinion. Justice Ginsburg's primary disagreement is on the ripeness
issue, to which she takes vehement factual objection. To a certain extent,
she agrees with the legal parameters for determining if a takings case is
ready for adjudication; the relevant test comes from Williamson County,
which maintains no case is ripe "until the agency administering the regula-
tions at issue, proceeding in good faith, 'has arrived at a final, definitive
position regarding how it will apply [those regulations] to the particular
land in question. " 41 Her disagreement is with whether the agency ever
applied the regulations to the upland portion of the tract at all; the only
plans examined and rejected were for fill and development of the wetland
portions.5 2
The incompleteness of Mr. Palazzolo's submissions made it difficult to
apprize the size and nature of his property. Although most reviewers as-
sumed that there were eighteen acres of wetlands, the amount of uplands,
whether they be in one area or several, was not disclosed because no com-
prehensive survey was provided.' 3 Mr. Palazzolo simply sought to develop
the wetlands, and when these plans were rejected, he claimed that all
value was gone from his lands. Justice Ginsburg emphasized that one ra-
tionale for the state's finding of lack of ripeness was that there had never
been an application to develop only the uplands.5 44 This failure thus made
the case similar to an earlier case, in which the Court had rejected the case
for adjudication because the rejection of a "grandiose" plan did not mean
539. Id. at 2472.
540. I& at 2470 n. 3 (citations omitted).
541. Id. at 2472 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Wiliamson County, 473 U.S. at 191).
542. Id. She notes that one application was submitted to fill the wetlands without any
plan to do anything with the property; Mr. Palazzolo simply asserted he wanted to fill be-
cause to fill was "his right." Id. at 2473 n. 1. Annoyance with government, rather than ac-
tual investment backed expectations, might have sparked not only this proposal, but also
the two proposals for "beach clubs" that would have been eyesores.
543. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2476.
544. Id. at 2473 (quoting Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 714).
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that all development was foreclosed . 45 Without consideration of the extent
the uplands could be used, no final agency decision was made.
Justice Ginsburg finds the majority's solution to this dilemma
reprehensible; foreclosing agency consideration by declaring that the value
of the uplands was conclusively found to be one residence of $200,000
value rewarded the plaintiff for "bait and switch tactics."546  Justice
Ginsburg maintained that throughout the trial and state court appeals,
Mr. Palazzolo claimed that there was a taking because his property was left
with no viable economical use at all, that is, he alleged a categorical taking
under Lucas. The state then logically defended this claim; it presented
some evidence that the land could be developed for at least one home site.
Justice Ginsburg notes that the state proved a "floor" of value, not a
"ceiling."5 47  It did not have to prove the ultimate value of permitted
development because it did not need to value the remaining lands to
compare them with any reasonable, investment-backed expectations Mr.
Palazzolo might have had.-48
Justice Ginsburg finds in the record ambiguous as to development
potential, rather than the majority's conclusiveness.5 49 The majority found
that any additional uplands other than one tract were "islands" and hence
undevelopable because no road fill would be permitted.5 50 Justice Gins-
burg noted other portions of the same witness's testimony pointed to the
possibility of development on three or four lots.5 5 1 Moreover, the only "find-
ing" of the state court was open-ended: "[tihere was undisputed evidence in
the record that it would be possible to build at least one single-family
home on the existing upland area, with no need for additional fill."55 2 Re-
ferring to a "fact" in a brief on certiorari did not make it so to Justice Gins-
burg.5
5 3
Therefore, Justice Ginsburg rejected the waiver argument, namely
that it was now "too late" for the state to argue that the total value of per-
545. Id. at 2473 (discussing MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340,
348, 351-53 (1986), ("As presented to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Anthony Palaz-
zolo's case was a close analogue to MacDonald.")).
546. Id. at 2476 ("Casting away fairness (and fairness to a State, no less), the Court in-
dulges Palazzolo's bait-and-switch maneuver.").
547. Id.
548. Justice Ginsburg notes that while there was "some" mention of a potential Penn Cen-
trat case taking, it was not central at trial or in the state supreme court. Id. at 2475. The
state supreme court mentioned only one factor-the impact of acquisition post regulation-
and declined to consider anything else.
549. Id. at 2477 ("The ambiguities in the record thus are substantial. They persist in part
because their resolution was not required to address the claim Palazzolo presented below,
and in part because Palazzolo failed ever to submit an accurate survey of his property.").
550. Palozzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2460.
551. Id. at 2476 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
552. Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 714. Justice Ginsburg would rely on the finding of the state
supreme court: "Under the circumstances, I would not step into the role of supreme topog-
raphical factfinder to resolve ambiguities in Palazzolo's favor." Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at
2477 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
553. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2476.
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mitted development on the tract was anything other than $200,000. This
would penalize the state for defending the case as the plaintiff originally
presented it. The term "caustic" might describe her reaction to the major-
ity:
This Court's waiver ruling thus amounts to an unsavory invitation to un-
scrupulous litigants: Change your theory and misrepresent the record in
your petition for certiorari; if the respondent fails to note your machina-
tions, you have created a different record on which this Court will review
554the case.
Therefore, Justice Ginsburg found that the case was not ripe. She noted
that, had it been ripe, she would have concurred that taking title after a
regulation could "impair a takings claim."555
6. The Dissent of Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer's presented his brief opinion to clarify his reading of
the impact post-regulation title acquisition might have. First, he agreed
with Justice O'Connor that the simple fact that
a piece of property has changed hands (for example, by inheritance) does
not always and automatically bar a takings claim. Here, for example,
without in any way suggesting that Palazzolo has any valid takings claim, I
believe his postregulatory acquisition of the property (through automatic
operation of law) by itself should not prove dispositive
5 5 6
To Justice Breyer, the Penn Central test should be able to factor timing into
its appraisal of reasonable expectations, which, he notes, can and do
change dramatically as property changes hands.55 7 He also tried to lay to
rest fears that strategic behavior would be encouraged if the Court did not
preclude the possibility of a taking for a party who acquires land after a
regulation's enactment. He opined that a doctrine concerned with "fair-
ness and justice" would not reward behavior such as selective transfers of
non-developable acreage to separate people. 5 8
C. Palazzolo in Perspective
1. Decoding the Supreme Court's Decision
The positions of the justices in Palazzolo reflect long standing divi-
sions, not only between the individual justices,55 9 but also in takings juris-
554. Id.
555. Id. at 2477 n. 3. This concurrence was specific. Justice Ginsberg delineated the
pages of opinions in which she concurred (citing Justice O'Connor, id. at 2465-2467 (con-
curring opinion), Justice Stevens, id. at 2471-2472 (opinion concurring in part and dis-
senting in part), and Justice Breyer, id. at 2477-2478 (dissenting opinion)).
556. Id. at 2477 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
557. Id.
558. Id. at 2477-78.
559. See e.g. Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and Discounting Holdings in the Supreme
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prudence. 560 The tensions remain between Mugler v. Kansas,56 with its
proclamation that a valid regulation could not be a taking,5 62 and Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon,563 with its counter-declaration that regulation
under the police power sometimes would require compensation if too great
a diminution of value to private interests resulted.564 More particularly, the
debate between Justice Holmes and dissenting Justice Brandeis in Penn-
sylvania Coal itself has never ended. It dramatically reappeared in Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis565 and Lucas. 5 6 6 The di-
vergent views color the more particularized Palazzolo debate, namely when
is a taking ripe for adjudication and what impact a regulation might have
on subsequent purchasers.
Justice Kennedy presented a non-absolutist opinion on the latter is-
sue, namely, a regulation's potential influence on reasonable expectations
or background principles, which are respectively crucial to a Penn Cen-
trap 67 or Lucas5 68 takings analysis. He simply stated that merely acquiring
land after the effective date of a limitation did not bar either type of
claim. 5 69 In light of the blanket ruling the Rhode Island court made, Jus-
tice Kennedy found no opportunity to explore precisely when a state legis-
lature's or agency's pronouncement could become part of background
principles57° or limit expectations. His concurrence in Lucas, however,
does recognize that a non-judicial definition of harmful activity could play
Court's Taking Cases, 38 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1099 (1997).
560. See the author's prior explications, Maria Mansfield, When "Private" Rights Meet
"Public" Rights: Problems of Labeling and Regulatory Takings, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 193, 212-
25 (1994) [hereinafter Mansfield, Private Meets Public]; Maria E. Mansfield, On the Cusp of
Property Rights: Lessons from Public Land Law, 18 Ecol. L.Q. 43, 92-102 (1991) [hereinafter
Mansfield, On the Cusp]; Maria E. Mansfield, Regulatory Takings, Expectations and Valid
Existing Rights, 5 J. Min. L. & Policy 431, 436-61 (1989-90) [hereinafter Mansfield, Regula-
tory Takings].
561. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
562, Id. at 668-69 ("A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are
declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the commu-
nity, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of the property for
the public benefit.").
563. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
564. Id. at 415 ("One fact for consideration in determining such limits [of proper police
power impingement] is the extent of diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in
most if not all cases there must be the exercise of the eminent domain and compensation
to sustain the act... . The general rule.., is, that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.").
565. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
566. 505 U.S. 1002 (1992).
567. Penn Central requires (at least for a partial taking) a consideration of three factors: 1)
the governmental purpose being forwarded; 2) the financial impact on the regulated party;
and 3) the degree the regulation affected reasonable, investment backed expectations. See
generally Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104.
568. Lucas held that a total deprivation of a property's economic value would be a "cate-
gorical taking" if the activity prohibited was not also prohibited by background principle of
property law so as to not be part of the private property right. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 37 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss1/6
BY THE DAWN'S EARLY LIGHT
such a role.5 7 ' Most of the remaining Justices also appear to view the
presence of a law to be non-determinative of the takings issue, requiring a
more individualized appraisal of the total circumstances. 57 Justice Scalia
and Justice Stevens, however, display more absolutist views.
Justice Stevens, with the caveat restating his position that the regula-
tion might not engender any taking at all,573 asserts that a statute or regu-
lation would enter into background principles or color expectations for a
subsequent owner. Although in theory the post-enactment acquirer could
seek an injunction against the operation of the law upon his or her prop-
erty if individually injured, 57 4 that owner could not seek compensation for a
"taking" if the regulation or law itself was the value-diminishing event or
"taking" because it "took" the property of a predecessor in interest. If a fu-
ture event, such as application of the regulations in an agency's adjudica-
tive setting is the taking, then the subsequent owner could not protest be-
cause the title acquired would have been subject to that law or regulation
and its restrictions.5 75 Only if the application was a unique or unforesee-
able extension of the pre-existing rule would it not already condition the
subsequent owner's title. 76 Therefore, Justice Stevens posits a strong po-
sition for the influence of a legislative or regulatory pronouncement on
property rights.
Justice Scalia, however, continues to discount the possibility that a
legislature or regulatory body could have any effect on title or expecta-
tions.577 He earlier held in Lucas:
Any limitation so severe [as to deprive the landowner of all economically
viable use] cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation),
but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background prin-
ciples of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do
no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the
courts -by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) un-
571. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (common law of nuisance does not
restrict the government's ability to regulate without compensation because that doctrine is
"too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex and interdependent
society").
572. The core majority, Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rhenquist lean to-
ward the assumption that the regulation or statute would not bar subsequent purchasers,
and Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Souter seem to lean toward an assumption that the
same could at least impair a takings claim. Justice Breyer aligns with this group, except
when acquisition was by operation of law.
573. He maintains that a valid exercise of the police power, which is of general applicabil-
ity and seeks to prevent a substantial harm, would not be a taking. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct.
at 2470 n. 3 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
574. That is, "[i]f the application of such restriction to a property owner would cause her a
'direct and substantial injury'." Id. at 2468-69.
575. Id. at 2471. Naturally, if one's title is limited by the regulations existent at the date
of acquisition, this would seem to make it difficult for the subsequent owner to prove a "di-
rect and substantial injury" in order to seek an injunction.
576. Id. at 2472 n. 7.
577. Id. at 2468 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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der the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its comple-
mentary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or oth-
erwise.
5 7 8
As for expectations, in Palazzolo, Justice Scalia mantains that only consti-
tutional regulations or laws could ever enter into a private party's expecta-
tions.7 9 In short, as other recent cases averred, a state's ability to define
property rights does not enable it to undertake a wholesale revision of such
rights.
58 0
The differences between Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens about the
role of governmental action hark back to the differences between Justice
Holmes and Justice Brandeis in Pennsylvania Coal. Conceptually, those
who champion the Holmesian view that a regulation could be tantamount
to a taking, focus on the practical impact of regulation on a private party.
Regulation might be akin to appropriation if active use of property is cen-
tral to private rights.58s For instance, Justice Holmes declared: "What
makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with profit
To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly
the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying
it."s s 2 A more recent Holmesian, Justice Scalia, pedantically asserted in
Lucas that the line between mitigating harm and putting property to public
purpose is sometimes blurry. Private property may be pressed into public
use in the guise of preventing harm; refusing to allow wetlands to be filled
may be for flood plain retention to mitigate flooding harm or for the pur-
pose of creating a wildlife refuge.58 3 Justice Brandeis,584 and his current
578. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035. Similar sentiments about state power appear in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439 (1982).
579. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2468 (Scalia, J., concurring).
580. Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 165 (1998). See Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980) ("a State, by ipse dixit, may not
transform private property into public property without compensation.") Webb, like Phil-
lips, dealt with a state attempting to make public use of interest on specific accounts and
noted the old rule that interest follows the principle. See Sevens v. City of Cannon Beach,
510 U.S. 1207 (1994). Justices Scalia and O'Connor dissented from the denial of certiorari,
declaring, "No more by judicial decree than by legislative fiat may a State transform private
property into public property without compensation." Id. at 1334.
581. Justice Scalia explains it in Lucas: "Perhaps it is simply, as Justice Brennan sug-
gested, that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the
equivalent of a physical appropriation. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450
U.S. at 652 (Brennan, J., dissenting)." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.
582. 260 U.S. at 414. A taking was found pursuant to the Holmes-authored majority
opinion in Penn. Coal. The Kohler Act at issue required coal to be left under houses and
streets when owned by a party other than the coal company. Justice Holmes characterized
this as benefitting private owners of houses. Public streets were also protected, but
Holmes felt cities should have bought more than the surface originally or, if a sufficient
problem existed for a city, it should use eminent domain and buy the coal. Id.
583. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
584. Justice Brandeis in his dissent envisioned an entire city falling into a gaping hole,
and there were such widespread problems. He believed the statute was thus close to pre-
venting noxious use, and made an analogy to mining releasing noxious gases, which might
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adherents such as Justice Stevens in his Keystone opinion, conversely
would concentrate on the public's right to protect itself.5 85
These justices have divergent outlooks on both the motives and po-
tential for chicanery on the part of legislators and agencies, that is, the
administrative state at the state or federal level. These differences can ex-
plain the divergent roles Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia assign to ex-
pectations. Justice Stevens credits legislatures and administrators with
concern for preventing harm:
Arresting the development of the common law is not only a departure from
our prior decisions; it is also profoundly unwise. The human condition is
one of constant learning and evolution-both moral and practical. Legis-
latures implement that new learning; in doing so they must often revise
5836the definition of property and the rights of property owners.
To Justice Steven's, once a non-discriminatory rule is established, parties
should conform their behavior and attitudes to the community-enhancing
norm, incorporating it into their expectations. Justice Scalia, on the other
hand, has a greater respect for the risk-taker who demands that a more
static view of property be recognized. In essence, he believes it "reason-
able" to doubt the wisdom of legislatures if they are changing developmen-
tal rights more than in a minor way.8 7 He therefore lauds the speculator
who purchases seemingly burdened property and fights to clear it of "un-
585. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492. In Keystone, which found no taking, Justice Stevens and
the majority found the purpose of an act very reminiscent of the Kohler Act to clearly have
a strong public purpose, tied to maintaining the health, environment and fiscal integrity of
the area. Justice Stevens noted the Subsidence Act had no exception to the prohibition
against mining if the coal company also owned the surface and concluded that "the Com-
monwealth is acting to protect the public interest in health, the environment, and the fiscal
integrity of the area. That private individuals erred in taking a risk cannot estop the
Commonwealth from exercising its police power to abate activity akin to a public nui-
sance." I&. at 492. The conclusion echoed Justice Brandeis, not Justice Holmes.
To Justice Stevens, the purpose related to preventing a public nuisance, but he used
average reciprocity language to justify upholding the law. Id. at 493 ("While each of us is
burdened somewhat by such restrictions [on our use of property], we, in turn, benefit
greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others."). This rationale for upholding a law
has a strong pedigree. Even Justice Holmes acknowledged that, at least in some situa-
tions, "average reciprocity of advantage" from regulation could nullify a taking argument.
In Penn. Coal Co., he approved of the holding in Plymouth Coal Co. v. Penn., 232 U.S. 531
(1914), which upheld a statute that required a pillar of coal to be left at boundaries of ad-
joining property. The coal pillar protected workers in both mines from water, which cre-
ates an "average reciprocity of advantage." This is important when government restricts
the use of property to benefit property of another. With a small group of similarly situated
coal mining companies involved, leaving coal in place helps a neighboring miner but the
neighbor would also leave coal in place. This rationale is also part of the justification of
zoning. The value of the total land area will go up if discordant uses are separated, even if
there Is some limitation of use on individual lots.
586. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1038 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
587. He does pay at least lip service to the mantra that "the finctional basis for permitting
the government, by regulation, to affect property values without compensation" resides in
the holding of Holmes in Penn. Coal that "Government hardly could go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law." Id. at 1018 (citing Penn. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413).
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constitutional" restrictions. 588
Justice Scalia also joins the majority in Palazzolo and finds that the
case is ripe for adjudication. Justice Kennedy's opinion discounted the
possibility that further development on the non-wetlands portion of the
property could be relevant, holding that there had already been a "finding"
on the upper limits of development. 589 Although expressly stating he was
not deciding whether the uplands and wetlands were two different tracts
because the question was not presented below, 590 the rush to ripeness
might reflect the belief that the relevant property is not the total tract, but
only the wetlands; it therefore would be less important to know how much
development on the uplands could satisfy Mr. Palazzolo's reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations.
A more limited, or segmented, view of property affected by a regula-
tion resembles Justice Holmes' view that the regulated property in Penn-
sylvania Coal was the individual tons of coal left behind59 1 or the support
estate.592 A broader view reveals itself in Justice Brandeis' statement: 'The
rights of an owner as against the public are not increased by dividing the
interests in his property into surface and subsoil. The sum of the rights in
parts can not be greater than the rights in the whole."593 Similar distinc-
tions were made between the majority and dissent in the Keystone case,
with Justice Stevens taking the expansive view,594 and Chief Justice
Rehnquist taking the more segmented position.
595
The definition of the "property" impacted is important post-Lucas,
which did not resolve this issue, as its footnote 7 reveals.5 96 The definition
question contains at least two subparts. One is whether the relevant
"property" is the totality of property rights or one particular "strand," such
as the right to mine or to sell. The question is how much of a tract is im-
588. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2467 (Scalia, J., concurring).
589. Id. at 2460.
590. Id. at 2465.
591. Penn. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413-15.
592. Id. at 416. At common law, the owner of the surface had a common law right to
force the mineral owner to avoid subsidence as a result of mining. This could be rear-
ranged by contract. In Pennsylvania, a "support estate" may be owned separately from ei-
ther the mineral or surface estates. In the particular case, the coal estate had the "support
estate," which meant it could mine without liability for causing subsidence.
593. Id. at 419, (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
594. Of the twenty-seven million tons of coal required to remain in place for thirteen
mines from 1966-72 out of 1.46 billion tons in the mine, Justice Stevens noted that less
than two percent was required to be left in place; therefore the tons were not separate
property interest and, even without the regulation, only seventy-five percent of coal was
mineable. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 489. Additionally the support estate needed a context; it
was a part of the value of either the surface or the coal estate because, as a practical mat-
ter, it was always owned by one of the two. It was not an individual piece of property. Id.
at 487.
595. As Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, the regulation "does not merely inhibit one strand
in bundle, but instead destroys completely any interest in a segment of property." Id- at
517-18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
596. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 n. 7.
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pacted. 597 Justice Stevens in Keystone said: "The hill is made especially
steep because Petitioners have not claimed... that the Act makes it com-
mercially impracticable for them to continue mining their bituminous coal
interest in western Pennsylvania. Indeed, petitioners have not even
pointed to a single mine that can no longer be mined at a profit."598 Al-
though looking at the rights impacted to be mining coal, this hints that a
court could aggregate property interests in determining whether a taking
has occurred, a thought which would send a shudder through Justice
Scalia.5 99 This second issue is to determine how much of a physical tract
of land should be considered as the "property" affected by the regulation.
The dissent in Palazzolo, however, appears much more eager than the
majority to consider the answer to the "property" question to be the tract as
a whole, at least in regard to the land still owned by Mr. Palazzolo, rather
than the wetlands acres themselves.6° This suggestion comes from their
insistence that what the impact of the regulation cannot be known until
development of the uplands is adjudicated. This ripeness decision is not a
perfect barometer of how the justices would vote if the "denominator" ques-
tion was distinctly before them, but may reflect parallel concerns.6 ° 1 One
logical way to approach the problem is to look to see what had been the
602functional unit for planning and potential revenue stream.
When the major issues in the Palazzolo opinions are identified, there-
fore, the opinions follow familiar debate lines. Nevertheless, the Justices
tend to reflect back these arguments through their own lenses; the debate
597. On segmentation generally, see Patty Gerstenblith, Protection of Cultural Heritage
Found on Private Land: The Paradigm of the Miami Circle and Regulatory Takings Doctrine
After Lucas, 13 St. Thomas L. Rev. 65, 83-93 (2000).
598. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496.
599. Cf Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 n. 7 ("For an extreme-and, we think, insupportable-
view of the relevant calculus, see Penn. Central Transp. Co., 366 N.E.2d 1271 (1977), affd,
438 U.S. 104 (1978), where the state court examined the diminution in a particular par-
cel's value produced by a municipal ordinance in light of total value of the taking claim-
ant's other holdings in the vicinity.").
600. As a shareholder, he benefitted from SGI's sale of property earlier. However, to con-
sider this would be inconsistent with judging his expectations as an individual as dating
from the time the corporation lost its charter.
601. The issue has been directly in front of courts other than the Supreme Court. These
courts have split. Some consider the property regulated to be an entire tract. See e.g.
Brace v. U.S., 48 Fed. Cl. 272, 280 (2000) (thirty acres could not be drained; court unable
to determine if a taking occurred without knowing how much land he owned); Forest Prop-
erties, Inc., 39 Fed. Cl. 56 (1997), affd, 177 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert denied
sub nom., RCK Properties, Inc. v. U.S., 528 U.S. 951 (1999) (dredge and fill permit); Tabb
Lakes, Ltd., v. U.S., 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Ciampitti v. U.S., 22 CI.Ct. 310, 319
(1991), Deltona Corp. v. U.S., 657 F.2d 1184, 1192-93 (Ct.Cl. 1981); Jentgen v. U.S., 657
F.2d 1210, 1213-14 (Ct.Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1017 (1982).
Others segment and look at the wetlands regulated as the affected property. See e.g.
Loveladies Harbor v. U.S., 21 Cl.Ct. 153 (1990), affd, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(permit denied development of twelve and a half acres; original tract was 250 acres and
only 57.4 still owned); Fla. Rock Indus. v. U.S., 18 F.3d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
602. District Intown Properties Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 880
(D.C. Cir. 1999), cert denied, 121 S. Ct. 34 (2000) (Tract was one parcel because lots were
.spatially and functionally contiguous").
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is not static and nuances may result in different syntheses or approaches
to problems.6 0 3 Expectation analysis is one area that might emerge. 6°4
2. Some Musings on Expectations
The mythology of land creates one of the difficulties in properly ap-
praising when new legislation or rules influence either reasonable invest-
ment backed expectations or background principles of law. Identifying ex-
pectations and general background principles of law are different exercises,
albeit related. Background principles of law foreclose viewing even a total
deprivation of value as a taking. In theory, these principles would be of
generalized import. Although an individual might not have specific notice
of them, the principles generally permeate societal values. Reasonable ex-
pectations in regard to property may depend more on the claimant's indi-
vidual history with the particular tract of land. However, the adjective
"reasonable" requires incorporating some objective standards. If a regula-
tion or statute is a general principle of law, it should color a person's rea-
sonable expectations. In theory, however, a regulation or statute may in-
fluence reasonable expectations about types of property before it is a
general principle of law.6 °5 To understand how this would influence the
takings analysis requires a examination of how or why investments in land
should be treated differently than other investments.
Supreme Court cases examining expectations readily take the state of
regulation into account if the property affected is not land. For example, in
Rucklehaus v. Monsanto Company,6  the highly regulated nature of the
603. See David A. Westbrook, Administrative Takings: A Realist Perspective on the Practice
and Theory of Regulatory Takings Cases, 74 Notre Dame. L. Rev. 717, 721 (1999) (arguing
that synthesis in the takings arena is perhaps impossible because of the fact-dependent
nature of the inquiry).
604. But see Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Councir A Tangled Web
of Expectations, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1368, 1371 (1993) (expectations analysis is circular, gov-
ernment should attempt to maximize social welfare and regulate so that we can make one
person better off and leave no one worse oft).
605. Some of the Judges on the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals have engaged in a lively
debate about whether any inquiry into reasonable expectations is needed when a total tak-
ing is involved. Compare Judge Plager: "In light of the Court's [in Lucas] repeated juxtapo-
sition of physical takings with 'categorical' regulatory takings, and the Court's repeated
unqualified statements that the latter deserve the same compensation without more, we
can only conclude that the Court's purpose was to convey that principle that, when there
is a physical taking of land, or a regulatory taking that constitutes a total wipeout, invest-
ment-backed expectations play no role." Palm Beach Isles Associates v. U.S., 208 F.3d
1374, on rehearing, 231 F.3d 1354, 1362-63 (Fed.Cir. 2000), with Judge Gajarsa: "Invest-
ment-backed expectations must be considered in all regulatory takings cases, even in
those rare situations where the government has deprived a landowner of all economically
beneficial use." Palm Beach Isles Assoc. v. U.S., 231 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed.Cir. 2000) (Ga-
jarsa J. dissenting from denial of en banc hearing). Judge Gajarsa find the following
statement of the law to be correct: "[A] Lucas- type taking, therefore, is categorical only in
the sense that the courts do not balance the importance of the public interest advanced by
the regulation against the regulation's impact on private property rights." Id. at 1368
(quoting Good v. U.S., 189 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1053
(2000)). This author would apply expectation analysis to both types of takings.
606. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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pesticide industry militated against a taking on expectation grounds. If a
company submitted trade data to the EPA for the purpose of getting pesti-
cide registration knowing of a regulation providing for some disclosure of
the data, the company's voluntary submission of the data prevents the dis-
closure from being a taking of a property right in the data.6 °7 A person's
ability to sell an eagle feather, which is personal property, may be curtailed
without "taking the property. 60  Justice Scalia in Lucas seems to imply
that personal property rules are different than those applying to land.
60 9
However, even if real property is involved, the highly regulated nature of an
industry would allow for some intrusions, such as warrantless administra-
tive searches.
610
Land, and a "right" to develop land,6 ' however, has often been viewed
as different from personal property ownership. For land-starved immi-
grants to the United States, the immutable nature of land and freedom
from landlords represented an ultimate goal. Many a child was told to own
and invest in land, because land was always of value and no additional
land could be created. An investment an land, therefore, was seen as
somehow different from any other investment. Land ownership, however,
has never created an inviolate fiefdom.
Land use has always been subject to dual masters: the individual and
the public.612 Even in Colonial times, land was regulated, often requiring
607. Id. at 1006-07. See Concrete Pipe and Prod. of Ca., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension
Trust for S. Ca., 508 U.S. 602, 645-46 (1993) (pension plans had long been subject to fed-
eral regulation so the plaintiff "could have had no reasonable expectation that it would not
be faced with liability"). Granting this role to regulations is not a universally held belief.
For example, Judge Hodges refuses to categorically find takings impossible in a highly
regulated industry unless the government regulation had initially created the right; takings
in other heavily regulated industries would simply be more difficult to pursue. Maritrans,
Inc, v. U.S., 40 Fed. Cl. 790, 794-97 (1998), after rehearing, 43 Fed. Cl. 86 (1999) (tank
owner's expectation that the United States would not institute a double-hull requirement
was reasonable, but at present only suffered a diminution of value and the taking claim
was untimely).
608. Andrus v. AUard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). There is a dispute about whether a later
case overruled Andrus v. Alard. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (finding a taking
when descent and devise of land was totally abolished, Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and
Marshall opined that it did not. Id. at 718. Justices Scalia and Powell said Hodel over-
ruled Allard. Id. at 719-20. Moreover, there is an additional intimation that the
Allard holding may not stand. Four Justices employed a taking analysis to void a retroac-
tive regulation that "took" an unspecified bundle of money by imposing retroactive liability.
E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (plurality opinion).
609. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
610. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
611. See Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982) (detailing reluctance in nineteenth and
early part of the twentieth century to protect a landowner's access to sunlight as being
based on three policy considerations; two were general: an interest in not impeding land
development and a belief that a person could do whatever one liked on private property so
long as not causing an injury to another).
612. These are the Madison/Lockean concept of land promoting individuality and the Jef-
fersonean/Roussauuean concept, which imbues property with a social purpose, creating
citizens. See Mansfield, Private Meets Public supra n. 560, at 205-08. Another dichotomy
posited is that between the "transformative economy" and the "economy of nature." See
Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1433, 1442-46 (1993) ("In the former, land is
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specific uses of property owned in fee; the law regulated both what could or
could not take place on property.6 13 Modem cases have begun to recognize
that developmental expectations must take into account existent regula-
tory objectives. For example, a land developer in Washington had to be
cognizant of increasing regulations to protect historic landmarks over a
sixty year period. These regulations, which were after the land was ac-
quired, but before development permission was sought, could eliminate a
land owner's reasonable expectations to develop as requested. 14  If the
regulations pre-dated the land acquisition, there have been several other
615
examples of court's denying taking claims. One judge, although reject-
ing the analysis in the particular case, explained the rationale for such a
denial:
In legal terms, the owner who bought with knowledge of the restraint
could be said to have no reliance interest, or to have assumed the risk of
any economic loss. In economic terms, it could be said that the market
had already discounted for the restraint, so that a purchaser could not
show a loss in his investment attributable to it.
6 16
Even more important than reliance interests or discounted prices, a land-
owner must view regulation - either before or after land acquisition, but
considered as a distinct entity that can be made into a human artifact. The second view,
however, is that land is systems, defined by their function, not by man-made bounda-
ries.").
613. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modem Takings Doc-
trine, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1252, 1281 (1996) ("The first century and a half of private land
ownership in America reveals no sign of the later-imagined rights of landowners to be let
alone as long as they do not harm others. In the minds of colonial legislators, the bundle
of rights received by patentees and passed on to their successors did not include a right to
use the land for everything short of nuisance. Instead, the landowner's right to control and
utilize land remained subject to an obligation to further important community objectives.").
See Lazarus, supra n. 559, at 1122 (Original intent constitutional analysis actually favors
those supporting regulations because there is little historical evidence that the framers
considered a regulatory action to be a trigger of the Fifth Amendment protection).
614. DisL Intown Prop. Ltd. Partn., 198 F.3d at 883-84 ("[A] buyer's reasonable expecta-
tions must be put in the context of the underlying regulatory regime... Businesses that
operate in an industry with a history of regulation have no reasonable expectation that
regulation will not be strengthened to achieve established legislative ends). The court here
did not do a separate "background principles of law" analysis, but folded the same into its
discussion of expectations. Judge Williams concurred in the judgment; he noted, however,
that under economic analysis, wasteful regulation could be promoted if the government
can make costs external to the government if it treats land as a "free" good. Id. at 884-90
(Williams, J., concurring).
615. Good v. U.S., 189 F.3d 1355, 1360-62 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1053
(2000) (regulatory regime of endangered species act foreclosed expectations even if particu-
lar species not listed at land acquisition); Brace v. U.S., 48 Fed. Cl. 272, 284 (2000) (plain-
tiff knew of wetland character of land when bought land in 1975; even if the specific wet-
land regulations were not in place, he was generally aware of CWA); Creppel v. U.S., 41
F.3d 627, 634 (Fed Cir. 1994) (test "limits recovery to owners who can demonstrate that
they bought their property in reliance on the non-existence of the challenged regulation");
Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1230 (9th Cir. 1998) (reasonable expectations
missing in regard to building home when homes were only allowed in special situations
when they acquired their property in a Forest Use Zone). See state cases collected in Ger-
stenblith, supra n. 597, at 82 n. 110 (2000). But see Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. U.S., 28
F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
616. Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 28 F.3d 1171.
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especially before - as part of the speculative aspect of land investment.
Ownership of land is an investment, and all investments are specula-
tive. Neither Mr. Palazzolo nor his predecessor in title, SGI, developed the
property since they acquired it. Similarly, the lot Mr. Lucas bought never
had been built on, but the lot was sold several times for seemingly ever-
increasing prices:
The properties were sold frequently at rapidly escalating prices before Lu-
cas purchased them. Lot 22 was first sold in 1979 for $96,660, sold in
1984 for $187,500, then in 1985 for $260,000, and, finally, to Lucas in
1986 for $475,000. He estimated its worth in 1991 at $650,000. Lot 24
had a similar past. The record does not indicate who purchased the prop-
erties prior to Lucas, or why none of the purchasers held on to the lots
and built on them.
6 17
Mr. Lucas, obviously, thought the land would continue to appreciate in
value. However, so did the buyers of Enron stock in 2000, tulip bulbs in
1636, and Beanie Babies in 1999. No investment is guaranteed to be suc-
cessful.
Nevertheless, one characteristic of the type of land that is sometimes
viewed as a "safe" investment is obvious in the lands involved in both Lu-
cas and Palazzolo; the lands were near shores. Land that is desirable from
a lifestyle or investment perspective is often near beaches or forests, lakes,
mountains or parks. These lands are of limited supply, even more so than
land generally. But the same characteristics that attract land buyers also
emphasize the importance of the lands both ecologically and for recreation
and aesthetics.6 18 In other words, the public values regulation forwards
also cluster on these lands. Two sets of expectations exist. The public re-
lies upon retaining these public values, which may directly provide ecologi-
cal services, 6 1 9 and the landowner expects profit from either development
or resale.620 Justice Brennan commented on this in his dissent in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commjsjn:621
It is therefore [sometimes] private landowners who threaten the disruption
of settled public expectations. Where a private landowner has had a rea-
sonable expectation that his or her property will be used for exclusively
private purposes, the disruption of this expectation dictates that the gov-
ernment pay if it wishes the property to be used for a public purpose. In
617. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1039 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
618. See Richard J. Lazarus, Litigating Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency in the
United States Supreme Court, 12 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 179, 192 (1997) ("The collision
between private expectations and environmental protection is further exacerbated at the
border between land and water because land values there are high.").
619. See for instance, the values wetlands provide. Richard C. Ausness, Regulatory Tak-
ings and Wetland Protection in the Post-Lucas Era, 30 Land & Water L. Rev. 349, 354-57
(1995).
620. Some of this profit may be in the form of individual pleasure from residing on the
land before resale. That is, even if resale is not the immediate plan, there is still "profit,"
even if not monetary.
621. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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this case, however, the State has sought to protect public expectations of
access from disruption by private land use. The State's exercise of its po-
lice power for this purpose deserves no less deference than any other
measure designed to further the welfare of state citizens.
622
At some point, the balance may tip to the expectations of the public.
If one requires the landowner's expectations to be reasonable, the
landowner must be part of the modem world. This is a world that recog-
nizes the interrelationships of land and other elements of an ecosystem.
Therefore, regulation and the possibility of regulation to prevent harm to
623public values must be within these expectations. Only if a new regula-
tion or application of a regulation is not evolutionary, but totally novel,
should landowners be able to escape the fact that their expectations, to be
reasonable, had to factor in the regulation or statute.62 4
Investment-backed expectations are not, of course, the only aspect of
a takings analysis. Also of import are the nature of the governmental in-
terest forwarded and the financial impact on the private property owner.
What is reasonable, however, may reflect where on the continuum the
other factors lie. In other words, when the public purpose forwarded is
625
stronger, the reasonable landowner would expect more limitations. The
lesser the financial impact, the more the landowner would expect to have
to accommodate the public need. In this regard, distinctions would emerge
based on whether or not the regulation had curtailed an existing use or
stopped an activity after the private party had initiated other individualized
activity indicating a strong expectation of imminent development before the
regulatory action. If neither situation was present, the landowner's expec-
626tations would be weaker. Rarely would a landowner expect land to be-
622. Id. at 848 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing against the need for an exact match be-
tween harm and remedy in the land exaction setting). See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 411 (1994) (Stevens, J. dissenting: "In our changing world one thing is certain: uncer-
tainty will characterize predictions about the impact of new urban developments on the
risks of floods, earthquakes, traffic congestion, or environmental harms. When there is
doubt concerning the magnitude of those impacts, the public interest in averting them
must outweigh th private interest of the commercial entrepreneur.").
623. Westbrook, supra n. 603, at 754 (arguing government is now expected to do certain
things, such as prevent externalities, prohibit nuisances and protect cultural history and
banking; "[tihe expectations of government action may preclude the formation of the pub-
licly settled expectations of stable relations that constitute property rights.").
624. It also would be unreasonable to factor in a law that is targeting individual property,
rather than a general, wide-ranging problem. If a law, however, is of general applicability,
it represents at least what a majority of representatives find to be "reasonable" about land
use, subject to the caveats about the limitations of the legislative process.
625. Cf Mansfield, On the Cusp, supra n. 560, at 96-97 (positing the evolutionary growth
of a "collective-protection servitude" to counter a regulatory taking challenge).
626. Cf Mansfield, Regulatory Takings, supra n. 560, at 465-68 (arguing for a "strong ex-
pectation test" to determine valid existing rights under the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act); Lazarus, supra n. 597, at 1136 (predicting that Justice Kennedy may
require economic deprivation be of actual rather than theoretical use and the actual use
must be clearly lawful at the time property owner gets the expectations); Sibson v. State,
336 A.2d 239, 243 (N.H. 1975) (-The board has not denied plaintiffs current uses of their
marsh but prevented a major change inn the marsh that plaintiffs seek to make for specu-
lative profit."); Carter v. S.C. Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327, 329 (S.C. 1984) (quoting Just
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627
come valueless. Nevertheless, at some point a regulation or law may be-
come such a part of the fabric of society that it does become a general
principle of property law;, to violate the same would be unreasonable, or
even a taking of the public's rights.628 This is especially true in the case of
long-term private non-development and long existing public environmental
concerns.
In essence, a reasonable party must factor in the possibility that land
values can go down, as well as up. As one court phrased it:
A speculative market may exist in land that is regulated as well as in land
that is not, and the precise content of regulations at any given time may
not be particularly important to those active in the market. As his Court
observed in Florida Rock 1H [791 F.2d 893 (Fed Cir. 1986) cert. denied 479
U.S. 1053 (1987)] at 902-3, yesterday's Everglades swamp to be drained as
a mosquito haven is today's wetland to be preserved for wildlife and aqui-
fer recharge; who knows what tomorrow's view of public policy will bring,
or how the market will respond to it.
6 2 9
A speculator need not always win, or may have to be in the game for
the long haul, and wait for regulation to change. As even Justice Scalia
has acknowledged, "business in the sense of the activity of doing business,
or the activity of making a profit is not property in the ordinary sense."
630
It is an anachronism to believe that development interests in land have a
super-hallowed position unlike all other investments.
VI. CONCLUSION
The various members of the Supreme Court replayed some of their
well-known themes in the triad of cases Solid Waste, American Trucking,
and Palazzolo. None of the cases made profound changes in the constitu-
tional doctrines they considered. However, the cumulative affect of their
rulings shows the continued hostility some justices harbor toward the fed-
v Marinette Co., 201 N.W. 2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972) ("While unquestionably respondents
wetland would have greater value to him if it were filled, an owner of land has no absolute
and unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his land so as to use if for
a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of
others."); Graham v. Estuary Prop., Inc., 399 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied sub norn,
Taylor v. Graham, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981) (Destruction of the mangroves and creation of in-
terceptor waterway would pollute the surrounding waters; action in denying permit is to
prevent harm).
627. The Rhode Island court found that Mr. Palazzolo could gain $157,500 from donating
the property Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 715.
628. Cf. Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998) (statutory effort to
immunize certain agricultural enterprises from liability for externality-generating activities
a "taking" of neighbors' land).
629. Fla. Rock Indus., Inc v. U.S., 18 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1109 (1995). On remand, Judge Smith found that the 73.1% diminution of value was
a taking. He noted that the claimant had what this article labeled "strong expectations;" it
had obtained all state and local permits to mine before passage of the 1977 wetland regula-
tions.
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eral administrative state.
Of the three cases, the Solid Waste case most greatly altered the regu-
latory scheme it reviewed. The case considered the Migratory Bird Rule,
under which the Corps of Engineers asserted jurisdiction over non-
navigable, non-interstate waters simply because they were or could be
habitat for migratory birds. Rather than finding the rule violated the
Commerce Clause, the Court found that the Clean Water Act did not in-
tend such an assertion of jurisdiction. This changed Clean Water Act ju-
risdiction from a grant that goes as far as Commerce Clause would allow to
one of more limited stretch. The route to this conclusion was through tor-
tured statutory interpretation, in which the textualist style of interpretation
drowned most "conventional wisdom" on the CWA as well as any deference
to the agency. Through it all came an echo of recent federalism concerns,
as Chief Justice Rehnquist again voiced objection to federal intrusion into
state-based land regulation.
The concern for land use also revealed itself in the takings case, Pa-
lazzolo. The majority opinion, with some quibbling on nuance, rejected a
per se rule which would make the existence of a regulation at the time of
land acquisition dispositive of a takings claim. If the Court had concluded
otherwise, it would have signaled much more support for state and federal
efforts toward environmental protection than ever before. Therefore, this
position, taken by almost all the justices, was not surprising. It was also
not startling that a familiar five of the justices remanded the case as ripe to
"get at" the substantive taking issues. They found the judgment ripe and
discounted the fact that the full developmental potential of the remainder
of the tract was not determined.63 1
The Clean Air Act case, American Trucking, was the only case that did
not fall into the now unsurprising five-four split.6 3 2 All the Justices de-
cided that the CAA provision at issue did not violate a prohibition against
delegating "legislative" power to the Executive. Many environmental and
other regulatory laws would have been vulnerable to attack had the Court
not found the delegation to contain a sufficient "intelligible principle,"
which was the prior standard to judge legality, or if the Court had changed
the standard itself. Nevertheless, the Court, through the expediency of
statutory interpretation, managed to negate one of the EPA's proposals.
Viewing the three cases together, it appears that champions of envi-
ronmental law pursuant to the dominant administrative state model do not
have five consistent allies on the Supreme Court. Interference with the
631. After considering Justice Stevens' partial concurrence, the alignment was the same
as in Solid Waste- on one side is Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalla,
Kennedy, and Thomas. The minority was comprised of Justice Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer.
632. In American Tucking, Justice Scalia wrote an opinion in which seven justices joined.
Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, but with a different
rationale. Justice Souter joined with him. Justice Thomas joined in Justice Scalia's opin-
ion and also wrote a special concurrence.
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model, however, will be by incremental means, not wholesale doctrinal up-
heaval. Delegation, Commerce Clause jurisdiction, and regulation without
compensation remain viable. The Court is not ready to discard these doc-
trines supporting the administrative state, but it has and probably will
continue to assert pressure to circumscribe their use.
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